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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Abstract  
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession 
of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so 
forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view 
confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal 
cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it 
to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what 
makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. 
And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines. Except in some 
interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human 
animals that we identify as persons. 
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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Meine Einstellung zu ihm ist eine Einstellung zur Seele. Ich habe nicht die Meinung, 
dass er eine Seele hat.  
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards thei soul. I am not of the opinion that 
he has a soul. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, p.152, tr. 
G.E.M.Anscombe) 
 
Love is conditioned by its object, but love also yields its object. (Gaita 1991: 122) 
 
 
1. Persons: humanism, speciesism, criterialism 
 
Any ethical outlook much like ours will take as central some primary moral 
constituency (PMC): some class of creatures who all alike, and all equally, share in 
the highest level of moral rights and privileges. Most philosophical ethicists use 
“person” to mean at least “member of the primary moral constituency” (whatever else 
they may also mean by “person”). In this paper, that is how I shall use the word too.ii  
 
So what makes any creature a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency? One view is what I shall call humanism:  
 
Humanism: Being human is sufficient for membership of the PMC. 
 
Humanism faces two very common objections. The first is that humanism is 
arbitrary discrimination, like racism, sexism, ageism; humanism, in Richard Ryder’s 
famous phrase, is speciesism. The second objection, which is really just the same idea 
taken a little deeper, says that humanism bases its demarcation of persons on a 
biological property which is morally insignificant. Membership of this or that 
species—just like membership of this or that race, gender, or age-group—is, we are 
told, a morally insignificant detail. It is not the kind of thing that we should expect 
any important moral distinction to be based on.  
 
In theory these objections could be put by anyone who rejected humanism. In 
practice they are usually put by proponents of another theory of personhood, which I 
shall call criterialism: 
 
Criterialism: Actual possession of the criterial properties is necessary and 
sufficient for membership of the PMC.iii 
 
 Here are four very well-known enunciations of criterialismiv: 
 
I propose to use “person”, in the sense of a rational and self-conscious being, 
to capture those elements of the popular sense of “human being” that are not 
covered by “member of the species Homo sapiens”. (Singer 1993: 87) 
 
 Persons are beings capable of valuing their own lives. (Harris 1985: 16-17) 
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An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of 
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such an entity. (Tooley 1972: 82) 
 
[The six key markers of personhood are] (1) sentience... (2) emotionality... (3) 
reason... (4) the capacity to communicate... (5) self-awareness... (6) moral 
agency. (Warren 1997: 83-84)v   
 
As here represented, the criterial view is an all-purposevi view about what 
personhood is, and why it matters, which is undeniably simple (as I shall argue, much 
too simple). Despite this simplicity, it is obvious, when criterialism is stated as baldly 
as it is in these four statements, that it has radical implications. Most noticeably, it 
implies a sharp contraction of the circle of intuitive moral concern. If rationality is a 
necessary condition of counting as a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency, then all children under a certain age will fail to count as persons. (This 
bullet is explicitly bitten by Tristan Engelhardt: “If being a person is to be [sic] a 
responsible agent, a bearer of rights and duties, children are not persons in a strict 
sense” (Engelhardt 1989: 120).) If self-consciousness is a necessary condition, then 
many mentally handicapped humans will fail to count as persons. If the capacity to 
communicate is a necessary condition, then Jean-Dominique Bauby, of The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly fame, would have failed to count as a person after his 
catastrophic stroke—had he not worked out how to signal with his eyelid.vii (Can 
whether Bauby is still a person after his stroke really depend on contingencies about 
whether he can still communicate?) If persons necessarily have “the concept of a self 
as a continuing subject”, and believe that they are such selves, then David Hume, 
Derek Parfit, and most Buddhists are not persons.viii If you cannot be a person unless 
you are capable of valuing your own life, then you cannot be both a person and a 
committed nihilist about value (i.e. someone who finds himself compelled to believe 
that no such thing as value exists). If persons have to possess “emotionality”, then Mr 
Spock in Star Trek is not a person, and neither, perhaps, are some extreme autistics.ix 
And so on. Criterialists can make personhood sound rather exclusive; it can seem as 
hard to qualify for personhood as it is to make membership of the Country Club. 
 
Of course, these problems are consequences of taking these “markers of 
personhood” as indicators of necessary conditions for personhood. A less extreme 
version of the criterial view might take each of the markers on some list, or some or 
other combination of the markers, as a sufficient condition of personhood: any 
creature that displays just one of these properties, or some large-enough variety of 
them, will count as a person. We might then want to argue about what counts as 
displaying a property, or possessing a capacity. Must I actually evince emotions to 
pass Warren’s emotionality test? How often, and how convincingly? Do I possess the 
capacity to communicate only when I have learned a language? Or just when I have 
learned to sign, or to get others to read my thoughts and feelings? Or do I have the 
capacity to communicate all along, just in virtue of being a member of a species that 
communicates, linguistically and in other ways?  
 
Here we touch on familiar and long-running debates about potentiality versus 
actuality in our assessments of personhood. It is commonplace for criterialists of 
Singer’s sort to point out that potential prime ministers obviously do not have the 
rights of actual prime ministers, so that “potential persons”x, or those with the 
 4 
potential for what Don Marquis famously called “a future like ours”xi , can hardly be 
treated as the same moral category as actual persons, or “us”. It is equally 
commonplace for the opponents of Singer-style criterialism to object that there must 
be something wrong with an emphasis on actual properties that makes it a live 
question whether one is a person while asleep or under general anaesthetic.  
 
Clearly there are problems about at least some of the suggestions listed above 
about what the criteria of personhood might actually be. But not all those suggestions 
are implausible, and it would be easy enough, in principle, to weed out or refine the 
implausible ones. True, it is striking how little criterialists feel they need to do this; in 
practice, criterialists often seem perfectly happy to stick with what, intuitively, seem 
implausibly over-demanding criteria for personhood.  
 
However, the plausibility or otherwise of the various suggested criteria is not 
my main concern here. Obviously enough, other criteria could be devised which did 
not have these consequences. The key difficulties for criterialism that I want to 
emphasise in this paper are three.  
 
The first, which I can state very quickly, is about the argumentative method 
underlying criterialism. To put it at its simplest, it looks as if criterialists typically 
adopt their preferred criterion of moral significance because they think it explains 
moral intuitions which we have anyway. The criterion is adopted, in other words, 
because it doesn’t have counter-intuitive consequences.xii But then, the same criterion 
is deployed, by the very same authors—Peter Singer and John Harris, for example—
precisely to produce counter-intuitive consequences, such as the moral acceptability 
of killing small babies or the mentally disabled. There is, I think, a serious question as 
to what can possibly be going on here. It is not entirely obvious why building a moral 
theory out of one intuition or set of intuitions that we certainly have, and then using 
this theory to attack other intuitions that we also certainly have, is anything more than 
arbitrary selectiveness. Perhaps this is a question that all system-building moral theory 
faces. 
 
 The second difficulty for criterialism, which I shall also mention only very 
briefly, is that criterialism can seem to imply a quite implausible picture of moral 
reasoning. Are we really to suppose that what we do when we come across any being 
we haven’t met before is first see whether it satisfies our criterion for personhood, and 
then, if it does, start treating it as a person? One is reminded of that well-known 
caricature the Cartesian Detective: we start with the hypothesis—the opinion, as 
Wittgenstein says in my epigraph—that the new being is a person, and feel justified in 
acting in line with that hypothesis, just insofar as the behavioural evidence confirms 
it. If criterialism is to be at all plausible, it cannot in this way be a general view about 
our typical real-time interaction with others. Such a picture might apply to some very 
exceptional cases, some of which we will discuss in section 4b. But in general, 
criterialism will have to be a view about the criterion of rightness for taking other 
creatures to be persons, not about our decision procedure for assuming that they are 
persons. For quite obviously, our normal interaction with others typically involves no 
such Cartesian-Detective rigmarole, and it takes a good deal of philosophical 
callousing of the soul not to find something absurd, and morally repugnant too, about 
the idea that it even could. But if in general criterialism only states the criterion of 
rightness, and not our decision procedure, for taking other creatures to be persons, 
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then it still faces a further objection, my third—which it is the main purpose of this 
paper to develop. 
  
This third objection to criterialism, on which I shall spend the rest of this 
paper, is connected to this second point. My claim is that the sort of properties that 
criterialists home in on are not criteria of personhood at all. Rather, they are 
dimensions of interpretation of beings that we already take to be persons.  
 
For my own part, I have always been aware of at least a vague sense of 
discomfort and unease here, the moment we start talking about these (or any other) 
properties as if they were criteria for personhood of the sort the criterialists have in 
mind. There is a hard-to-articulate feeling that, despite the considerable first-blush 
plausibility of criterialism, it leaves out something crucial; a feeling of the kind that is 
naturally expressed in ordinary conversation by a trailing-off “Yes, but…”. I suspect 
that my unease is not unrelated to the unease that Raimond Gaita is bringing out when 
he writes (Gaita 1991: 115) that it is 
 
naïve to think that the kinds of properties which interest philosophers when 
they ask what is a person, and which we often share to some degree with 
higher animals, play the kind of role in our treatment of one another which is 
assumed by those who argue that differences in treatment must be justified by 
relevantly different properties of those kinds. That philosophical perspective 
from which we are encouraged to reassess our sense of how we might 
justifiably treat animals distorts and indeed cheapens our understanding of 
human life. 
 
Gaita 1991 is a marvellous exploration of one philosopher’s attempt to make 
articulate that trailing-off “Yes, but…”. This essay offers another philosopher’s. My 
attempt is not necessarily the same as Gaita’s, but not necessarily in competition with 
it either.  
 
And it is perhaps worth saying before I begin that what I am trying to do here, 
what Gaita was trying to do, is hard: hard to articulate, hard to state clearly, hard to 
see in the round, hard to apply. Again and again criterialism wins out in philosophers’ 
discussions of personhood because, conversely, it is dead easy; it is such a simple and 
straightforward view of personhood. There are plenty of spurious analogies between 
science and ethics around, but at any rate we can trust this one: no more in the case of 
the nature of the person than in the case of particle physics does the fact that a view is 
simple in any way improve its chances of being true.  
 
 
2. The proleptic view of personhood 
 
Contrary to what criterialism seems to suggest, we do not look for sentience or 
rationality or self-awareness in a creature as a test to decide whether or not that 
creature counts as a person. It’s the other way round. Having once decided, on other 
grounds, that a creature is a person, we know that this makes it the kind of creature 
which is likely to display sentience, rationality, self-awareness and the rest of the 
personal properties. Hence we look for displays of these properties from the creature. 
That is to say, we treat it as a person in advance of any such displays.xiii  
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The biggest and clearest example of this is an activity that is absolutely central 
to human life: parenting. Parents are, of course, aware of the differences in rationality, 
linguistic capacity, self-representing ability, and so forth between young human 
beings at various ages and developmental stages. Nonetheless, a parent’s attitude 
towards her child is always, basically, what Wittgenstein famously calls “an attitude 
towards a soul”. She does not do what criterialism (especially if understood in 
decision-procedure terms) might seem to imply she should do: start out by treating her 
child as an inanimate object, like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber-plant, and grudgingly 
consent to adjust her attitude to it, one little step at a time, only as and when it proves 
itself more than inanimate by passing a succession of behavioural tests for at least 
having interests like a snail’s perhaps,xiv and then later on for the interests of some 
more advanced kind of animal such as a puppy, and eventually for full criterialist 
personhood.xv If parents did treat their children in this almost behaviouristic fashion, 
the parents would be callous monsters, and the children would be basket-cases. In a 
world where parents generally accepted this sort of criterial view, and applied it 
directly in their parenting practice, even the best-adjusted of us would be a wolf-child. 
 
Fortunately, however, parents are not criterialists, either in their decision 
procedure or in the criterion of rightness for ascriptions of personhood that they 
actually employ. Rather, a parent treats her child from the very beginning—and from 
before it is literally and actually true—as a creature that can reason, respond, reflect, 
feel, laugh, think about itself as a person, think about others as persons too, and do 
everything else that persons characteristically do. From the beginning her attitudes 
towards the child are not only “objective” (to use Strawson 1962: 67’s slightly 
unfortunate termxvi): they also include what he famously calls “participant reactive 
attitudes”, of just the same sort as she adopts towards anyone else.  
 
Of course, as Strawson impliesxvii, these participant reactive attitudes’ scope 
may be more restricted in the case of a very small baby. The point is that they are 
there; and that like the baby—often indeed in advance of the baby—they grow. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre notes in a recent discussion of the development of practical 
reasoning in the individual person (1999: 90), ethically and psychologically adequate 
parenthood centrally involves “a systematic refusal to treat the child in a way that is 
proportionate to its qualities and aptitudes” (that is, its actual and non-idealised 
qualities and aptitudes, the kind of qualities and aptitudes that interest the criterialist). 
 
The parent who says to her three day old baby, “What do you think? Should 
we give you some more milk now?”, or to her three year old toddler “How kind of 
you to share your toys with your sister when she’s sad!”, is not deluded about a 
neonate’s capacity for interpersonal practical reasoning, or a toddler’s capacity for 
calculatedly empathetic altruism. But she is not making a sentimental joke either. She 
is treating the baby or the toddler proleptically, in the light of the ideal of personhood. 
By years of treating her children as creatures who “have the personal properties”—in 
the sense that interests the criterialist—she makes it true that they are creatures who 
have the personal properties in just that sense.  
 
The child staggers across and plonks a book down on his sibling’s lap; the 
parent’s reaction is “How kind of you to let her share your book!” Is that, in fact, what 
the toddler was doing? The right answer to this question can be: “Yes it is—once the 
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parent has given this reaction.” The parent’s reaction is an interpretation of the child’s 
deed. Before the reaction, perhaps, there was no fact of the matter about what the little 
boy was doing: the child did not know himself what his action was. For all he knew 
about it, his action might as well have been simply a random sequence of bodily 
movements. But now that his mother offers her interpretation, the child, on his 
mother’s authority, learns to see himself a certain way. Because his mother frames his 
act as one with a certain meaning (as the giving of a gift), and because the child sees 
his mother as seeing his act this way, and because his mother sees the child as seeing 
her as seeing his act this way… (Grice 1957), the act comes to have that meaning.  
 
Paul Grice’s famous work on meaning and intention is even more relevant to 
another clear example of this sort of prolepsis, namely language-learning. A baby 
begins by babbling—that is, by producing all the sounds the human mouthparts can 
make. Some of these sounds get a response because they are sounds that occur in the 
parents’ language, while others don’t because they are not. (The inability of many 
English adults to pronounce the Scots ch in loch or the Welsh ll in Llanfair is a learnt 
inability, not mirrored in English babies, who can and do make both sounds until 
conditioned not to by English adults.) The baby “homes in” on the sounds, and then 
on the patterns or combinations of sounds, that get a response. Then it learns to 
correlate particular patterns of sounds with particular contexts by the same homing-in 
process. What the parents say is “She’s learned to say ‘tiger’” (my own first child’s 
first word). What has happened is that the parents, by treating their daughter as if she 
has the word for, and then the concept of, a tiger, have made it true that she has that 
word. (And, a little later perhaps, that concept too; though I am not suggesting that 
any one word or concept can be learned on its own: in Wittgenstein’s familiar image, 
“light dawns gradually over the whole” (On Certainty 141).) 
 
Stephen Darwall too talks of prolepsis when describing a third connected 
process, namely the process whereby we come to be, and to hold others, morally 
responsible (Darwall 2006: 87-88):  
 
There seem to be many cases where we wish to hold others accountable 
though we seem to have very good evidence that they are not free to act on 
moral reasons in the way our practices of holding someone fully responsible 
seem to presuppose… In some instances, for example with children, we seem 
simultaneously to move on two tracks in the process of inducting them into 
full second-person responsibility, sometimes treating them proleptically as 
though they were apt for second-personal address as a way of developing 
moral competence while nonetheless realising… that [at their developmental 
stage] this is an illusion. 
 
Or an illusion, at any rate, if you agree with the criterialist about what it takes 
to be “apt for second-personal address”, and/or about what it takes to “have the 
personal properties”. My point, with which Darwall might or might not agree—I’m 
not sure—is that what it takes does not have to be already-realised and –actualised 
capacities of the sorts that interest criterialists. (The mother who asks her neonate 
child “Shall I give you some milk?” is certainly engaging in second-person address, 
despite the manifold incapacities, perfectly well-known to her, of neonates.)  
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There is at least this much truth in Dennett 1987’s well-known idea of the 
“intentional stance”: persons constitute each other as persons, both as agents and as 
patients, by treating each other as persons, as agents and patients. Something like the 
Davidsonian “principle of charity” (Davidson 1980) is at work in our mutual 
interpretations. By charitably, and proleptically, interpreting the other as a person, I 
make him a person. 
 
The looseness and ambiguity of the term “person” is evident when we say 
things like this. In ordinary language, “person” can certainly, at one end of its 
semantic range, mean something like what Singer and other criterialists want it to 
mean, a “rational and self-conscious being” (or whatever). Yet at the other end of its 
semantic range, the ordinary-language term can also be a synonym for “human 
animal”. It seems to be part of the point of our person-concept to allow those young 
humans who are persons only in the “human animal” sense to enter into a continuum 
of meaning towards the far end of which they can become persons in much stronger 
senses. 
 
Many things in our shared life can be seen in this sort of way as aspirations 
towards an ideal which, like any ideal, is never fully realised. The basic sort of 
idealisation, the sort that grounds attributions of personhood, is not the only sort. We 
ascribe the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech to every human 
being, even though we know that small babies can’t speak and don’t assemble (not 
without help), and that acutely asocial loners may well never (or at least never again) 
actually exercise either right. The behaviour of parents, besides (as described) 
involving the person-constituting prolepsis in a particularly clear form, is also full of 
other similarly-patterned proleptic idealisations that might, on a criterialist’s view, be 
regarded as quite unrealistic. Parents give their children the opportunities to play the 
cello, to learn Spanish, to use their monthly allowances sensibly, to be polite to Great 
Aunt Maud (…), even though the parents may be fully aware that every one of these 
opportunities will in all probability be spurned. In minimally decent jurisdictions the 
treatment even of hardened criminals displays the same pattern of basic openness to 
the convict, however much of an unrealistic idealisation this openness may seem to 
involve: the jurisdiction goes on offering the criminals opportunities to reform, even 
though it is as good as certain that these opportunities will not be taken up. (I think 
that something like this refusal to “close the door” finally and irrevocably on the 
criminal is also, in connection perhaps with some thoughts about the state’s obligation 
to be fundamentally benevolent to the citizens for whose sake alone it after all exists, 
the ground of a good reason to reject capital punishment. But that’s another story.) 
 
In general, the idealisation that accords X the status due to a φer does not have 
to involve any kind of expectation that X will ever actually φ, or even can φ. What it 
does have to involve is the understanding that X is of a kind that characteristically 
includes φers. The human kind includes individuals who characteristically (at the 
right point in the human life-cycle) will freely assemble and speak. That is why it is 
not ridiculous to give the rights to free assembly, speech, and political action, e.g. 
becoming a senator, to any and every human, including asocial misanthropes, those 
(as yet, or as of recently) physically incapable of speech, and those who choose never 
to utter a word. Contrast the equine kind, which does not characteristically include 
any such individuals. That is why it is ridiculous to give these rights (or the status of a 
senator) to any horse.  
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Considered as a kind, children characteristically include individuals who learn 
the cello or Spanish or wise use of money or good manners to venerable relatives 
(well… eventually). That is why the parents who try to teach these lessons to their 
children are not acting absurdly even if they know in advance that this particular 
child is not going to respond—whereas parents who tried to teach these lessons to the 
family goldfish or the rubber plant would be acting absurdly. Similarly, there is 
nothing absurd about offering the old lag a place on the rehabilitation programme, 
even if it seems certain that this old lag will always refuse or abuse the offer: and the 
reason why not has to do with the general fact that some old lags do sometimes 
reform.  
 
A fortiori, there is nothing absurd about giving the rights of free speech, 
assembly, private choice and the rest of it to women, or to other races, or to 
homosexuals or transgender people, or to the disabled, or to gingers, or to the various 
other sorts of historically marginalised groups. People in these categories are not 
another kind, as horses and hamsters are. Their well-being is human well-being, just 
as white male heterosexuals’ is, and just as horses’ and hamsters’ well-being is not. 
That, in a nutshell, is why speciesism is not like racism or sexism. 
 
Clearly, then, this is not just a point about the induction of babies and very 
small children into the social life of humanity at large. All humans, even the healthy 
intelligent mature well-adjusted independent affluent adults that typical criterialism is 
so clearly focused on—the Country Club again—are always only incompletely and 
impurely agents. Incompletely, because we are never all agents can be. However well 
things go, we never do or even can reach the full potential of human well-being, 
which would include a fully worked-out articulation of our own agency, a full 
coordination and marshalling of our own forces and powers for action in the world: 
towards this we are always only, at best, on the way. And impurely, because each of 
us always can be interpreted, by a sufficiently determined sceptic, as not really an 
agent at all, but a victim of the instinctive or other determining external forces that 
constantly threaten anyone’s agency. To extend “an attitude towards a soul” towards 
anyone is always, and not just with children, an idealisation. As Tamar Schapiro notes 
within a Kantian framework (Schapiro 1999: 723): 
 
[T]here is a sense in which no one, regardless of age or maturity, is able to 
achieve autonomy on Kant’s view. This is because the notion of autonomy in 
Kant is an ideal concept which outstrips all possible realisations in experience. 
Strictly speaking, every instance of human willing is necessarily an imperfect 
realisation of transcendental freedom, and every virtuous character necessarily 
falls short of perfect virtue. And yet the applicability of the moral law depends 
on our mapping these ideal concepts onto ourselves and one another for the 
purposes of guiding action. So we are to regard the social world as a 
community of autonomous agents despite the fact that perfect realisations of 
autonomy are nowhere to be found. 
 
The criterialists are right to insist that properties like self-awareness, emotionality, 
rationality, and so forth are crucial parts of our concept of a person. It does not follow 
that these properties can be used as the criterialists want to use them: as tests for 
personhood. Even at the cool-hour level of the criterion of rightness—never mind the 
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real-time level of deliberative procedure—to treat someone as a person is not to put a 
tick in the box by her name, to show that she has passed some inspection or met some 
standard, of rationality or self-awareness or emotionality or whatever. Indeed, it 
seems no less arbitrary discrimination to say “Sorry, you’re not rational or self-aware 
or linguistically capable or emotionally responsive enough to count as a person” than 
to say “Sorry, you’re not white enough to count as a person”. Behavioural properties 
like rationality, self-awareness, emotionality are not tests for, but parts of the ideal of, 
personhood. To treat someone as a person is to engage with him as the kind of 
creature to which that ideal applies. So to treat him is not, at the deepest level, a 
response to his behaviour at all, but to his nature. To see some creature as a person is 
to take an attitude to that creature which, before any behavioural evidence comes in, is 
already different from our attitudes to creatures that (we think) aren’t persons. This is 
the second-person standpoint (to use the title of Darwall’s outstanding book): the 
attitude we take to persons, and do not take to sofas, fridges, or rubber plants.  
 
The fact that it takes charity, in more than one sense, to constitute persons 
imposes on persons a crucial sort of vulnerability and dependence: “The personal 
reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the 
manifestation of a certain degree of good will or regard on the part of other human 
beings towards ourselves” (Strawson 1962: 70). All human persons are, in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s splendidly apt phrase, “dependent rational animals”, as MacIntyre 
himself emphasises (MacIntyre 1999: 81-85): 
 
In most moral philosophy the starting point is one that already presupposes the 
existence of mature independent practical reasoners whose social relationships 
are the relationships of the adult world. Childhood, if noticed at all, is a topic 
that receives only brief and incidental attention… To become an effective 
independent practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which 
others have made an essential contribution. The earliest of these relate directly 
to our animal existence, to what we share in our development with members of 
other intelligent species… [But what] we [also] need from others, if we are not 
only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities 
of independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for 
fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical 
judgements… Acknowledgement of dependence is the key to independence.  
 
We are vulnerable to each other, and dependent on each other, because it is 
remarkably easy to attack persons by withdrawing the second-personal attitude from 
them. Part of the reason why it is so easy to stop seeing others as persons is, as I said 
before, because the interpersonal attitude always involves a degree of idealisation. 
There is always some truth in sceptical or cynical views that reject that idealisation. 
(For example, the human person is a physical object—even if it is not “merely” a 
physical object.) 
 
We fail to see others as persons in a small way when we explain away what 
others do, or refuse to listen to them or to take their wishes and ambitions seriously. 
(Parents are never perfect in charity; children’s protests against such treatment are a 
recurring theme of family life.) We do it in bigger ways when we “use” others, or (in 
Kant’s phrase) fail to treat them as “ends in themselves”. At the limit, we can 
withdraw the interpersonal attitude from others completely, by pretending that they 
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simply aren’t there, as British and Irish settlers did to the aboriginal Australians under 
their notorious legal doctrine of terra nullius (see Gaita 1998). Or we can do it by 
treating them merely as physical objects, as often happens in pornography, violence, 
and murder. Or, lastly, we can do it by declaring them “non-persons”, as the Nazis did 
to the Jews—and as criterialists routinely do to the very old, the very young, and the 
very disabled.  
 
 The personal properties, then, set the content of the ideal of personhood. They 
do not set the boundaries of the class of persons (the PMC, as I’ve also called it). 
What does set the boundaries? That is my question in section 3. My answer will be 
the humanist answer already advertised in section 1: roughly, the boundaries of the 
class of persons are the boundaries of the human species.  
 
 
3. The truth in speciesism 
 
Rubber plants, fridges, sofas, human babies: we come to the last of these four 
sorts of things with a very different attitude from our attitudes to the other three sorts. 
And my point is that we come to them with different attitudes. Our attitudes to them 
are not responses to evidence that we gather after we have “come to them”. The 
moment I meet a rubber plant or a fridge, I am perfectly sure, unless my sanity is in 
question, that it will not attempt to talk to me or tickle me—as, say, a baby might.  
 
What makes me so sure of that? Well, simply the sort of thing a rubber plant 
or a fridge is, and the kinds of behaviour that it is natural to expect from that sort of 
thing. Rubber plants and fridges are not the kind of thing that tries to talk to you or 
tickle you. Babies are. And if you ask “What kind of thing is that?”, the obvious 
answer is: “Young human beings”. If some creature is a human being, it is completely 
natural to expect it to be the kind of thing that might (at least if it’s a family member) 
try to talk to you, or tickle you, or otherwise demonstrate its (budding) mastery of the 
kinds of mental capacity that criterialists take to be criteria. (Talking to someone and 
tickling someone both require interesting interpersonal capabilities. To do either, you 
have to want things to be a certain way for someone else—roughly, you have to want 
to get them to think a thought, or to feel a tickle. These are wants with quite 
sophisticated contents.)  
 
This sort of expectation is based squarely on the nature of the creature in 
question. And that means, on its nature as a member of the human species. Our 
understanding of which creatures are persons, and so may be expected to exhibit the 
personal properties, is not formed on an individual basis but on the basis of 
generalisation from experience of humans in general. I have already mentioned 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “my attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul”; 
on the same page of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein also says that “the 
human body is the best picture of the human soul” (der menschliche Körper ist das 
beste Bild der menschlichen Seele). And perhaps what he means is this: that when we 
see that some creature is a human, just seeing that is enough to license us to adopt the 
interpersonal attitude to that creature.  
 
We know in advance how we can expect any particular rubber plant or fridge 
to behave, because we can draw on a bank of past experience (our own and others’) of 
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rubber plants and fridges. In this sense, the fact that a thing is a rubber plant or a 
fridge sets the scope of our expectations about it. In just the same way, we know what 
kinds of capacities and properties humans in general have. It is that background 
knowledge that we draw on, whenever we apply the interpersonal attitude to any 
individual human being, simply on the basis that it is a human being.  
 
We obviously do the same with other species of animals. When I meet a cat or 
a gerbil, I treat it neither as an inanimate object like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber 
plant, nor as a person. (Not, of course, that I treat all inanimate objects the same, 
either. Sofas, fridges, and rubber plants are very different things, especially rubber 
plants.) You can play games with a gerbil. With a dog or a cat, you can even have a 
cuddle (in the reciprocal sense, I mean).xviii Neither is possible with a fridge. On the 
other hand, you would be wrong to expect a dog to play a good hand of contract 
bridge, or a cat to give you good investment advice, or a gerbil to read your mind, as a 
human being might. What you expect of an individual dog or individual cat will be 
different from what you expect of an individual gerbil, and both will be different from 
your expectations of inanimate objects. In each case, your expectations will be set by 
your background knowledge of the different kinds in question. Where dogs, gerbils, 
cats, and indeed all other kinds of living thing are concerned, this obviously means the 
different species in question. Why should it be otherwise with humans? 
 
These remarks should enable us to see—pace the criterialists—how central it 
is, to our moral responses to the things and creatures around us, to assign them to 
species. It is species-assignments that enable us to answer what you might reasonably 
think is the most basic question of all about any thing that might be in front of us at 
any time: namely, what kind of thing it is. Until we know what species it is, we do not 
know how it may act, or how to treat it: what is good for it, how we might harm or 
hinder it, what counts as health for it, and so on. The nature of the creature determines 
what well-being is for it; and its nature is its species. To put it another way, the best 
way to answer “What is it?”, when this question is asked about any individual animal, 
is to give the name of its species. Or as we might ask moral individualists like 
McMahan: “If species-membership isn’t an intrinsic property, what is?” Singer, 
Rachels, and McMahan never tell us why being human cannot count as any creature’s 
“own particular characteristic”. It can’t be merely because being human is a group 
membership (as McMahan 2005 suggests). For there is nothing to stop a given 
property from being both a “group membership” and an “own particular 
characteristic”; that is how it is with being a vertebrate, for instance. To put it more 
formally, nothing stops a given property from being both a relational property, and 
also an intrinsic property.xix Indeed, if Kripke is right in his well-known thesis of the 
metaphysical necessity of origin, such properties must be very common. 
 
This shows how humanism can be true without falling prey to a charge of 
arbitrary speciesism. To treat any species of creatures as persons is to treat them, not 
as successful passers of some test for the personal qualities, but on the assumption 
that they are individuals of a species the ideal for which is (roughly) the highest 
attainable development of those qualities. In this sense, references to species are an 
ineliminable part of our talk about persons.  
 
In that sense, but not in some others. We are now in a position to respond to 
four familiar objections to “speciesism”. I consider these in section 4. The aim of my 
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response is not of course to defend speciesism, if that is defined as “arbitrary moral 
discrimination on the grounds of species”. But it is to defend humanism, the view that 
not all moral discrimination on the grounds of species is arbitrary. 
 
 
4. Four objections to speciesism  
 
a. All animals are equal. Peter Singer (1993: 57) writes that “No matter what 
the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering of any other being”. Nothing I have said so far commits 
me to rejecting this application of the principle of equality. If I were to accept it, I 
would want to add, first, that plenty of other things besides suffering “count”, and 
secondly, that however alike human and animal pain (the physical sensation) may be, 
human and animal suffering (the state of mind) are mostly quite unlike. A cat can be 
tortured like Gloucester, but it cannot suffer like King Lear.xx And suffering matters 
more than pain. 
 
But perhaps we should reject this application of equality anyway. Right now 
there is (quite likely) monstrous pain, and a fair amount of suffering too, on the plains 
of the Serengeti, where a wounded buffalo is being eaten alive by a pride of lions. 
Singer’s principle of equality requires us to say that our duty to prevent the buffalo’s 
pain and suffering in the teeth of the lions is directly proportional to the amount of 
pain and suffering involved. If any implication of any moral theory is absurd, this one 
is. There just isn’t any duty, not even a prima facie one, for us to act as Zoological 
Pain Police. (Don’t say: “We can’t intervene, because the lions might eat us”. Where 
is your moral courage? And don’t say: “But it causes less pain in nature overall if we 
don’t intervene in nature in this sort of way.” As many writers on the theological 
problem of evil are keen to remind us, most animal suffering is gratuitous. If lions can 
be caught and trained to jump through hoops, perhaps they can be caught and trained 
to kill their prey cleanly before eating it. So is anyone trying to train them? Of course 
they’re not.) The vast majority of the huge amount of animal pain and suffering that 
happens every day is simply none of our business. “It is not an accident or a limitation 
or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a 
condition of our existence and our sanity” (Williams 2006: 147).xxi  
 
So it looks like Singer’s principle that all suffering counts for the same, no 
matter what the species involved, is just false. On the other hand, some weaker 
principle of this general sort seems clearly true: perhaps “Animal suffering is bad for 
the same sort of reasons as human suffering is bad”, or something like that. What also 
seems clearly true is that humans should do what they can not to generate animal 
suffering, and to prevent animals from being needlessly hurt or damaged by humans 
(and sometimes, though less often, by accident or by each other). This is a much 
weaker principle than Singer’s equality-of-suffering principle. But perhaps even this 
is strong enough to generate a good argument for vegetarianism. I suspect it all 
depends what counts as needless hurt or harm. 
 
 Hence “the limit of sentience” is not “the only defensible boundary of 
concern for the interests of others” (Singer 1993: 58). Certainly that limit marks one 
distinction between the ways we should take an interest in the welfare of other 
creatures. For example, hacking a frog to pieces is wrong in a way that hacking an 
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orange to pieces is not, partly because an orange certainly cannot feel pain, and a frog 
pretty definitely can. But only partly. Quite aside from the pain involved, destroying a 
living creature for fun is wrong in a way that destroying a piece of fruit for fun is not. 
(Hacking trees, or anaesthetised frogs, to pieces for fun is usually wrong too.xxii) 
Unless we think that nothing matters except pain and pleasure—and this is not, e.g., 
Singer’s position either (Singer 1993: xi)—there is no reason to think that the 
distinction between sentience and non-sentience is the only fundamental moral 
distinction we can make among beings; nor that it is the most important.  
 
There are some interesting complications about the notion of sentience. If 
“sentience” means simply “capacity to feel (sensational) pain and pleasure”, then 
sentience does not fit the story that I have developed about how the personal 
properties come into being. The capacity to feel pain- and pleasure-sensations is 
certainly one of the capacities that we expect to find in any human person. But it is 
not, unlike rationality or intentionality, a capacity whose presence in any person is 
even partly constituted by others’ idealising assumption, expectation, or hope that it is 
there. Whether or not a being can feel pain does not depend on others’ adopting 
“participant attitudes” or taking the “intentional stance” towards him, in the way that 
(I have argued) his capacities for self-consciousness, rationality, and suffering do. I 
don’t think this shows that sentience is a counter-example to my thesis about how the 
person-constituting properties are developed. Rather, I think it shows that sentience is 
not one of the person-constituting properties. A creature which had the (other) person-
constituting properties, but lacked the capacity for pain- and pleasure-sensations, 
would still undeniably be a person.xxiii A creature which had the capacity for pain and 
pleasure, but lacked the (other) person-constituting properties, surely would not be. 
 
b. Aliens, talking chimps, Locke’s parrot, and a possessed fridge. The position that I 
am defending under the name of humanism says that, normally, to be a person it is 
sufficient to be a human being. Not necessary, because humanism does not imply that 
members of other species could not be drawn into the moral community of human 
persons. On the contrary, I can see at least three distinct ways in which this could 
happen. One is that we could discover a whole species—aliens, or angels, or what 
have you—which is like the human species in that its members are characteristically 
persons (in one sense or another). A second is that a species already known to us 
might, en masse, somehow change so as to become characteristically persons. Or, 
third, some particular individual creature—Locke’s parrot, say (Locke, Essay 2.27), 
or Washoe the chimp (Singer 1993: 111)xxiv, or some group of creatures, like Peter 
Carruthers’ Chimp Class of ’92xxv—might start to count as persons, perhaps e.g. by 
displaying the personal properties, even though this behaviour is otherwise 
completely untypical of the species in question. (Come to that, I suppose a possessed 
fridge might, in principle, start displaying the personal properties.)  
 
In these special cases, we perhaps will have to appeal to something like the 
criterial view of personhood as our decision procedure for the vexed cases. 
Apparently we will have to ask whether this alien species, or this new class of highly-
educated chimps, or this individual chimp, parrot, or spooky fridge, displays 
something like the criterialist’s personal properties, before we can decide whether to 
count these beings as persons.  
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Doesn’t this show that my arguments against criterialism were mistaken? Not 
at all. It does show that something like criterialism may perhaps be our decision 
procedure if and when we encounter a being that we do not already know how to 
classify as a person or not a person by way of its species. (Perhaps; actually I doubt 
even this much is true, but at any rate it is the most that is true.) However, it would be 
utterly misleading to generalise from thought-experiments about these special and rare 
cases—almost all of which, to date, are imaginary—to alleged conclusions about the 
normal cases. (It would be as misleading to do that as it would be generalise the 
justificatory/ rational structure of every belief we have about the external world from 
the justificatory/ rational structure of the external-world beliefs that we might form 
when we are thinking about the classic, and nearly always imaginary, sceptical 
predicaments.) Unfortunately, just this generalisation is a criterialist stock-in-trade. 
The most famous example of it is perhaps Mary Anne Warren’s derivation of the 
personal properties (her list was quoted in section 1) from an imagined meeting with 
aliens. But even if Warren is right that this is the decision procedure that we would 
have to adopt with aliens to settle whether they were persons in some extraordinary 
imaginary scenario, nothing at all follows about our beliefs (either at the decision-
procedure or at the criterion-of-rightness level) about whether any humans are persons 
in a multitude of ordinary real scenarios. For we have met humans before. 
 
But anyway, I suspect Warren’s description is much too black-and-white to 
get anywhere near characterising the decision procedure that would really be involved 
in such a meeting. (This is why I say, above, only that we would probably have to use 
something like the criterialist approach in alien encounters and similar.) For one thing, 
there is not the slightest reason to think that, in such a meeting, yes and no would be 
the only possible answers available to the question “Are these persons?”. Even Star 
Trek yields a rather subtler answer—“It’s life, Jim, but not as we know it”; the world, 
after all, is a complicated place, and it constantly throws us surprises. For another, our 
responses in such situations would be—or should I say will be?—based on all sorts of 
factors and reactions, most of them probably defying explicit articulation; on 
judgements about “forms of life”, in fact. It would not and could not be based on 
some neatly finite check-list of diagnostic properties like Warren’s. Looking beyond 
Star Trek, science fiction is full of wonderfully complex and subtle explorations of 
such encounters. The contrast with the mechanical simplicities of a criterialist list 
such as Warren suggests is instructive—and not entirely to be dismissed as unfair on 
the grounds that Warren is, after all, not writing science fiction. 
 
c. The two-species scenario. A third interesting objection to speciesism is 
offered by Peter Carruthers: 
 
Suppose it had been discovered that human beings in fact consist of two 
distinct species, otherwise hardly distinguishable from one another, the 
members of which cannot inter-breed. In these circumstances it would plainly 
be objectionable for the members of the majority species to attempt to 
withhold moral rights from the members of the minority, on the mere ground 
of difference of species. This, too, would be obvious speciesism. (Carruthers 
1992 Ch 3) 
 
Carruthers, I think, is quite right to claim that it would alter nothing morally 
speaking if we discovered that “the human species” was in fact two different 
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biological species—perhaps homo neanderthalis and homo sapiens—living together 
in a single moral community. (Modulo the point about not interbreeding, some 
anthropologists think that this has actually happened: Trinkaus and Shipman 1993.) 
Pace Carruthers, his argument does not show that that there is no species-
classification that bestows participation in the moral community on its members, and 
so that species-classifications are morally irrelevant. What his argument shows is that 
there may be more than one species-classification (or other kind-classification) that 
bestows participation in the primary moral constituency on its members. That is 
something that we should grant anyway given the possibility of other species whose 
members are characteristically persons; and it is not inconsistent with the claim that 
species-classifications are morally significant.xxvi 
 
d. Species and Darwinism. A fourth objection to my argument is the claim that 
species don’t exist: that as a matter of strict biology, there is no clear differentiation 
between humankind and “other species”, only a differentiation between different parts 
of the same evolutionary family tree. Species therefore are populations, not 
Aristotelian (or Kripkean) natural kinds (Sober 1994). True, but irrelevant to my 
argument, which can work equally well with the population conception of species, or 
indeed with any conception at all that will allow “humanity” to count as the name of a 
kind of some kind. At least for creatures like us, whose temporal experience runs only 
over decades, hardly ever over centuries even, let alone the millions of years that 
speciation takes, it should not be a controversial thought that a population of creatures 
sharing a common genetic heritage, physiology, and ethology can sensibly be treated 
as a unitary grouping, as in fact common sense treats it. And that thought is all I am 
committed to meaning by “species”. 
 
 So it looks like humanism can resist these four objections. And it looks like 
humanism can accept, indeed welcome, the thought that humans are not the only 
persons, the only members of the primary moral constituency—or at least, they might 
easily not be. What about the question on the other side: the question whether all 
human beings are persons? I turn to this question in the next and final section. 
 
 
5. Are all human beings persons?  
 
 Humanism as I have developed it here straightforwardly implies that all 
human beings are persons. Our treatment of any human being should be conditioned 
by the background of expectations, hopes, and aspirations that spell out what we 
know, from experience, humans in general can be. Eudaimonia in its broad outlines is 
the same for all human beings; and requires, as a general rule, that we must give all 
human beings the space to achieve eudaimonia—whether or not they predictably will 
achieve eudaimonia. To deny this space to any individual human being is to exclude 
that individual from the moral community of persons. And that is a serious 
injustice.xxvii 
 
The very young are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they have not yet achieved many key forms of human eudaimonia; the 
mentally handicapped are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they cannot ever achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. As I pointed 
out in section 1, all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever 
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does everything she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are 
just too many things she could do).  In one way or another, all of us are less than fully 
free to pursue happiness; everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, 
or just plain ill, in some respect. That does not make it wrong to treat “normal” 
humans, whatever their age or IQ, with an interpretive charity, and with a kind of pity, 
that sees beyond their limitations, and leaves the door open, in each individual’s case, 
to what any human might become—even if we are well aware that this person here 
has no chance of becoming that.  
 
[T]he kind of care that was needed to make us what we have in fact become, 
independent practical reasoners, had to be, if it was to be effective, 
unconditional care for the human being as such, whatever the outcome. And 
this is the kind of care that we in turn now owe or will owe. Of the brain-
damaged, of those almost incapable of movement, of the autistic, of all such 
we have to say: This could have been us. (MacIntyre 1999: 100) 
 
There is the possibility of deep moral concern for retarded people, in which 
they are seen as having, however incomprehensible we may find it, a human 
fate, as much as anyone else’s…. Someone may be very touched by the 
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being 
touched an imaginative sense of shared humanity. (Diamond 1991: 55) 
 
The terminally ill are not an exception to this rule either, just because they 
cannot any longer achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. Perhaps it is true of 
them that they no longer have—to reuse Marquis’ phrase—“a future like ours”, and so 
will not achieve very much, or any, more eudaimonia before they die. Given that their 
futures have closed in on them in this radical way, you might call it “futile” to go on 
treating them with the full range of interpersonal hopes and expectations that you 
extend to any human, or to go on being as scrupulous about not killing them as you 
would be about anyone else. There again, you might also call it “respectful”; you 
might call it an expression of pity.  
 
To pity someone in the sense I have in mind is to think, as MacIntyre puts it, 
“this could have been us”: this person too is part of human life and shares in human 
ideals, even if the idea of realising them in almost any way is quite hopeless for him/ 
her. Such pity is a key part of our charity towards other people; of what is involved in 
recognising them as people, as fellow human beings.  
 
(It is interestingly not something that follows in any very clear way from an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics where the focus is, eudaimonistically, on maximal forms of 
flourishing—on how much you as a being can develop, not on how many relatively 
undeveloped beings you can extend charity towards. Indeed it is a notorious fact about 
Aristotle that there is something rather ruthlessly bright-eye-and-gleaming-coatxxviii 
about his conception of eudaimonia, and that—not unconnectedly—he seems to have 
had little room in his ethics for the notion of pity.xxix Pity is, however, part of the sorts 
of virtue ethics that we may find in a Christian writer like Simone Weil. And that is 
the sort that I would defend, though I cannot defend it here.)  
 
There are, as many people have emphasised, better and worse ways to die. 
And one of the worse ways to die is to have recognition of your humanity withdrawn 
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from you before it happens. Part of understanding why that is such a bad thing to have 
happen to you must, I think, depend on taking a different view from the criterialist’s 
about the locus of the value of persons. For the criterialist, apparently, the value of 
persons consists in their instantiating the person-constituting properties. Aside from 
such instantiations, persons, at the most basic level, have no value (compare the 
familiar view in bioethics that being alive in itself is neither good nor bad); indeed 
there is a sense in which, aside from such instantiations, there are no persons. What 
such a view of the value of persons obscures from view is the notion of loving an 
individual in itself; it seems to be only the properties of an individual that a consistent 
criterialist can love—and then, only when they are duly manifested. But the idea that 
the object of love is always and necessarily some property-instantiation, common 
though it is, is a dogma. If property-instantiations can be objects of love (we may 
fairly ask), why not things in other metaphysical categories: individual human beings, 
for example?xxx  
 
Alongside this dogma, perhaps there is another, related but slightly different, 
dogma at work in securing the foundations of criterialism. This is the dogma that 
whenever we answer the question “Why is X valuable?” by citing some valuable 
property V that X displays, what we must be really saying is always that it is (this 
instance of) V that is valuable, not X. But this too is a dogma, and unmasking it may 
be another way of setting ourselves free from the lures of criterialism. To cite V in 
explanation of the claim that X is valuable can, so to speak, be understood the other 
way around: you can take it that citing V is displaying a symptom, a reminder, of the 
value of X. When George Orwell, in a famous passage from his essay “A Hanging”, 
describes the growing fingernails and the refusal to walk through a puddle of the man 
who is about to be hanged, I take it that this latter thing is what he is doing.xxxi He is 
not saying that having growing fingernails is a value-giving property. Rather he is 
saying that being human is a value-giving property, the importance of which can be 
brought out for us by all sorts of exercises in the “assembling of reminders”—
including such reminders as the growth of fingernails. 
 
 “But all the same, isn’t there a profound difference between what we hope for 
in general for other people, and what we hope in the particular case of someone who 
is severely mentally handicapped?” There certainly is. There is always a distinction 
between the aspirations for other persons that are grounded in human eudaimonia in 
general, and the aspirations for specific other persons that are grounded in our 
particular knowledge of them as individuals. This distinction is just as applicable to 
the profoundly mentally handicapped as it is to anyone else. And it makes for the 
same commonalities, and the same differences, as with anyone else. If your friend is 
tone-deaf, there is no need to pretend that he will ever be Mozart; but that does not 
make it all right to take home all his CDs. If your friend loses both his legs in a skiing 
accident, you needn’t spend the rest of his life pretending to him that he can still ski; 
but you miss something vital, too, if you bounce into his hospital ward straight after 
his double amputation with the words “So, you won’t be wanting those ski-boots any 
more”. Many of the details of what counts as just and loving treatment of other 
persons are, certainly, set by the particular trajectories of their particular lives. But the 
most basic and elementary requirements of love and justice, is set by reference to the 
aspirations that arise from human eudaimonia in general. And this applies just as 
much to the mentally disabled as to anyone else.  
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In Nick Hornby’s very funny novel about suicidal depression, A Long Way 
Down, Maureen, the mother of a severely mentally disabled child, says this:  
 
This all began years ago, when I decided to decorate his bedroom. He was 
eight, and he still slept in a nursery—clowns on the curtains, bunny rabbits on 
the frieze round the wall, all the things I’d chosen when I was waiting for him 
and I didn’t know what he was. And it was all peeling away… and I hadn’t 
done anything about it because it made me think too much about all the things 
that weren’t happening to him, all the ways he wasn’t growing up. What was I 
going to replace the bunny rabbits with? He was eight, so perhaps trains and 
rocket ships and footballers were the right sort of thing for him—but of 
course, he didn’t know what any of those things were… But there again, he 
didn’t know what the rabbits were either, or the clowns. So what was I 
supposed to do? Everything was pretending, wasn’t it? The only thing I could 
do that wasn’t make-believe was paint the walls white, get a plain pair of 
curtains. That would be a way of [saying] that I knew he was a vegetable, a 
cabbage, and I wasn’t trying to hide it. But then, where does it stop? Does that 
mean you can never buy him a T-shirt with a word on it, or a picture, because 
he’ll never read, and he can’t make sense of pictures? And who knows 
whether he even gets anything out of colours, or patterns? And it goes without 
saying that talking to him is ridiculous, and smiling at him, and kissing him on 
the head. Everything I do is pretending, so why not pretend properly?  
In the end, I went for trains on the curtains, and your man from Star Wars on 
the lampshade. And soon after that, I started buying comics every now and 
then, just to see what a lad of his age might be reading and thinking about. 
And we started watching the Saturday morning television together, so I 
learned a little bit about pop singers he might like… thinking about these 
things helped me to see Matty, in a strange sort of way… I made up a son. 
(Nick Hornby, A Long Way Down, pp.118-9) 
 
Of course there is—as Maureen herself recognises—something delusional, 
and something pathetic, in her treatment of Matty.  For sure, her attitude to him is 
strained and exaggerated. But what we should not lose sight of is that it is a strained 
and exaggerated version of something morally indispensable: the kind of interpretive 
charity, the humanistic understanding and pity, that, I have argued here, we all need 
from everybody else all the time. In the words of an older writer: “Charity bears all 
things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”xxxii  
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Anscombe mistranslates zur Seele as “to a soul”; I have corrected this to “to the soul”. 
ii
 Perhaps we could do ethics entirely or almost entirely without using the word or concept “person”: so 
numerous philosophers have at times suggested, including Jenny Teichman (1996), Bernard Williams 
(2006a), Christopher Coope (2006), and myself (I have at least had this thought; I can’t now remember 
if it has ever seen the light of published day; something close to that thought is certainly at work in 
Chappell 1998, Chapter 4). However, I don’t pursue that idea here. 
iii
 Criterialism, as I call it, is pretty much the same view as what McMahan 2005, following Rachels 
1990, calls “moral individualism”. This is the view (Rachels 1990: 173) that “how an individual may 
be treated is determined, not by considering his group memberships, but by considering his own 
particular characteristics”.  
iv
 Or something very close to criterialism. I need not commit myself yet on whether these authors are 
defending necessary-and-sufficient-conditions versions of a criterial view. 
v
 Something like the criterial view pops up in many other places. For instance, it seems to be behind 
Olson 2007’s suggestion that “person” is a phase sortal: “Being a person may be only a temporary 
property of you, like being a philosopher”.  
vi
 It might be suggested that (some instance of) Criterialism is a bespoke view of personhood, aimed 
only at defining what persons are for some specific purpose. Such a position is perfectly possible, of 
course, but I think it is very clearly not what is at issue in discussions like the four I cite here, all of 
which are aimed at completely general conclusions about “what persons are”: what they are in their 
essence, and for any possible purpose. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.)  
vii
 For more on personhood and language, see Patterson and Gordon 1993.  
viii
 David Hume: “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible 
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist” (Treatise 1.6.3). Derek Parfit: “We could give a complete 
description of reality without claiming that persons exist” (Parfit 1984: 212). The Buddha: “There 
exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements” (quoted in Parfit 1984: 
502).  
ix
 Autism involves very various sorts of emotional dysfunction. It can involve over-emotionality and 
“inappropriate” emotional responses as well as a lack of emotional response. But that just underlines 
the absurdity of using “emotionality” as a necessary condition of personhood. For then autistics who 
are over-emotional will count as persons, autistics who are “cold” and “withdrawn” won’t. 
x
 There is a surprising contrast between some recent philosophers’ willingness to grant moral standing 
to “potential persons” in the sense of metaphysically possible future human beings who admittedly do 
not exist right now, and their reluctance to do so to “potential persons” in the sense of young human 
beings who admittedly do exist right now.   
xi
 “The wrongness of killing us is understood in terms of what killing does to us. Killing us imposes on 
us the misfortune of premature death. That misfortune underlies the wrongness... The misfortune of 
premature death consists in the loss to us of the future goods of consciousness... What makes my future 
valuable to me are those aspects of my future that I will (or would) value when I will (or would) 
experience them... What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us of a future of value. 
Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours.” (Marquis 1997: 
95-96) 
xii
 And it is nearly always the criterion, i.e. some one criterion, that we are talking about. (Warren’s list 
of six criteria is the only exception to this monism that I can think of.) The suspicion that the value of 
persons might be multiform not monistic, that there might be not just one simple and readily-articulable 
reason for valuing persons but all sorts of reasons, some of them far from simple or easy to put into 
words, is not at all a characteristic suspicion for criterialists.  
xiii
 About the argument that I develop from this point on, about “how we treat” people, it is natural to 
ask: are these descriptive or normative claims? The answer to that, as quite often with Wittgensteinians 
like (I suppose) me, is: a bit of both. What is on offer is a phenomenology of (part of) the moral life. 
My claim is that the most basic and fundamental truths about this phenomenology makes certain 
options in thinking about ethics that might seem attractive and viable, such as criterialism, actually 
incoherent, because of its mismatch with what is basic and fundamental. Because of how things are, 
there are some things we shouldn’t think or do: both a normative and a descriptive thesis. 
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Another worry that might occur to some here: am I attacking criterialism because it is a theory of 
personhood? If so, isn’t it hypocritical of me to go on to develop what is really just another theory of 
personhood? The answers are No and No. I’m not attacking criterialism because it’s a theory, but 
because it’s a rotten theory. A good theory (or if you dislike that word, a good philosophical account) 
of personhood will make good sense of our intuitions; this criterialism signally fails to do.  
(My thanks to anonymous referees for pressing these questions.) 
xiv
 The charming comparison is Singer’s: Singer 1993: 89-90. 
xv
 But when exactly? As part of the child’s fourth birthday celebrations? On going to primary school? 
Would a Singerian society have a ritual for an induction into personhood? 
xvi
 At least, the term “objective” is unfortunate if it implies, as I suspect it does in passages like the one 
from Strawson that I cite in the next Note, that there is something non-objective about participant 
reactive attitudes. 
xvii
 “We look with an objective eye on the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic or the tiresome 
behaviour of a very young child, thinking in terms of treatment or training. But we sometimes look 
with something like the same eye on the behaviour of the normal and the mature. We have this resource 
[the objective attitude] and can sometimes use it. Being human we cannot, in the normal case, do this 
for very long, or altogether. But what is above all interesting is the tension there is, in us, between the 
participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is tempted to say: between our humanity and our 
intelligence. But to say this would be to distort both notions.” (Strawson 1962: 66-67, with omissions) 
xviii
 “One speaks and expresses emotions to and not simply at one’s cat. Nonetheless, although we of 
course discipline them, we don’t press claims against or hold our pets accountable in the same way we 
do with one another... Granted, when I look into my cat’s eyes, I can’t get over the feeling that he is 
looking also into mine in some personal way or shake the hope that he is seeing me in some way other 
that ‘the guy who feeds me’. But I find it utterly impossible to sustain the thought that he can 
imaginatively enter into my point of view or acknowledge me as a being with an independent 
perspective.” (Darwall 2006: 43)  
Pets are an interesting case of something like a “pretend” interpersonal relationship, if “pretend” is the 
right thing to call it. We know that, unlike infants, our cats will never become responsive in the way 
that persons do. That doesn’t stop us (or at least the dedicated pet-owners among us) from extending 
something interestingly like the constitutive prolepsis even to cats, hamsters, or stick-insects. Children, 
of course, do something similar with their dolls or other toys—and here “pretend” clearly is the right 
word. For a recent fashion to which similar comments apply see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26FOB-2DLove-t.html . (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for drawing this to my attention.) 
xix
 “Intrinsic” in the sense of “essential”, I mean; not in the sense of “non-relational”, obviously. 
xx
 Gaita 1991: 117: “An animal can suffer, but it cannot curse the day it was born. An animal can be 
afraid, but it cannot be ashamed of its fear and despite itself. An animal can be happy, but it cannot be 
joyous. An animal cannot give of its substance to certain pursuits and be admonished for doing so. One 
could go on almost indefinitely. The problems of life’s meaning cannot arise for an animal. Only a 
being for whom life can be problematic can have a spiritual life, and therefore have a soul.” 
xxi
 For more examples applying this argument see Hills 2010: 235-7. 
xxii
 So I say. In the case of trees, of course, there was at least one stern Victorian moralist who thought 
otherwise, namely W.E.Gladstone, whose hobby was chopping down trees. 
xxiii
 For this speculation deployed for a different purpose, cp. Kahane 2010. 
xxiv
 Cp. Gerald the gorilla in the well-known Not the Nine O’Clock News sketch: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MpbMm0433I 
xxv
 “Suppose that the experiments attempting to teach language to chimpanzees had been successful 
beyond their originators’ wildest dreams. The apes in question gained a complete mastery of English 
within a few years, were able to attend school and later university, and made many close friendships 
with human beings… in these imaginary circumstances it would plainly be absurd to claim that the 
apes lacked moral standing, or had a moral importance that was lower than our own.” (Carruthers 1992, 
Ch.3) 
xxvi
 Carruthers’ own view about animal rights is much closer to speciesism than to animal liberationism. 
He holds that there is an indirect argument, arising from contractualism, for granting all humans and no 
animals moral standing (for a brief exposition see his online paper “The animals issue” at 
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20Issue.pdf). Since I think it is 
obviously true that (non-human) animals do have moral standing in their own right, based roughly on 
the wrongness of causing unnecessary suffering, damage, and destruction, it seems I am closer to 
animal liberationism than Carruthers is. 
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xxvii
 Jeff McMahan (2005: 366) writes that his “moral individualism” gives us reason to deny that it is 
a grave misfortune for a human individual who is disabled to have limited cognitive capacities. After 
all, it is not a misfortune for an individual animal to have capacities of roughly the same level; and 
according to moral individualism, it is only the individual creatures that we should be considering. So 
either both the human and the animal are unfortunate, or neither is.  
This seems a very counter-intuitive consequence of “moral individualism”. Surely it matters how the 
creatures got into their states: at the very least, there must be a difference in fortune between a human 
individual who was born at a low cognitive level, and one who is at that level because of some 
horrendous accident? So far as I can see, McMahan must deny this. For presumably he thinks that my 
past stands to me as a relational characteristic, not an intrinsic one—and the whole point of “moral 
individualism” is that only “intrinsic characteristics” count morally. 
xxviii
 Bernard Williams’ delightfully mordant phrase: Williams 1985: 46. 
xxix
 The best presentation I know of the evidence for Aristotle’s blindness on the subject of pity is in 
Gaita 1991. 
xxx
 For more on this point see Chappell 2003, Grau 2010, Vlastos 1981. 
xxxi
 “It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious 
man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable 
wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was alive just as we 
were alive. All the organs of his body were working—bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself, nails 
growing, tissues forming—all toiling away in solemn foolery. His nails would still be growing when he 
stood on the drop, when he was falling through the air with a tenth of a second to live. His eyes saw the 
yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned—reasoned even 
about puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, hearing, feeling, 
understanding the same world; and in two minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone—one 
mind less, one world less.” (George Orwell, “A Hanging”, Adelphi Magazine August 1931) 
xxxii
 My thanks for their comments and encouragement to a large number of people, including Julia 
Annas, Alex Barber, Chris Belshaw, David Benatar, Peter Cave, Stephen Clark, John Cottingham, 
Christopher Coope, Christopher Grau, John Haldane, Rosalind Hursthouse, Tim Mulgan, David 
Oderberg, Tim O’Hagan, Charles Taliaferro, Chris Tollefsen, and Garrath Williams; an audience in 
Leeds at the Society for Applied Philosophy in 2009; and three anonymous referees for this journal.   
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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Abstract  
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession 
of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so 
forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view 
confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal 
cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it 
to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what 
makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. 
And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines. Except in some 
interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human 
animals that we identify as persons. 
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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Meine Einstellung zu ihm ist eine Einstellung zur Seele. Ich habe nicht die Meinung, 
dass er eine Seele hat.  
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards thei soul. I am not of the opinion that 
he has a soul. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, p.152, tr. 
G.E.M.Anscombe) 
 
Love is conditioned by its object, but love also yields its object. (Gaita 1991: 122) 
 
 
1. Persons: humanism, speciesism, criterialism 
 
Any ethical outlook much like ours will take as central some primary moral 
constituency (PMC): some class of creatures who all alike, and all equally, share in 
the highest level of moral rights and privileges. Most philosophical ethicists use 
“person” to mean at least “member of the primary moral constituency” (whatever else 
they may also mean by “person”). In this paper, that is how I shall use the word too.ii  
 
So what makes any creature a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency? One view is what I shall call humanism:  
 
Humanism: Being human is sufficient for membership of the PMC. 
 
Humanism faces two very common objections. The first is that humanism is 
arbitrary discrimination, like racism, sexism, ageism; humanism, in Richard Ryder’s 
famous phrase, is speciesism. The second objection, which is really just the same idea 
taken a little deeper, says that humanism bases its demarcation of persons on a 
biological property which is morally insignificant. Membership of this or that 
species—just like membership of this or that race, gender, or age-group—is, we are 
told, a morally insignificant detail. It is not the kind of thing that we should expect 
any important moral distinction to be based on.  
 
In theory these objections could be put by anyone who rejected humanism. In 
practice they are usually put by proponents of another theory of personhood, which I 
shall call criterialism: 
 
Criterialism: Actual possession of the criterial properties is necessary and 
sufficient for membership of the PMC.iii 
 
 Here are four very well-known enunciations of criterialismiv: 
 
I propose to use “person”, in the sense of a rational and self-conscious being, 
to capture those elements of the popular sense of “human being” that are not 
covered by “member of the species Homo sapiens”. (Singer 1993: 87) 
 
 Persons are beings capable of valuing their own lives. (Harris 1985: 16-17) 
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An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of 
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such an entity. (Tooley 1972: 82) 
 
[The six key markers of personhood are] (1) sentience... (2) emotionality... (3) 
reason... (4) the capacity to communicate... (5) self-awareness... (6) moral 
agency. (Warren 1997: 83-84)v   
 
As here represented, the criterial view is an all-purposevi view about what 
personhood is, and why it matters, which is undeniably simple (as I shall argue, much 
too simple). Despite this simplicity, it is obvious, when criterialism is stated as baldly 
as it is in these four statements, that it has radical implications. Most noticeably, it 
implies a sharp contraction of the circle of intuitive moral concern. If rationality is a 
necessary condition of counting as a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency, then all children under a certain age will fail to count as persons. (This 
bullet is explicitly bitten by Tristan Engelhardt: “If being a person is to be [sic] a 
responsible agent, a bearer of rights and duties, children are not persons in a strict 
sense” (Engelhardt 1989: 120).) If self-consciousness is a necessary condition, then 
many mentally handicapped humans will fail to count as persons. If the capacity to 
communicate is a necessary condition, then Jean-Dominique Bauby, of The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly fame, would have failed to count as a person after his 
catastrophic stroke—had he not worked out how to signal with his eyelid.vii (Can 
whether Bauby is still a person after his stroke really depend on contingencies about 
whether he can still communicate?) If persons necessarily have “the concept of a self 
as a continuing subject”, and believe that they are such selves, then David Hume, 
Derek Parfit, and most Buddhists are not persons.viii If you cannot be a person unless 
you are capable of valuing your own life, then you cannot be both a person and a 
committed nihilist about value (i.e. someone who finds himself compelled to believe 
that no such thing as value exists). If persons have to possess “emotionality”, then Mr 
Spock in Star Trek is not a person, and neither, perhaps, are some extreme autistics.ix 
And so on. Criterialists can make personhood sound rather exclusive; it can seem as 
hard to qualify for personhood as it is to make membership of the Country Club. 
 
Of course, these problems are consequences of taking these “markers of 
personhood” as indicators of necessary conditions for personhood. A less extreme 
version of the criterial view might take each of the markers on some list, or some or 
other combination of the markers, as a sufficient condition of personhood: any 
creature that displays just one of these properties, or some large-enough variety of 
them, will count as a person. We might then want to argue about what counts as 
displaying a property, or possessing a capacity. Must I actually evince emotions to 
pass Warren’s emotionality test? How often, and how convincingly? Do I possess the 
capacity to communicate only when I have learned a language? Or just when I have 
learned to sign, or to get others to read my thoughts and feelings? Or do I have the 
capacity to communicate all along, just in virtue of being a member of a species that 
communicates, linguistically and in other ways?  
 
Here we touch on familiar and long-running debates about potentiality versus 
actuality in our assessments of personhood. It is commonplace for criterialists of 
Singer’s sort to point out that potential prime ministers obviously do not have the 
rights of actual prime ministers, so that “potential persons”x, or those with the 
 4 
potential for what Don Marquis famously called “a future like ours”xi , can hardly be 
treated as the same moral category as actual persons, or “us”. It is equally 
commonplace for the opponents of Singer-style criterialism to object that there must 
be something wrong with an emphasis on actual properties that makes it a live 
question whether one is a person while asleep or under general anaesthetic.  
 
Clearly there are problems about at least some of the suggestions listed above 
about what the criteria of personhood might actually be. But not all those suggestions 
are implausible, and it would be easy enough, in principle, to weed out or refine the 
implausible ones. True, it is striking how little criterialists feel they need to do this; in 
practice, criterialists often seem perfectly happy to stick with what, intuitively, seem 
implausibly over-demanding criteria for personhood.  
 
However, the plausibility or otherwise of the various suggested criteria is not 
my main concern here. Obviously enough, other criteria could be devised which did 
not have these consequences. The key difficulties for criterialism that I want to 
emphasise in this paper are three.  
 
The first, which I can state very quickly, is about the argumentative method 
underlying criterialism. To put it at its simplest, it looks as if criterialists typically 
adopt their preferred criterion of moral significance because they think it explains 
moral intuitions which we have anyway. The criterion is adopted, in other words, 
because it doesn’t have counter-intuitive consequences.xii But then, the same criterion 
is deployed, by the very same authors—Peter Singer and John Harris, for example—
precisely to produce counter-intuitive consequences, such as the moral acceptability 
of killing small babies or the mentally disabled. There is, I think, a serious question as 
to what can possibly be going on here. It is not entirely obvious why building a moral 
theory out of one intuition or set of intuitions that we certainly have, and then using 
this theory to attack other intuitions that we also certainly have, is anything more than 
arbitrary selectiveness. Perhaps this is a question that all system-building moral theory 
faces. 
 
 The second difficulty for criterialism, which I shall also mention only very 
briefly, is that criterialism can seem to imply a quite implausible picture of moral 
reasoning. Are we really to suppose that what we do when we come across any being 
we haven’t met before is first see whether it satisfies our criterion for personhood, and 
then, if it does, start treating it as a person? One is reminded of that well-known 
caricature the Cartesian Detective: we start with the hypothesis—the opinion, as 
Wittgenstein says in my epigraph—that the new being is a person, and feel justified in 
acting in line with that hypothesis, just insofar as the behavioural evidence confirms 
it. If criterialism is to be at all plausible, it cannot in this way be a general view about 
our typical real-time interaction with others. Such a picture might apply to some very 
exceptional cases, some of which we will discuss in section 4b. But in general, 
criterialism will have to be a view about the criterion of rightness for taking other 
creatures to be persons, not about our decision procedure for assuming that they are 
persons. For quite obviously, our normal interaction with others typically involves no 
such Cartesian-Detective rigmarole, and it takes a good deal of philosophical 
callousing of the soul not to find something absurd, and morally repugnant too, about 
the idea that it even could. But if in general criterialism only states the criterion of 
rightness, and not our decision procedure, for taking other creatures to be persons, 
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then it still faces a further objection, my third—which it is the main purpose of this 
paper to develop. 
  
This third objection to criterialism, on which I shall spend the rest of this 
paper, is connected to this second point. My claim is that the sort of properties that 
criterialists home in on are not criteria of personhood at all. Rather, they are 
dimensions of interpretation of beings that we already take to be persons.  
 
For my own part, I have always been aware of at least a vague sense of 
discomfort and unease here, the moment we start talking about these (or any other) 
properties as if they were criteria for personhood of the sort the criterialists have in 
mind. There is a hard-to-articulate feeling that, despite the considerable first-blush 
plausibility of criterialism, it leaves out something crucial; a feeling of the kind that is 
naturally expressed in ordinary conversation by a trailing-off “Yes, but…”. I suspect 
that my unease is not unrelated to the unease that Raimond Gaita is bringing out when 
he writes (Gaita 1991: 115) that it is 
 
naïve to think that the kinds of properties which interest philosophers when 
they ask what is a person, and which we often share to some degree with 
higher animals, play the kind of role in our treatment of one another which is 
assumed by those who argue that differences in treatment must be justified by 
relevantly different properties of those kinds. That philosophical perspective 
from which we are encouraged to reassess our sense of how we might 
justifiably treat animals distorts and indeed cheapens our understanding of 
human life. 
 
Gaita 1991 is a marvellous exploration of one philosopher’s attempt to make 
articulate that trailing-off “Yes, but…”. This essay offers another philosopher’s. My 
attempt is not necessarily the same as Gaita’s, but not necessarily in competition with 
it either.  
 
And it is perhaps worth saying before I begin that what I am trying to do here, 
what Gaita was trying to do, is hard: hard to articulate, hard to state clearly, hard to 
see in the round, hard to apply. Again and again criterialism wins out in philosophers’ 
discussions of personhood because, conversely, it is dead easy; it is such a simple and 
straightforward view of personhood. There are plenty of spurious analogies between 
science and ethics around, but at any rate we can trust this one: no more in the case of 
the nature of the person than in the case of particle physics does the fact that a view is 
simple in any way improve its chances of being true.  
 
 
2. The proleptic view of personhood 
 
Contrary to what criterialism seems to suggest, we do not look for sentience or 
rationality or self-awareness in a creature as a test to decide whether or not that 
creature counts as a person. It’s the other way round. Having once decided, on other 
grounds, that a creature is a person, we know that this makes it the kind of creature 
which is likely to display sentience, rationality, self-awareness and the rest of the 
personal properties. Hence we look for displays of these properties from the creature. 
That is to say, we treat it as a person in advance of any such displays.xiii  
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The biggest and clearest example of this is an activity that is absolutely central 
to human life: parenting. Parents are, of course, aware of the differences in rationality, 
linguistic capacity, self-representing ability, and so forth between young human 
beings at various ages and developmental stages. Nonetheless, a parent’s attitude 
towards her child is always, basically, what Wittgenstein famously calls “an attitude 
towards a soul”. She does not do what criterialism (especially if understood in 
decision-procedure terms) might seem to imply she should do: start out by treating her 
child as an inanimate object, like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber-plant, and grudgingly 
consent to adjust her attitude to it, one little step at a time, only as and when it proves 
itself more than inanimate by passing a succession of behavioural tests for at least 
having interests like a snail’s perhaps,xiv and then later on for the interests of some 
more advanced kind of animal such as a puppy, and eventually for full criterialist 
personhood.xv If parents did treat their children in this almost behaviouristic fashion, 
the parents would be callous monsters, and the children would be basket-cases. In a 
world where parents generally accepted this sort of criterial view, and applied it 
directly in their parenting practice, even the best-adjusted of us would be a wolf-child. 
 
Fortunately, however, parents are not criterialists, either in their decision 
procedure or in the criterion of rightness for ascriptions of personhood that they 
actually employ. Rather, a parent treats her child from the very beginning—and from 
before it is literally and actually true—as a creature that can reason, respond, reflect, 
feel, laugh, think about itself as a person, think about others as persons too, and do 
everything else that persons characteristically do. From the beginning her attitudes 
towards the child are not only “objective” (to use Strawson 1962: 67’s slightly 
unfortunate termxvi): they also include what he famously calls “participant reactive 
attitudes”, of just the same sort as she adopts towards anyone else.  
 
Of course, as Strawson impliesxvii, these participant reactive attitudes’ scope 
may be more restricted in the case of a very small baby. The point is that they are 
there; and that like the baby—often indeed in advance of the baby—they grow. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre notes in a recent discussion of the development of practical 
reasoning in the individual person (1999: 90), ethically and psychologically adequate 
parenthood centrally involves “a systematic refusal to treat the child in a way that is 
proportionate to its qualities and aptitudes” (that is, its actual and non-idealised 
qualities and aptitudes, the kind of qualities and aptitudes that interest the criterialist). 
 
The parent who says to her three day old baby, “What do you think? Should 
we give you some more milk now?”, or to her three year old toddler “How kind of 
you to share your toys with your sister when she’s sad!”, is not deluded about a 
neonate’s capacity for interpersonal practical reasoning, or a toddler’s capacity for 
calculatedly empathetic altruism. But she is not making a sentimental joke either. She 
is treating the baby or the toddler proleptically, in the light of the ideal of personhood. 
By years of treating her children as creatures who “have the personal properties”—in 
the sense that interests the criterialist—she makes it true that they are creatures who 
have the personal properties in just that sense.  
 
The child staggers across and plonks a book down on his sibling’s lap; the 
parent’s reaction is “How kind of you to let her share your book!” Is that, in fact, what 
the toddler was doing? The right answer to this question can be: “Yes it is—once the 
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parent has given this reaction.” The parent’s reaction is an interpretation of the child’s 
deed. Before the reaction, perhaps, there was no fact of the matter about what the little 
boy was doing: the child did not know himself what his action was. For all he knew 
about it, his action might as well have been simply a random sequence of bodily 
movements. But now that his mother offers her interpretation, the child, on his 
mother’s authority, learns to see himself a certain way. Because his mother frames his 
act as one with a certain meaning (as the giving of a gift), and because the child sees 
his mother as seeing his act this way, and because his mother sees the child as seeing 
her as seeing his act this way… (Grice 1957), the act comes to have that meaning.  
 
Paul Grice’s famous work on meaning and intention is even more relevant to 
another clear example of this sort of prolepsis, namely language-learning. A baby 
begins by babbling—that is, by producing all the sounds the human mouthparts can 
make. Some of these sounds get a response because they are sounds that occur in the 
parents’ language, while others don’t because they are not. (The inability of many 
English adults to pronounce the Scots ch in loch or the Welsh ll in Llanfair is a learnt 
inability, not mirrored in English babies, who can and do make both sounds until 
conditioned not to by English adults.) The baby “homes in” on the sounds, and then 
on the patterns or combinations of sounds, that get a response. Then it learns to 
correlate particular patterns of sounds with particular contexts by the same homing-in 
process. What the parents say is “She’s learned to say ‘tiger’” (my own first child’s 
first word). What has happened is that the parents, by treating their daughter as if she 
has the word for, and then the concept of, a tiger, have made it true that she has that 
word. (And, a little later perhaps, that concept too; though I am not suggesting that 
any one word or concept can be learned on its own: in Wittgenstein’s familiar image, 
“light dawns gradually over the whole” (On Certainty 141).) 
 
Stephen Darwall too talks of prolepsis when describing a third connected 
process, namely the process whereby we come to be, and to hold others, morally 
responsible (Darwall 2006: 87-88):  
 
There seem to be many cases where we wish to hold others accountable 
though we seem to have very good evidence that they are not free to act on 
moral reasons in the way our practices of holding someone fully responsible 
seem to presuppose… In some instances, for example with children, we seem 
simultaneously to move on two tracks in the process of inducting them into 
full second-person responsibility, sometimes treating them proleptically as 
though they were apt for second-personal address as a way of developing 
moral competence while nonetheless realising… that [at their developmental 
stage] this is an illusion. 
 
Or an illusion, at any rate, if you agree with the criterialist about what it takes 
to be “apt for second-personal address”, and/or about what it takes to “have the 
personal properties”. My point, with which Darwall might or might not agree—I’m 
not sure—is that what it takes does not have to be already-realised and –actualised 
capacities of the sorts that interest criterialists. (The mother who asks her neonate 
child “Shall I give you some milk?” is certainly engaging in second-person address, 
despite the manifold incapacities, perfectly well-known to her, of neonates.)  
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There is at least this much truth in Dennett 1987’s well-known idea of the 
“intentional stance”: persons constitute each other as persons, both as agents and as 
patients, by treating each other as persons, as agents and patients. Something like the 
Davidsonian “principle of charity” (Davidson 1980) is at work in our mutual 
interpretations. By charitably, and proleptically, interpreting the other as a person, I 
make him a person. 
 
The looseness and ambiguity of the term “person” is evident when we say 
things like this. In ordinary language, “person” can certainly, at one end of its 
semantic range, mean something like what Singer and other criterialists want it to 
mean, a “rational and self-conscious being” (or whatever). Yet at the other end of its 
semantic range, the ordinary-language term can also be a synonym for “human 
animal”. It seems to be part of the point of our person-concept to allow those young 
humans who are persons only in the “human animal” sense to enter into a continuum 
of meaning towards the far end of which they can become persons in much stronger 
senses. 
 
Many things in our shared life can be seen in this sort of way as aspirations 
towards an ideal which, like any ideal, is never fully realised. The basic sort of 
idealisation, the sort that grounds attributions of personhood, is not the only sort. We 
ascribe the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech to every human 
being, even though we know that small babies can’t speak and don’t assemble (not 
without help), and that acutely asocial loners may well never (or at least never again) 
actually exercise either right. The behaviour of parents, besides (as described) 
involving the person-constituting prolepsis in a particularly clear form, is also full of 
other similarly-patterned proleptic idealisations that might, on a criterialist’s view, be 
regarded as quite unrealistic. Parents give their children the opportunities to play the 
cello, to learn Spanish, to use their monthly allowances sensibly, to be polite to Great 
Aunt Maud (…), even though the parents may be fully aware that every one of these 
opportunities will in all probability be spurned. In minimally decent jurisdictions the 
treatment even of hardened criminals displays the same pattern of basic openness to 
the convict, however much of an unrealistic idealisation this openness may seem to 
involve: the jurisdiction goes on offering the criminals opportunities to reform, even 
though it is as good as certain that these opportunities will not be taken up. (I think 
that something like this refusal to “close the door” finally and irrevocably on the 
criminal is also, in connection perhaps with some thoughts about the state’s obligation 
to be fundamentally benevolent to the citizens for whose sake alone it after all exists, 
the ground of a good reason to reject capital punishment. But that’s another story.) 
 
In general, the idealisation that accords X the status due to a φer does not have 
to involve any kind of expectation that X will ever actually φ, or even can φ. What it 
does have to involve is the understanding that X is of a kind that characteristically 
includes φers. The human kind includes individuals who characteristically (at the 
right point in the human life-cycle) will freely assemble and speak. That is why it is 
not ridiculous to give the rights to free assembly, speech, and political action, e.g. 
becoming a senator, to any and every human, including asocial misanthropes, those 
(as yet, or as of recently) physically incapable of speech, and those who choose never 
to utter a word. Contrast the equine kind, which does not characteristically include 
any such individuals. That is why it is ridiculous to give these rights (or the status of a 
senator) to any horse.  
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Considered as a kind, children characteristically include individuals who learn 
the cello or Spanish or wise use of money or good manners to venerable relatives 
(well… eventually). That is why the parents who try to teach these lessons to their 
children are not acting absurdly even if they know in advance that this particular 
child is not going to respond—whereas parents who tried to teach these lessons to the 
family goldfish or the rubber plant would be acting absurdly. Similarly, there is 
nothing absurd about offering the old lag a place on the rehabilitation programme, 
even if it seems certain that this old lag will always refuse or abuse the offer: and the 
reason why not has to do with the general fact that some old lags do sometimes 
reform.  
 
A fortiori, there is nothing absurd about giving the rights of free speech, 
assembly, private choice and the rest of it to women, or to other races, or to 
homosexuals or transgender people, or to the disabled, or to gingers, or to the various 
other sorts of historically marginalised groups. People in these categories are not 
another kind, as horses and hamsters are. Their well-being is human well-being, just 
as white male heterosexuals’ is, and just as horses’ and hamsters’ well-being is not. 
That, in a nutshell, is why speciesism is not like racism or sexism. 
 
Clearly, then, this is not just a point about the induction of babies and very 
small children into the social life of humanity at large. All humans, even the healthy 
intelligent mature well-adjusted independent affluent adults that typical criterialism is 
so clearly focused on—the Country Club again—are always only incompletely and 
impurely agents. Incompletely, because we are never all agents can be. However well 
things go, we never do or even can reach the full potential of human well-being, 
which would include a fully worked-out articulation of our own agency, a full 
coordination and marshalling of our own forces and powers for action in the world: 
towards this we are always only, at best, on the way. And impurely, because each of 
us always can be interpreted, by a sufficiently determined sceptic, as not really an 
agent at all, but a victim of the instinctive or other determining external forces that 
constantly threaten anyone’s agency. To extend “an attitude towards a soul” towards 
anyone is always, and not just with children, an idealisation. As Tamar Schapiro notes 
within a Kantian framework (Schapiro 1999: 723): 
 
[T]here is a sense in which no one, regardless of age or maturity, is able to 
achieve autonomy on Kant’s view. This is because the notion of autonomy in 
Kant is an ideal concept which outstrips all possible realisations in experience. 
Strictly speaking, every instance of human willing is necessarily an imperfect 
realisation of transcendental freedom, and every virtuous character necessarily 
falls short of perfect virtue. And yet the applicability of the moral law depends 
on our mapping these ideal concepts onto ourselves and one another for the 
purposes of guiding action. So we are to regard the social world as a 
community of autonomous agents despite the fact that perfect realisations of 
autonomy are nowhere to be found. 
 
The criterialists are right to insist that properties like self-awareness, emotionality, 
rationality, and so forth are crucial parts of our concept of a person. It does not follow 
that these properties can be used as the criterialists want to use them: as tests for 
personhood. Even at the cool-hour level of the criterion of rightness—never mind the 
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real-time level of deliberative procedure—to treat someone as a person is not to put a 
tick in the box by her name, to show that she has passed some inspection or met some 
standard, of rationality or self-awareness or emotionality or whatever. Indeed, it 
seems no less arbitrary discrimination to say “Sorry, you’re not rational or self-aware 
or linguistically capable or emotionally responsive enough to count as a person” than 
to say “Sorry, you’re not white enough to count as a person”. Behavioural properties 
like rationality, self-awareness, emotionality are not tests for, but parts of the ideal of, 
personhood. To treat someone as a person is to engage with him as the kind of 
creature to which that ideal applies. So to treat him is not, at the deepest level, a 
response to his behaviour at all, but to his nature. To see some creature as a person is 
to take an attitude to that creature which, before any behavioural evidence comes in, is 
already different from our attitudes to creatures that (we think) aren’t persons. This is 
the second-person standpoint (to use the title of Darwall’s outstanding book): the 
attitude we take to persons, and do not take to sofas, fridges, or rubber plants.  
 
The fact that it takes charity, in more than one sense, to constitute persons 
imposes on persons a crucial sort of vulnerability and dependence: “The personal 
reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the 
manifestation of a certain degree of good will or regard on the part of other human 
beings towards ourselves” (Strawson 1962: 70). All human persons are, in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s splendidly apt phrase, “dependent rational animals”, as MacIntyre 
himself emphasises (MacIntyre 1999: 81-85): 
 
In most moral philosophy the starting point is one that already presupposes the 
existence of mature independent practical reasoners whose social relationships 
are the relationships of the adult world. Childhood, if noticed at all, is a topic 
that receives only brief and incidental attention… To become an effective 
independent practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which 
others have made an essential contribution. The earliest of these relate directly 
to our animal existence, to what we share in our development with members of 
other intelligent species… [But what] we [also] need from others, if we are not 
only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities 
of independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for 
fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical 
judgements… Acknowledgement of dependence is the key to independence.  
 
We are vulnerable to each other, and dependent on each other, because it is 
remarkably easy to attack persons by withdrawing the second-personal attitude from 
them. Part of the reason why it is so easy to stop seeing others as persons is, as I said 
before, because the interpersonal attitude always involves a degree of idealisation. 
There is always some truth in sceptical or cynical views that reject that idealisation. 
(For example, the human person is a physical object—even if it is not “merely” a 
physical object.) 
 
We fail to see others as persons in a small way when we explain away what 
others do, or refuse to listen to them or to take their wishes and ambitions seriously. 
(Parents are never perfect in charity; children’s protests against such treatment are a 
recurring theme of family life.) We do it in bigger ways when we “use” others, or (in 
Kant’s phrase) fail to treat them as “ends in themselves”. At the limit, we can 
withdraw the interpersonal attitude from others completely, by pretending that they 
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simply aren’t there, as British and Irish settlers did to the aboriginal Australians under 
their notorious legal doctrine of terra nullius (see Gaita 1998). Or we can do it by 
treating them merely as physical objects, as often happens in pornography, violence, 
and murder. Or, lastly, we can do it by declaring them “non-persons”, as the Nazis did 
to the Jews—and as criterialists routinely do to the very old, the very young, and the 
very disabled.  
 
 The personal properties, then, set the content of the ideal of personhood. They 
do not set the boundaries of the class of persons (the PMC, as I’ve also called it). 
What does set the boundaries? That is my question in section 3. My answer will be 
the humanist answer already advertised in section 1: roughly, the boundaries of the 
class of persons are the boundaries of the human species.  
 
 
3. The truth in speciesism 
 
Rubber plants, fridges, sofas, human babies: we come to the last of these four 
sorts of things with a very different attitude from our attitudes to the other three sorts. 
And my point is that we come to them with different attitudes. Our attitudes to them 
are not responses to evidence that we gather after we have “come to them”. The 
moment I meet a rubber plant or a fridge, I am perfectly sure, unless my sanity is in 
question, that it will not attempt to talk to me or tickle me—as, say, a baby might.  
 
What makes me so sure of that? Well, simply the sort of thing a rubber plant 
or a fridge is, and the kinds of behaviour that it is natural to expect from that sort of 
thing. Rubber plants and fridges are not the kind of thing that tries to talk to you or 
tickle you. Babies are. And if you ask “What kind of thing is that?”, the obvious 
answer is: “Young human beings”. If some creature is a human being, it is completely 
natural to expect it to be the kind of thing that might (at least if it’s a family member) 
try to talk to you, or tickle you, or otherwise demonstrate its (budding) mastery of the 
kinds of mental capacity that criterialists take to be criteria. (Talking to someone and 
tickling someone both require interesting interpersonal capabilities. To do either, you 
have to want things to be a certain way for someone else—roughly, you have to want 
to get them to think a thought, or to feel a tickle. These are wants with quite 
sophisticated contents.)  
 
This sort of expectation is based squarely on the nature of the creature in 
question. And that means, on its nature as a member of the human species. Our 
understanding of which creatures are persons, and so may be expected to exhibit the 
personal properties, is not formed on an individual basis but on the basis of 
generalisation from experience of humans in general. I have already mentioned 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “my attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul”; 
on the same page of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein also says that “the 
human body is the best picture of the human soul” (der menschliche Körper ist das 
beste Bild der menschlichen Seele). And perhaps what he means is this: that when we 
see that some creature is a human, just seeing that is enough to license us to adopt the 
interpersonal attitude to that creature.  
 
We know in advance how we can expect any particular rubber plant or fridge 
to behave, because we can draw on a bank of past experience (our own and others’) of 
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rubber plants and fridges. In this sense, the fact that a thing is a rubber plant or a 
fridge sets the scope of our expectations about it. In just the same way, we know what 
kinds of capacities and properties humans in general have. It is that background 
knowledge that we draw on, whenever we apply the interpersonal attitude to any 
individual human being, simply on the basis that it is a human being.  
 
We obviously do the same with other species of animals. When I meet a cat or 
a gerbil, I treat it neither as an inanimate object like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber 
plant, nor as a person. (Not, of course, that I treat all inanimate objects the same, 
either. Sofas, fridges, and rubber plants are very different things, especially rubber 
plants.) You can play games with a gerbil. With a dog or a cat, you can even have a 
cuddle (in the reciprocal sense, I mean).xviii Neither is possible with a fridge. On the 
other hand, you would be wrong to expect a dog to play a good hand of contract 
bridge, or a cat to give you good investment advice, or a gerbil to read your mind, as a 
human being might. What you expect of an individual dog or individual cat will be 
different from what you expect of an individual gerbil, and both will be different from 
your expectations of inanimate objects. In each case, your expectations will be set by 
your background knowledge of the different kinds in question. Where dogs, gerbils, 
cats, and indeed all other kinds of living thing are concerned, this obviously means the 
different species in question. Why should it be otherwise with humans? 
 
These remarks should enable us to see—pace the criterialists—how central it 
is, to our moral responses to the things and creatures around us, to assign them to 
species. It is species-assignments that enable us to answer what you might reasonably 
think is the most basic question of all about any thing that might be in front of us at 
any time: namely, what kind of thing it is. Until we know what species it is, we do not 
know how it may act, or how to treat it: what is good for it, how we might harm or 
hinder it, what counts as health for it, and so on. The nature of the creature determines 
what well-being is for it; and its nature is its species. To put it another way, the best 
way to answer “What is it?”, when this question is asked about any individual animal, 
is to give the name of its species. Or as we might ask moral individualists like 
McMahan: “If species-membership isn’t an intrinsic property, what is?” Singer, 
Rachels, and McMahan never tell us why being human cannot count as any creature’s 
“own particular characteristic”. It can’t be merely because being human is a group 
membership (as McMahan 2005 suggests). For there is nothing to stop a given 
property from being both a “group membership” and an “own particular 
characteristic”; that is how it is with being a vertebrate, for instance. To put it more 
formally, nothing stops a given property from being both a relational property, and 
also an intrinsic property.xix Indeed, if Kripke is right in his well-known thesis of the 
metaphysical necessity of origin, such properties must be very common. 
 
This shows how humanism can be true without falling prey to a charge of 
arbitrary speciesism. To treat any species of creatures as persons is to treat them, not 
as successful passers of some test for the personal qualities, but on the assumption 
that they are individuals of a species the ideal for which is (roughly) the highest 
attainable development of those qualities. In this sense, references to species are an 
ineliminable part of our talk about persons.  
 
In that sense, but not in some others. We are now in a position to respond to 
four familiar objections to “speciesism”. I consider these in section 4. The aim of my 
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response is not of course to defend speciesism, if that is defined as “arbitrary moral 
discrimination on the grounds of species”. But it is to defend humanism, the view that 
not all moral discrimination on the grounds of species is arbitrary. 
 
 
4. Four objections to speciesism  
 
a. All animals are equal. Peter Singer (1993: 57) writes that “No matter what 
the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering of any other being”. Nothing I have said so far commits 
me to rejecting this application of the principle of equality. If I were to accept it, I 
would want to add, first, that plenty of other things besides suffering “count”, and 
secondly, that however alike human and animal pain (the physical sensation) may be, 
human and animal suffering (the state of mind) are mostly quite unlike. A cat can be 
tortured like Gloucester, but it cannot suffer like King Lear.xx And suffering matters 
more than pain. 
 
But perhaps we should reject this application of equality anyway. Right now 
there is (quite likely) monstrous pain, and a fair amount of suffering too, on the plains 
of the Serengeti, where a wounded buffalo is being eaten alive by a pride of lions. 
Singer’s principle of equality requires us to say that our duty to prevent the buffalo’s 
pain and suffering in the teeth of the lions is directly proportional to the amount of 
pain and suffering involved. If any implication of any moral theory is absurd, this one 
is. There just isn’t any duty, not even a prima facie one, for us to act as Zoological 
Pain Police. (Don’t say: “We can’t intervene, because the lions might eat us”. Where 
is your moral courage? And don’t say: “But it causes less pain in nature overall if we 
don’t intervene in nature in this sort of way.” As many writers on the theological 
problem of evil are keen to remind us, most animal suffering is gratuitous. If lions can 
be caught and trained to jump through hoops, perhaps they can be caught and trained 
to kill their prey cleanly before eating it. So is anyone trying to train them? Of course 
they’re not.) The vast majority of the huge amount of animal pain and suffering that 
happens every day is simply none of our business. “It is not an accident or a limitation 
or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a 
condition of our existence and our sanity” (Williams 2006: 147).xxi  
 
So it looks like Singer’s principle that all suffering counts for the same, no 
matter what the species involved, is just false. On the other hand, some weaker 
principle of this general sort seems clearly true: perhaps “Animal suffering is bad for 
the same sort of reasons as human suffering is bad”, or something like that. What also 
seems clearly true is that humans should do what they can not to generate animal 
suffering, and to prevent animals from being needlessly hurt or damaged by humans 
(and sometimes, though less often, by accident or by each other). This is a much 
weaker principle than Singer’s equality-of-suffering principle. But perhaps even this 
is strong enough to generate a good argument for vegetarianism. I suspect it all 
depends what counts as needless hurt or harm. 
 
 Hence “the limit of sentience” is not “the only defensible boundary of 
concern for the interests of others” (Singer 1993: 58). Certainly that limit marks one 
distinction between the ways we should take an interest in the welfare of other 
creatures. For example, hacking a frog to pieces is wrong in a way that hacking an 
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orange to pieces is not, partly because an orange certainly cannot feel pain, and a frog 
pretty definitely can. But only partly. Quite aside from the pain involved, destroying a 
living creature for fun is wrong in a way that destroying a piece of fruit for fun is not. 
(Hacking trees, or anaesthetised frogs, to pieces for fun is usually wrong too.xxii) 
Unless we think that nothing matters except pain and pleasure—and this is not, e.g., 
Singer’s position either (Singer 1993: xi)—there is no reason to think that the 
distinction between sentience and non-sentience is the only fundamental moral 
distinction we can make among beings; nor that it is the most important.  
 
There are some interesting complications about the notion of sentience. If 
“sentience” means simply “capacity to feel (sensational) pain and pleasure”, then 
sentience does not fit the story that I have developed about how the personal 
properties come into being. The capacity to feel pain- and pleasure-sensations is 
certainly one of the capacities that we expect to find in any human person. But it is 
not, unlike rationality or intentionality, a capacity whose presence in any person is 
even partly constituted by others’ idealising assumption, expectation, or hope that it is 
there. Whether or not a being can feel pain does not depend on others’ adopting 
“participant attitudes” or taking the “intentional stance” towards him, in the way that 
(I have argued) his capacities for self-consciousness, rationality, and suffering do. I 
don’t think this shows that sentience is a counter-example to my thesis about how the 
person-constituting properties are developed. Rather, I think it shows that sentience is 
not one of the person-constituting properties. A creature which had the (other) person-
constituting properties, but lacked the capacity for pain- and pleasure-sensations, 
would still undeniably be a person.xxiii A creature which had the capacity for pain and 
pleasure, but lacked the (other) person-constituting properties, surely would not be. 
 
b. Aliens, talking chimps, Locke’s parrot, and a possessed fridge. The position that I 
am defending under the name of humanism says that, normally, to be a person it is 
sufficient to be a human being. Not necessary, because humanism does not imply that 
members of other species could not be drawn into the moral community of human 
persons. On the contrary, I can see at least three distinct ways in which this could 
happen. One is that we could discover a whole species—aliens, or angels, or what 
have you—which is like the human species in that its members are characteristically 
persons (in one sense or another). A second is that a species already known to us 
might, en masse, somehow change so as to become characteristically persons. Or, 
third, some particular individual creature—Locke’s parrot, say (Locke, Essay 2.27), 
or Washoe the chimp (Singer 1993: 111)xxiv, or some group of creatures, like Peter 
Carruthers’ Chimp Class of ’92xxv—might start to count as persons, perhaps e.g. by 
displaying the personal properties, even though this behaviour is otherwise 
completely untypical of the species in question. (Come to that, I suppose a possessed 
fridge might, in principle, start displaying the personal properties.)  
 
In these special cases, we perhaps will have to appeal to something like the 
criterial view of personhood as our decision procedure for the vexed cases. 
Apparently we will have to ask whether this alien species, or this new class of highly-
educated chimps, or this individual chimp, parrot, or spooky fridge, displays 
something like the criterialist’s personal properties, before we can decide whether to 
count these beings as persons.  
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Doesn’t this show that my arguments against criterialism were mistaken? Not 
at all. It does show that something like criterialism may perhaps be our decision 
procedure if and when we encounter a being that we do not already know how to 
classify as a person or not a person by way of its species. (Perhaps; actually I doubt 
even this much is true, but at any rate it is the most that is true.) However, it would be 
utterly misleading to generalise from thought-experiments about these special and rare 
cases—almost all of which, to date, are imaginary—to alleged conclusions about the 
normal cases. (It would be as misleading to do that as it would be generalise the 
justificatory/ rational structure of every belief we have about the external world from 
the justificatory/ rational structure of the external-world beliefs that we might form 
when we are thinking about the classic, and nearly always imaginary, sceptical 
predicaments.) Unfortunately, just this generalisation is a criterialist stock-in-trade. 
The most famous example of it is perhaps Mary Anne Warren’s derivation of the 
personal properties (her list was quoted in section 1) from an imagined meeting with 
aliens. But even if Warren is right that this is the decision procedure that we would 
have to adopt with aliens to settle whether they were persons in some extraordinary 
imaginary scenario, nothing at all follows about our beliefs (either at the decision-
procedure or at the criterion-of-rightness level) about whether any humans are persons 
in a multitude of ordinary real scenarios. For we have met humans before. 
 
But anyway, I suspect Warren’s description is much too black-and-white to 
get anywhere near characterising the decision procedure that would really be involved 
in such a meeting. (This is why I say, above, only that we would probably have to use 
something like the criterialist approach in alien encounters and similar.) For one thing, 
there is not the slightest reason to think that, in such a meeting, yes and no would be 
the only possible answers available to the question “Are these persons?”. Even Star 
Trek yields a rather subtler answer—“It’s life, Jim, but not as we know it”; the world, 
after all, is a complicated place, and it constantly throws us surprises. For another, our 
responses in such situations would be—or should I say will be?—based on all sorts of 
factors and reactions, most of them probably defying explicit articulation; on 
judgements about “forms of life”, in fact. It would not and could not be based on 
some neatly finite check-list of diagnostic properties like Warren’s. Looking beyond 
Star Trek, science fiction is full of wonderfully complex and subtle explorations of 
such encounters. The contrast with the mechanical simplicities of a criterialist list 
such as Warren suggests is instructive—and not entirely to be dismissed as unfair on 
the grounds that Warren is, after all, not writing science fiction. 
 
c. The two-species scenario. A third interesting objection to speciesism is 
offered by Peter Carruthers: 
 
Suppose it had been discovered that human beings in fact consist of two 
distinct species, otherwise hardly distinguishable from one another, the 
members of which cannot inter-breed. In these circumstances it would plainly 
be objectionable for the members of the majority species to attempt to 
withhold moral rights from the members of the minority, on the mere ground 
of difference of species. This, too, would be obvious speciesism. (Carruthers 
1992 Ch 3) 
 
Carruthers, I think, is quite right to claim that it would alter nothing morally 
speaking if we discovered that “the human species” was in fact two different 
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biological species—perhaps homo neanderthalis and homo sapiens—living together 
in a single moral community. (Modulo the point about not interbreeding, some 
anthropologists think that this has actually happened: Trinkaus and Shipman 1993.) 
Pace Carruthers, his argument does not show that that there is no species-
classification that bestows participation in the moral community on its members, and 
so that species-classifications are morally irrelevant. What his argument shows is that 
there may be more than one species-classification (or other kind-classification) that 
bestows participation in the primary moral constituency on its members. That is 
something that we should grant anyway given the possibility of other species whose 
members are characteristically persons; and it is not inconsistent with the claim that 
species-classifications are morally significant.xxvi 
 
d. Species and Darwinism. A fourth objection to my argument is the claim that 
species don’t exist: that as a matter of strict biology, there is no clear differentiation 
between humankind and “other species”, only a differentiation between different parts 
of the same evolutionary family tree. Species therefore are populations, not 
Aristotelian (or Kripkean) natural kinds (Sober 1994). True, but irrelevant to my 
argument, which can work equally well with the population conception of species, or 
indeed with any conception at all that will allow “humanity” to count as the name of a 
kind of some kind. At least for creatures like us, whose temporal experience runs only 
over decades, hardly ever over centuries even, let alone the millions of years that 
speciation takes, it should not be a controversial thought that a population of creatures 
sharing a common genetic heritage, physiology, and ethology can sensibly be treated 
as a unitary grouping, as in fact common sense treats it. And that thought is all I am 
committed to meaning by “species”. 
 
 So it looks like humanism can resist these four objections. And it looks like 
humanism can accept, indeed welcome, the thought that humans are not the only 
persons, the only members of the primary moral constituency—or at least, they might 
easily not be. What about the question on the other side: the question whether all 
human beings are persons? I turn to this question in the next and final section. 
 
 
5. Are all human beings persons?  
 
 Humanism as I have developed it here straightforwardly implies that all 
human beings are persons. Our treatment of any human being should be conditioned 
by the background of expectations, hopes, and aspirations that spell out what we 
know, from experience, humans in general can be. Eudaimonia in its broad outlines is 
the same for all human beings; and requires, as a general rule, that we must give all 
human beings the space to achieve eudaimonia—whether or not they predictably will 
achieve eudaimonia. To deny this space to any individual human being is to exclude 
that individual from the moral community of persons. And that is a serious 
injustice.xxvii 
 
The very young are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they have not yet achieved many key forms of human eudaimonia; the 
mentally handicapped are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they cannot ever achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. As I pointed 
out in section 1, all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever 
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does everything she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are 
just too many things she could do).  In one way or another, all of us are less than fully 
free to pursue happiness; everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, 
or just plain ill, in some respect. That does not make it wrong to treat “normal” 
humans, whatever their age or IQ, with an interpretive charity, and with a kind of pity, 
that sees beyond their limitations, and leaves the door open, in each individual’s case, 
to what any human might become—even if we are well aware that this person here 
has no chance of becoming that.  
 
[T]he kind of care that was needed to make us what we have in fact become, 
independent practical reasoners, had to be, if it was to be effective, 
unconditional care for the human being as such, whatever the outcome. And 
this is the kind of care that we in turn now owe or will owe. Of the brain-
damaged, of those almost incapable of movement, of the autistic, of all such 
we have to say: This could have been us. (MacIntyre 1999: 100) 
 
There is the possibility of deep moral concern for retarded people, in which 
they are seen as having, however incomprehensible we may find it, a human 
fate, as much as anyone else’s…. Someone may be very touched by the 
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being 
touched an imaginative sense of shared humanity. (Diamond 1991: 55) 
 
The terminally ill are not an exception to this rule either, just because they 
cannot any longer achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. Perhaps it is true of 
them that they no longer have—to reuse Marquis’ phrase—“a future like ours”, and so 
will not achieve very much, or any, more eudaimonia before they die. Given that their 
futures have closed in on them in this radical way, you might call it “futile” to go on 
treating them with the full range of interpersonal hopes and expectations that you 
extend to any human, or to go on being as scrupulous about not killing them as you 
would be about anyone else. There again, you might also call it “respectful”; you 
might call it an expression of pity.  
 
To pity someone in the sense I have in mind is to think, as MacIntyre puts it, 
“this could have been us”: this person too is part of human life and shares in human 
ideals, even if the idea of realising them in almost any way is quite hopeless for him/ 
her. Such pity is a key part of our charity towards other people; of what is involved in 
recognising them as people, as fellow human beings.  
 
(It is interestingly not something that follows in any very clear way from an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics where the focus is, eudaimonistically, on maximal forms of 
flourishing—on how much you as a being can develop, not on how many relatively 
undeveloped beings you can extend charity towards. Indeed it is a notorious fact about 
Aristotle that there is something rather ruthlessly bright-eye-and-gleaming-coatxxviii 
about his conception of eudaimonia, and that—not unconnectedly—he seems to have 
had little room in his ethics for the notion of pity.xxix Pity is, however, part of the sorts 
of virtue ethics that we may find in a Christian writer like Simone Weil. And that is 
the sort that I would defend, though I cannot defend it here.)  
 
There are, as many people have emphasised, better and worse ways to die. 
And one of the worse ways to die is to have recognition of your humanity withdrawn 
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from you before it happens. Part of understanding why that is such a bad thing to have 
happen to you must, I think, depend on taking a different view from the criterialist’s 
about the locus of the value of persons. For the criterialist, apparently, the value of 
persons consists in their instantiating the person-constituting properties. Aside from 
such instantiations, persons, at the most basic level, have no value (compare the 
familiar view in bioethics that being alive in itself is neither good nor bad); indeed 
there is a sense in which, aside from such instantiations, there are no persons. What 
such a view of the value of persons obscures from view is the notion of loving an 
individual in itself; it seems to be only the properties of an individual that a consistent 
criterialist can love—and then, only when they are duly manifested. But the idea that 
the object of love is always and necessarily some property-instantiation, common 
though it is, is a dogma. If property-instantiations can be objects of love (we may 
fairly ask), why not things in other metaphysical categories: individual human beings, 
for example?xxx  
 
Alongside this dogma, perhaps there is another, related but slightly different, 
dogma at work in securing the foundations of criterialism. This is the dogma that 
whenever we answer the question “Why is X valuable?” by citing some valuable 
property V that X displays, what we must be really saying is always that it is (this 
instance of) V that is valuable, not X. But this too is a dogma, and unmasking it may 
be another way of setting ourselves free from the lures of criterialism. To cite V in 
explanation of the claim that X is valuable can, so to speak, be understood the other 
way around: you can take it that citing V is displaying a symptom, a reminder, of the 
value of X. When George Orwell, in a famous passage from his essay “A Hanging”, 
describes the growing fingernails and the refusal to walk through a puddle of the man 
who is about to be hanged, I take it that this latter thing is what he is doing.xxxi He is 
not saying that having growing fingernails is a value-giving property. Rather he is 
saying that being human is a value-giving property, the importance of which can be 
brought out for us by all sorts of exercises in the “assembling of reminders”—
including such reminders as the growth of fingernails. 
 
 “But all the same, isn’t there a profound difference between what we hope for 
in general for other people, and what we hope in the particular case of someone who 
is severely mentally handicapped?” There certainly is. There is always a distinction 
between the aspirations for other persons that are grounded in human eudaimonia in 
general, and the aspirations for specific other persons that are grounded in our 
particular knowledge of them as individuals. This distinction is just as applicable to 
the profoundly mentally handicapped as it is to anyone else. And it makes for the 
same commonalities, and the same differences, as with anyone else. If your friend is 
tone-deaf, there is no need to pretend that he will ever be Mozart; but that does not 
make it all right to take home all his CDs. If your friend loses both his legs in a skiing 
accident, you needn’t spend the rest of his life pretending to him that he can still ski; 
but you miss something vital, too, if you bounce into his hospital ward straight after 
his double amputation with the words “So, you won’t be wanting those ski-boots any 
more”. Many of the details of what counts as just and loving treatment of other 
persons are, certainly, set by the particular trajectories of their particular lives. But the 
most basic and elementary requirements of love and justice, is set by reference to the 
aspirations that arise from human eudaimonia in general. And this applies just as 
much to the mentally disabled as to anyone else.  
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In Nick Hornby’s very funny novel about suicidal depression, A Long Way 
Down, Maureen, the mother of a severely mentally disabled child, says this:  
 
This all began years ago, when I decided to decorate his bedroom. He was 
eight, and he still slept in a nursery—clowns on the curtains, bunny rabbits on 
the frieze round the wall, all the things I’d chosen when I was waiting for him 
and I didn’t know what he was. And it was all peeling away… and I hadn’t 
done anything about it because it made me think too much about all the things 
that weren’t happening to him, all the ways he wasn’t growing up. What was I 
going to replace the bunny rabbits with? He was eight, so perhaps trains and 
rocket ships and footballers were the right sort of thing for him—but of 
course, he didn’t know what any of those things were… But there again, he 
didn’t know what the rabbits were either, or the clowns. So what was I 
supposed to do? Everything was pretending, wasn’t it? The only thing I could 
do that wasn’t make-believe was paint the walls white, get a plain pair of 
curtains. That would be a way of [saying] that I knew he was a vegetable, a 
cabbage, and I wasn’t trying to hide it. But then, where does it stop? Does that 
mean you can never buy him a T-shirt with a word on it, or a picture, because 
he’ll never read, and he can’t make sense of pictures? And who knows 
whether he even gets anything out of colours, or patterns? And it goes without 
saying that talking to him is ridiculous, and smiling at him, and kissing him on 
the head. Everything I do is pretending, so why not pretend properly?  
In the end, I went for trains on the curtains, and your man from Star Wars on 
the lampshade. And soon after that, I started buying comics every now and 
then, just to see what a lad of his age might be reading and thinking about. 
And we started watching the Saturday morning television together, so I 
learned a little bit about pop singers he might like… thinking about these 
things helped me to see Matty, in a strange sort of way… I made up a son. 
(Nick Hornby, A Long Way Down, pp.118-9) 
 
Of course there is—as Maureen herself recognises—something delusional, 
and something pathetic, in her treatment of Matty.  For sure, her attitude to him is 
strained and exaggerated. But what we should not lose sight of is that it is a strained 
and exaggerated version of something morally indispensable: the kind of interpretive 
charity, the humanistic understanding and pity, that, I have argued here, we all need 
from everybody else all the time. In the words of an older writer: “Charity bears all 
things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”xxxii  
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Anscombe mistranslates zur Seele as “to a soul”; I have corrected this to “to the soul”. 
ii
 Perhaps we could do ethics entirely or almost entirely without using the word or concept “person”: so 
numerous philosophers have at times suggested, including Jenny Teichman (1996), Bernard Williams 
(2006a), Christopher Coope (2006), and myself (I have at least had this thought; I can’t now remember 
if it has ever seen the light of published day; something close to that thought is certainly at work in 
Chappell 1998, Chapter 4). However, I don’t pursue that idea here. 
iii
 Criterialism, as I call it, is pretty much the same view as what McMahan 2005, following Rachels 
1990, calls “moral individualism”. This is the view (Rachels 1990: 173) that “how an individual may 
be treated is determined, not by considering his group memberships, but by considering his own 
particular characteristics”.  
iv
 Or something very close to criterialism. I need not commit myself yet on whether these authors are 
defending necessary-and-sufficient-conditions versions of a criterial view. 
v
 Something like the criterial view pops up in many other places. For instance, it seems to be behind 
Olson 2007’s suggestion that “person” is a phase sortal: “Being a person may be only a temporary 
property of you, like being a philosopher”.  
vi
 It might be suggested that (some instance of) Criterialism is a bespoke view of personhood, aimed 
only at defining what persons are for some specific purpose. Such a position is perfectly possible, of 
course, but I think it is very clearly not what is at issue in discussions like the four I cite here, all of 
which are aimed at completely general conclusions about “what persons are”: what they are in their 
essence, and for any possible purpose. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.)  
vii
 For more on personhood and language, see Patterson and Gordon 1993.  
viii
 David Hume: “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible 
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist” (Treatise 1.6.3). Derek Parfit: “We could give a complete 
description of reality without claiming that persons exist” (Parfit 1984: 212). The Buddha: “There 
exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements” (quoted in Parfit 1984: 
502).  
ix
 Autism involves very various sorts of emotional dysfunction. It can involve over-emotionality and 
“inappropriate” emotional responses as well as a lack of emotional response. But that just underlines 
the absurdity of using “emotionality” as a necessary condition of personhood. For then autistics who 
are over-emotional will count as persons, autistics who are “cold” and “withdrawn” won’t. 
x
 There is a surprising contrast between some recent philosophers’ willingness to grant moral standing 
to “potential persons” in the sense of metaphysically possible future human beings who admittedly do 
not exist right now, and their reluctance to do so to “potential persons” in the sense of young human 
beings who admittedly do exist right now.   
xi
 “The wrongness of killing us is understood in terms of what killing does to us. Killing us imposes on 
us the misfortune of premature death. That misfortune underlies the wrongness... The misfortune of 
premature death consists in the loss to us of the future goods of consciousness... What makes my future 
valuable to me are those aspects of my future that I will (or would) value when I will (or would) 
experience them... What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us of a future of value. 
Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours.” (Marquis 1997: 
95-96) 
xii
 And it is nearly always the criterion, i.e. some one criterion, that we are talking about. (Warren’s list 
of six criteria is the only exception to this monism that I can think of.) The suspicion that the value of 
persons might be multiform not monistic, that there might be not just one simple and readily-articulable 
reason for valuing persons but all sorts of reasons, some of them far from simple or easy to put into 
words, is not at all a characteristic suspicion for criterialists.  
xiii
 About the argument that I develop from this point on, about “how we treat” people, it is natural to 
ask: are these descriptive or normative claims? The answer to that, as quite often with Wittgensteinians 
like (I suppose) me, is: a bit of both. What is on offer is a phenomenology of (part of) the moral life. 
My claim is that the most basic and fundamental truths about this phenomenology makes certain 
options in thinking about ethics that might seem attractive and viable, such as criterialism, actually 
incoherent, because of its mismatch with what is basic and fundamental. Because of how things are, 
there are some things we shouldn’t think or do: both a normative and a descriptive thesis. 
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Another worry that might occur to some here: am I attacking criterialism because it is a theory of 
personhood? If so, isn’t it hypocritical of me to go on to develop what is really just another theory of 
personhood? The answers are No and No. I’m not attacking criterialism because it’s a theory, but 
because it’s a rotten theory. A good theory (or if you dislike that word, a good philosophical account) 
of personhood will make good sense of our intuitions; this criterialism signally fails to do.  
(My thanks to anonymous referees for pressing these questions.) 
xiv
 The charming comparison is Singer’s: Singer 1993: 89-90. 
xv
 But when exactly? As part of the child’s fourth birthday celebrations? On going to primary school? 
Would a Singerian society have a ritual for an induction into personhood? 
xvi
 At least, the term “objective” is unfortunate if it implies, as I suspect it does in passages like the one 
from Strawson that I cite in the next Note, that there is something non-objective about participant 
reactive attitudes. 
xvii
 “We look with an objective eye on the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic or the tiresome 
behaviour of a very young child, thinking in terms of treatment or training. But we sometimes look 
with something like the same eye on the behaviour of the normal and the mature. We have this resource 
[the objective attitude] and can sometimes use it. Being human we cannot, in the normal case, do this 
for very long, or altogether. But what is above all interesting is the tension there is, in us, between the 
participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is tempted to say: between our humanity and our 
intelligence. But to say this would be to distort both notions.” (Strawson 1962: 66-67, with omissions) 
xviii
 “One speaks and expresses emotions to and not simply at one’s cat. Nonetheless, although we of 
course discipline them, we don’t press claims against or hold our pets accountable in the same way we 
do with one another... Granted, when I look into my cat’s eyes, I can’t get over the feeling that he is 
looking also into mine in some personal way or shake the hope that he is seeing me in some way other 
that ‘the guy who feeds me’. But I find it utterly impossible to sustain the thought that he can 
imaginatively enter into my point of view or acknowledge me as a being with an independent 
perspective.” (Darwall 2006: 43)  
Pets are an interesting case of something like a “pretend” interpersonal relationship, if “pretend” is the 
right thing to call it. We know that, unlike infants, our cats will never become responsive in the way 
that persons do. That doesn’t stop us (or at least the dedicated pet-owners among us) from extending 
something interestingly like the constitutive prolepsis even to cats, hamsters, or stick-insects. Children, 
of course, do something similar with their dolls or other toys—and here “pretend” clearly is the right 
word. For a recent fashion to which similar comments apply see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26FOB-2DLove-t.html . (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for drawing this to my attention.) 
xix
 “Intrinsic” in the sense of “essential”, I mean; not in the sense of “non-relational”, obviously. 
xx
 Gaita 1991: 117: “An animal can suffer, but it cannot curse the day it was born. An animal can be 
afraid, but it cannot be ashamed of its fear and despite itself. An animal can be happy, but it cannot be 
joyous. An animal cannot give of its substance to certain pursuits and be admonished for doing so. One 
could go on almost indefinitely. The problems of life’s meaning cannot arise for an animal. Only a 
being for whom life can be problematic can have a spiritual life, and therefore have a soul.” 
xxi
 For more examples applying this argument see Hills 2010: 235-7. 
xxii
 So I say. In the case of trees, of course, there was at least one stern Victorian moralist who thought 
otherwise, namely W.E.Gladstone, whose hobby was chopping down trees. 
xxiii
 For this speculation deployed for a different purpose, cp. Kahane 2010. 
xxiv
 Cp. Gerald the gorilla in the well-known Not the Nine O’Clock News sketch: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MpbMm0433I 
xxv
 “Suppose that the experiments attempting to teach language to chimpanzees had been successful 
beyond their originators’ wildest dreams. The apes in question gained a complete mastery of English 
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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Abstract  
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession 
of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so 
forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view 
confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal 
cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it 
to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what 
makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. 
And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines. Except in some 
interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human 
animals that we identify as persons. 
 
 
 2 
On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Meine Einstellung zu ihm ist eine Einstellung zur Seele. Ich habe nicht die Meinung, 
dass er eine Seele hat.  
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards thei soul. I am not of the opinion that 
he has a soul. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, p.152, tr. 
G.E.M.Anscombe) 
 
Love is conditioned by its object, but love also yields its object. (Gaita 1991: 122) 
 
 
1. Persons: humanism, speciesism, criterialism 
 
Any ethical outlook much like ours will take as central some primary moral 
constituency (PMC): some class of creatures who all alike, and all equally, share in 
the highest level of moral rights and privileges. Most philosophical ethicists use 
“person” to mean at least “member of the primary moral constituency” (whatever else 
they may also mean by “person”). In this paper, that is how I shall use the word too.ii  
 
So what makes any creature a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency? One view is what I shall call humanism:  
 
Humanism: Being human is sufficient for membership of the PMC. 
 
Humanism faces two very common objections. The first is that humanism is 
arbitrary discrimination, like racism, sexism, ageism; humanism, in Richard Ryder’s 
famous phrase, is speciesism. The second objection, which is really just the same idea 
taken a little deeper, says that humanism bases its demarcation of persons on a 
biological property which is morally insignificant. Membership of this or that 
species—just like membership of this or that race, gender, or age-group—is, we are 
told, a morally insignificant detail. It is not the kind of thing that we should expect 
any important moral distinction to be based on.  
 
In theory these objections could be put by anyone who rejected humanism. In 
practice they are usually put by proponents of another theory of personhood, which I 
shall call criterialism: 
 
Criterialism: Actual possession of the criterial properties is necessary and 
sufficient for membership of the PMC.iii 
 
 Here are four very well-known enunciations of criterialismiv: 
 
I propose to use “person”, in the sense of a rational and self-conscious being, 
to capture those elements of the popular sense of “human being” that are not 
covered by “member of the species Homo sapiens”. (Singer 1993: 87) 
 
 Persons are beings capable of valuing their own lives. (Harris 1985: 16-17) 
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An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of 
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such an entity. (Tooley 1972: 82) 
 
[The six key markers of personhood are] (1) sentience... (2) emotionality... (3) 
reason... (4) the capacity to communicate... (5) self-awareness... (6) moral 
agency. (Warren 1997: 83-84)v   
 
As here represented, the criterial view is an all-purposevi view about what 
personhood is, and why it matters, which is undeniably simple (as I shall argue, much 
too simple). Despite this simplicity, it is obvious, when criterialism is stated as baldly 
as it is in these four statements, that it has radical implications. Most noticeably, it 
implies a sharp contraction of the circle of intuitive moral concern. If rationality is a 
necessary condition of counting as a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency, then all children under a certain age will fail to count as persons. (This 
bullet is explicitly bitten by Tristan Engelhardt: “If being a person is to be [sic] a 
responsible agent, a bearer of rights and duties, children are not persons in a strict 
sense” (Engelhardt 1989: 120).) If self-consciousness is a necessary condition, then 
many mentally handicapped humans will fail to count as persons. If the capacity to 
communicate is a necessary condition, then Jean-Dominique Bauby, of The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly fame, would have failed to count as a person after his 
catastrophic stroke—had he not worked out how to signal with his eyelid.vii (Can 
whether Bauby is still a person after his stroke really depend on contingencies about 
whether he can still communicate?) If persons necessarily have “the concept of a self 
as a continuing subject”, and believe that they are such selves, then David Hume, 
Derek Parfit, and most Buddhists are not persons.viii If you cannot be a person unless 
you are capable of valuing your own life, then you cannot be both a person and a 
committed nihilist about value (i.e. someone who finds himself compelled to believe 
that no such thing as value exists). If persons have to possess “emotionality”, then Mr 
Spock in Star Trek is not a person, and neither, perhaps, are some extreme autistics.ix 
And so on. Criterialists can make personhood sound rather exclusive; it can seem as 
hard to qualify for personhood as it is to make membership of the Country Club. 
 
Of course, these problems are consequences of taking these “markers of 
personhood” as indicators of necessary conditions for personhood. A less extreme 
version of the criterial view might take each of the markers on some list, or some or 
other combination of the markers, as a sufficient condition of personhood: any 
creature that displays just one of these properties, or some large-enough variety of 
them, will count as a person. We might then want to argue about what counts as 
displaying a property, or possessing a capacity. Must I actually evince emotions to 
pass Warren’s emotionality test? How often, and how convincingly? Do I possess the 
capacity to communicate only when I have learned a language? Or just when I have 
learned to sign, or to get others to read my thoughts and feelings? Or do I have the 
capacity to communicate all along, just in virtue of being a member of a species that 
communicates, linguistically and in other ways?  
 
Here we touch on familiar and long-running debates about potentiality versus 
actuality in our assessments of personhood. It is commonplace for criterialists of 
Singer’s sort to point out that potential prime ministers obviously do not have the 
rights of actual prime ministers, so that “potential persons”x, or those with the 
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potential for what Don Marquis famously called “a future like ours”xi , can hardly be 
treated as the same moral category as actual persons, or “us”. It is equally 
commonplace for the opponents of Singer-style criterialism to object that there must 
be something wrong with an emphasis on actual properties that makes it a live 
question whether one is a person while asleep or under general anaesthetic.  
 
Clearly there are problems about at least some of the suggestions listed above 
about what the criteria of personhood might actually be. But not all those suggestions 
are implausible, and it would be easy enough, in principle, to weed out or refine the 
implausible ones. True, it is striking how little criterialists feel they need to do this; in 
practice, criterialists often seem perfectly happy to stick with what, intuitively, seem 
implausibly over-demanding criteria for personhood.  
 
However, the plausibility or otherwise of the various suggested criteria is not 
my main concern here. Obviously enough, other criteria could be devised which did 
not have these consequences. The key difficulties for criterialism that I want to 
emphasise in this paper are three.  
 
The first, which I can state very quickly, is about the argumentative method 
underlying criterialism. To put it at its simplest, it looks as if criterialists typically 
adopt their preferred criterion of moral significance because they think it explains 
moral intuitions which we have anyway. The criterion is adopted, in other words, 
because it doesn’t have counter-intuitive consequences.xii But then, the same criterion 
is deployed, by the very same authors—Peter Singer and John Harris, for example—
precisely to produce counter-intuitive consequences, such as the moral acceptability 
of killing small babies or the mentally disabled. There is, I think, a serious question as 
to what can possibly be going on here. It is not entirely obvious why building a moral 
theory out of one intuition or set of intuitions that we certainly have, and then using 
this theory to attack other intuitions that we also certainly have, is anything more than 
arbitrary selectiveness. Perhaps this is a question that all system-building moral theory 
faces. 
 
 The second difficulty for criterialism, which I shall also mention only very 
briefly, is that criterialism can seem to imply a quite implausible picture of moral 
reasoning. Are we really to suppose that what we do when we come across any being 
we haven’t met before is first see whether it satisfies our criterion for personhood, and 
then, if it does, start treating it as a person? One is reminded of that well-known 
caricature the Cartesian Detective: we start with the hypothesis—the opinion, as 
Wittgenstein says in my epigraph—that the new being is a person, and feel justified in 
acting in line with that hypothesis, just insofar as the behavioural evidence confirms 
it. If criterialism is to be at all plausible, it cannot in this way be a general view about 
our typical real-time interaction with others. Such a picture might apply to some very 
exceptional cases, some of which we will discuss in section 4b. But in general, 
criterialism will have to be a view about the criterion of rightness for taking other 
creatures to be persons, not about our decision procedure for assuming that they are 
persons. For quite obviously, our normal interaction with others typically involves no 
such Cartesian-Detective rigmarole, and it takes a good deal of philosophical 
callousing of the soul not to find something absurd, and morally repugnant too, about 
the idea that it even could. But if in general criterialism only states the criterion of 
rightness, and not our decision procedure, for taking other creatures to be persons, 
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then it still faces a further objection, my third—which it is the main purpose of this 
paper to develop. 
  
This third objection to criterialism, on which I shall spend the rest of this 
paper, is connected to this second point. My claim is that the sort of properties that 
criterialists home in on are not criteria of personhood at all. Rather, they are 
dimensions of interpretation of beings that we already take to be persons.  
 
For my own part, I have always been aware of at least a vague sense of 
discomfort and unease here, the moment we start talking about these (or any other) 
properties as if they were criteria for personhood of the sort the criterialists have in 
mind. There is a hard-to-articulate feeling that, despite the considerable first-blush 
plausibility of criterialism, it leaves out something crucial; a feeling of the kind that is 
naturally expressed in ordinary conversation by a trailing-off “Yes, but…”. I suspect 
that my unease is not unrelated to the unease that Raimond Gaita is bringing out when 
he writes (Gaita 1991: 115) that it is 
 
naïve to think that the kinds of properties which interest philosophers when 
they ask what is a person, and which we often share to some degree with 
higher animals, play the kind of role in our treatment of one another which is 
assumed by those who argue that differences in treatment must be justified by 
relevantly different properties of those kinds. That philosophical perspective 
from which we are encouraged to reassess our sense of how we might 
justifiably treat animals distorts and indeed cheapens our understanding of 
human life. 
 
Gaita 1991 is a marvellous exploration of one philosopher’s attempt to make 
articulate that trailing-off “Yes, but…”. This essay offers another philosopher’s. My 
attempt is not necessarily the same as Gaita’s, but not necessarily in competition with 
it either.  
 
And it is perhaps worth saying before I begin that what I am trying to do here, 
what Gaita was trying to do, is hard: hard to articulate, hard to state clearly, hard to 
see in the round, hard to apply. Again and again criterialism wins out in philosophers’ 
discussions of personhood because, conversely, it is dead easy; it is such a simple and 
straightforward view of personhood. There are plenty of spurious analogies between 
science and ethics around, but at any rate we can trust this one: no more in the case of 
the nature of the person than in the case of particle physics does the fact that a view is 
simple in any way improve its chances of being true.  
 
 
2. The proleptic view of personhood 
 
Contrary to what criterialism seems to suggest, we do not look for sentience or 
rationality or self-awareness in a creature as a test to decide whether or not that 
creature counts as a person. It’s the other way round. Having once decided, on other 
grounds, that a creature is a person, we know that this makes it the kind of creature 
which is likely to display sentience, rationality, self-awareness and the rest of the 
personal properties. Hence we look for displays of these properties from the creature. 
That is to say, we treat it as a person in advance of any such displays.xiii  
 6 
 
The biggest and clearest example of this is an activity that is absolutely central 
to human life: parenting. Parents are, of course, aware of the differences in rationality, 
linguistic capacity, self-representing ability, and so forth between young human 
beings at various ages and developmental stages. Nonetheless, a parent’s attitude 
towards her child is always, basically, what Wittgenstein famously calls “an attitude 
towards a soul”. She does not do what criterialism (especially if understood in 
decision-procedure terms) might seem to imply she should do: start out by treating her 
child as an inanimate object, like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber-plant, and grudgingly 
consent to adjust her attitude to it, one little step at a time, only as and when it proves 
itself more than inanimate by passing a succession of behavioural tests for at least 
having interests like a snail’s perhaps,xiv and then later on for the interests of some 
more advanced kind of animal such as a puppy, and eventually for full criterialist 
personhood.xv If parents did treat their children in this almost behaviouristic fashion, 
the parents would be callous monsters, and the children would be basket-cases. In a 
world where parents generally accepted this sort of criterial view, and applied it 
directly in their parenting practice, even the best-adjusted of us would be a wolf-child. 
 
Fortunately, however, parents are not criterialists, either in their decision 
procedure or in the criterion of rightness for ascriptions of personhood that they 
actually employ. Rather, a parent treats her child from the very beginning—and from 
before it is literally and actually true—as a creature that can reason, respond, reflect, 
feel, laugh, think about itself as a person, think about others as persons too, and do 
everything else that persons characteristically do. From the beginning her attitudes 
towards the child are not only “objective” (to use Strawson 1962: 67’s slightly 
unfortunate termxvi): they also include what he famously calls “participant reactive 
attitudes”, of just the same sort as she adopts towards anyone else.  
 
Of course, as Strawson impliesxvii, these participant reactive attitudes’ scope 
may be more restricted in the case of a very small baby. The point is that they are 
there; and that like the baby—often indeed in advance of the baby—they grow. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre notes in a recent discussion of the development of practical 
reasoning in the individual person (1999: 90), ethically and psychologically adequate 
parenthood centrally involves “a systematic refusal to treat the child in a way that is 
proportionate to its qualities and aptitudes” (that is, its actual and non-idealised 
qualities and aptitudes, the kind of qualities and aptitudes that interest the criterialist). 
 
The parent who says to her three day old baby, “What do you think? Should 
we give you some more milk now?”, or to her three year old toddler “How kind of 
you to share your toys with your sister when she’s sad!”, is not deluded about a 
neonate’s capacity for interpersonal practical reasoning, or a toddler’s capacity for 
calculatedly empathetic altruism. But she is not making a sentimental joke either. She 
is treating the baby or the toddler proleptically, in the light of the ideal of personhood. 
By years of treating her children as creatures who “have the personal properties”—in 
the sense that interests the criterialist—she makes it true that they are creatures who 
have the personal properties in just that sense.  
 
The child staggers across and plonks a book down on his sibling’s lap; the 
parent’s reaction is “How kind of you to let her share your book!” Is that, in fact, what 
the toddler was doing? The right answer to this question can be: “Yes it is—once the 
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parent has given this reaction.” The parent’s reaction is an interpretation of the child’s 
deed. Before the reaction, perhaps, there was no fact of the matter about what the little 
boy was doing: the child did not know himself what his action was. For all he knew 
about it, his action might as well have been simply a random sequence of bodily 
movements. But now that his mother offers her interpretation, the child, on his 
mother’s authority, learns to see himself a certain way. Because his mother frames his 
act as one with a certain meaning (as the giving of a gift), and because the child sees 
his mother as seeing his act this way, and because his mother sees the child as seeing 
her as seeing his act this way… (Grice 1957), the act comes to have that meaning.  
 
Paul Grice’s famous work on meaning and intention is even more relevant to 
another clear example of this sort of prolepsis, namely language-learning. A baby 
begins by babbling—that is, by producing all the sounds the human mouthparts can 
make. Some of these sounds get a response because they are sounds that occur in the 
parents’ language, while others don’t because they are not. (The inability of many 
English adults to pronounce the Scots ch in loch or the Welsh ll in Llanfair is a learnt 
inability, not mirrored in English babies, who can and do make both sounds until 
conditioned not to by English adults.) The baby “homes in” on the sounds, and then 
on the patterns or combinations of sounds, that get a response. Then it learns to 
correlate particular patterns of sounds with particular contexts by the same homing-in 
process. What the parents say is “She’s learned to say ‘tiger’” (my own first child’s 
first word). What has happened is that the parents, by treating their daughter as if she 
has the word for, and then the concept of, a tiger, have made it true that she has that 
word. (And, a little later perhaps, that concept too; though I am not suggesting that 
any one word or concept can be learned on its own: in Wittgenstein’s familiar image, 
“light dawns gradually over the whole” (On Certainty 141).) 
 
Stephen Darwall too talks of prolepsis when describing a third connected 
process, namely the process whereby we come to be, and to hold others, morally 
responsible (Darwall 2006: 87-88):  
 
There seem to be many cases where we wish to hold others accountable 
though we seem to have very good evidence that they are not free to act on 
moral reasons in the way our practices of holding someone fully responsible 
seem to presuppose… In some instances, for example with children, we seem 
simultaneously to move on two tracks in the process of inducting them into 
full second-person responsibility, sometimes treating them proleptically as 
though they were apt for second-personal address as a way of developing 
moral competence while nonetheless realising… that [at their developmental 
stage] this is an illusion. 
 
Or an illusion, at any rate, if you agree with the criterialist about what it takes 
to be “apt for second-personal address”, and/or about what it takes to “have the 
personal properties”. My point, with which Darwall might or might not agree—I’m 
not sure—is that what it takes does not have to be already-realised and –actualised 
capacities of the sorts that interest criterialists. (The mother who asks her neonate 
child “Shall I give you some milk?” is certainly engaging in second-person address, 
despite the manifold incapacities, perfectly well-known to her, of neonates.)  
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There is at least this much truth in Dennett 1987’s well-known idea of the 
“intentional stance”: persons constitute each other as persons, both as agents and as 
patients, by treating each other as persons, as agents and patients. Something like the 
Davidsonian “principle of charity” (Davidson 1980) is at work in our mutual 
interpretations. By charitably, and proleptically, interpreting the other as a person, I 
make him a person. 
 
The looseness and ambiguity of the term “person” is evident when we say 
things like this. In ordinary language, “person” can certainly, at one end of its 
semantic range, mean something like what Singer and other criterialists want it to 
mean, a “rational and self-conscious being” (or whatever). Yet at the other end of its 
semantic range, the ordinary-language term can also be a synonym for “human 
animal”. It seems to be part of the point of our person-concept to allow those young 
humans who are persons only in the “human animal” sense to enter into a continuum 
of meaning towards the far end of which they can become persons in much stronger 
senses. 
 
Many things in our shared life can be seen in this sort of way as aspirations 
towards an ideal which, like any ideal, is never fully realised. The basic sort of 
idealisation, the sort that grounds attributions of personhood, is not the only sort. We 
ascribe the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech to every human 
being, even though we know that small babies can’t speak and don’t assemble (not 
without help), and that acutely asocial loners may well never (or at least never again) 
actually exercise either right. The behaviour of parents, besides (as described) 
involving the person-constituting prolepsis in a particularly clear form, is also full of 
other similarly-patterned proleptic idealisations that might, on a criterialist’s view, be 
regarded as quite unrealistic. Parents give their children the opportunities to play the 
cello, to learn Spanish, to use their monthly allowances sensibly, to be polite to Great 
Aunt Maud (…), even though the parents may be fully aware that every one of these 
opportunities will in all probability be spurned. In minimally decent jurisdictions the 
treatment even of hardened criminals displays the same pattern of basic openness to 
the convict, however much of an unrealistic idealisation this openness may seem to 
involve: the jurisdiction goes on offering the criminals opportunities to reform, even 
though it is as good as certain that these opportunities will not be taken up. (I think 
that something like this refusal to “close the door” finally and irrevocably on the 
criminal is also, in connection perhaps with some thoughts about the state’s obligation 
to be fundamentally benevolent to the citizens for whose sake alone it after all exists, 
the ground of a good reason to reject capital punishment. But that’s another story.) 
 
In general, the idealisation that accords X the status due to a φer does not have 
to involve any kind of expectation that X will ever actually φ, or even can φ. What it 
does have to involve is the understanding that X is of a kind that characteristically 
includes φers. The human kind includes individuals who characteristically (at the 
right point in the human life-cycle) will freely assemble and speak. That is why it is 
not ridiculous to give the rights to free assembly, speech, and political action, e.g. 
becoming a senator, to any and every human, including asocial misanthropes, those 
(as yet, or as of recently) physically incapable of speech, and those who choose never 
to utter a word. Contrast the equine kind, which does not characteristically include 
any such individuals. That is why it is ridiculous to give these rights (or the status of a 
senator) to any horse.  
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Considered as a kind, children characteristically include individuals who learn 
the cello or Spanish or wise use of money or good manners to venerable relatives 
(well… eventually). That is why the parents who try to teach these lessons to their 
children are not acting absurdly even if they know in advance that this particular 
child is not going to respond—whereas parents who tried to teach these lessons to the 
family goldfish or the rubber plant would be acting absurdly. Similarly, there is 
nothing absurd about offering the old lag a place on the rehabilitation programme, 
even if it seems certain that this old lag will always refuse or abuse the offer: and the 
reason why not has to do with the general fact that some old lags do sometimes 
reform.  
 
A fortiori, there is nothing absurd about giving the rights of free speech, 
assembly, private choice and the rest of it to women, or to other races, or to 
homosexuals or transgender people, or to the disabled, or to gingers, or to the various 
other sorts of historically marginalised groups. People in these categories are not 
another kind, as horses and hamsters are. Their well-being is human well-being, just 
as white male heterosexuals’ is, and just as horses’ and hamsters’ well-being is not. 
That, in a nutshell, is why speciesism is not like racism or sexism. 
 
Clearly, then, this is not just a point about the induction of babies and very 
small children into the social life of humanity at large. All humans, even the healthy 
intelligent mature well-adjusted independent affluent adults that typical criterialism is 
so clearly focused on—the Country Club again—are always only incompletely and 
impurely agents. Incompletely, because we are never all agents can be. However well 
things go, we never do or even can reach the full potential of human well-being, 
which would include a fully worked-out articulation of our own agency, a full 
coordination and marshalling of our own forces and powers for action in the world: 
towards this we are always only, at best, on the way. And impurely, because each of 
us always can be interpreted, by a sufficiently determined sceptic, as not really an 
agent at all, but a victim of the instinctive or other determining external forces that 
constantly threaten anyone’s agency. To extend “an attitude towards a soul” towards 
anyone is always, and not just with children, an idealisation. As Tamar Schapiro notes 
within a Kantian framework (Schapiro 1999: 723): 
 
[T]here is a sense in which no one, regardless of age or maturity, is able to 
achieve autonomy on Kant’s view. This is because the notion of autonomy in 
Kant is an ideal concept which outstrips all possible realisations in experience. 
Strictly speaking, every instance of human willing is necessarily an imperfect 
realisation of transcendental freedom, and every virtuous character necessarily 
falls short of perfect virtue. And yet the applicability of the moral law depends 
on our mapping these ideal concepts onto ourselves and one another for the 
purposes of guiding action. So we are to regard the social world as a 
community of autonomous agents despite the fact that perfect realisations of 
autonomy are nowhere to be found. 
 
The criterialists are right to insist that properties like self-awareness, emotionality, 
rationality, and so forth are crucial parts of our concept of a person. It does not follow 
that these properties can be used as the criterialists want to use them: as tests for 
personhood. Even at the cool-hour level of the criterion of rightness—never mind the 
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real-time level of deliberative procedure—to treat someone as a person is not to put a 
tick in the box by her name, to show that she has passed some inspection or met some 
standard, of rationality or self-awareness or emotionality or whatever. Indeed, it 
seems no less arbitrary discrimination to say “Sorry, you’re not rational or self-aware 
or linguistically capable or emotionally responsive enough to count as a person” than 
to say “Sorry, you’re not white enough to count as a person”. Behavioural properties 
like rationality, self-awareness, emotionality are not tests for, but parts of the ideal of, 
personhood. To treat someone as a person is to engage with him as the kind of 
creature to which that ideal applies. So to treat him is not, at the deepest level, a 
response to his behaviour at all, but to his nature. To see some creature as a person is 
to take an attitude to that creature which, before any behavioural evidence comes in, is 
already different from our attitudes to creatures that (we think) aren’t persons. This is 
the second-person standpoint (to use the title of Darwall’s outstanding book): the 
attitude we take to persons, and do not take to sofas, fridges, or rubber plants.  
 
The fact that it takes charity, in more than one sense, to constitute persons 
imposes on persons a crucial sort of vulnerability and dependence: “The personal 
reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the 
manifestation of a certain degree of good will or regard on the part of other human 
beings towards ourselves” (Strawson 1962: 70). All human persons are, in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s splendidly apt phrase, “dependent rational animals”, as MacIntyre 
himself emphasises (MacIntyre 1999: 81-85): 
 
In most moral philosophy the starting point is one that already presupposes the 
existence of mature independent practical reasoners whose social relationships 
are the relationships of the adult world. Childhood, if noticed at all, is a topic 
that receives only brief and incidental attention… To become an effective 
independent practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which 
others have made an essential contribution. The earliest of these relate directly 
to our animal existence, to what we share in our development with members of 
other intelligent species… [But what] we [also] need from others, if we are not 
only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities 
of independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for 
fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical 
judgements… Acknowledgement of dependence is the key to independence.  
 
We are vulnerable to each other, and dependent on each other, because it is 
remarkably easy to attack persons by withdrawing the second-personal attitude from 
them. Part of the reason why it is so easy to stop seeing others as persons is, as I said 
before, because the interpersonal attitude always involves a degree of idealisation. 
There is always some truth in sceptical or cynical views that reject that idealisation. 
(For example, the human person is a physical object—even if it is not “merely” a 
physical object.) 
 
We fail to see others as persons in a small way when we explain away what 
others do, or refuse to listen to them or to take their wishes and ambitions seriously. 
(Parents are never perfect in charity; children’s protests against such treatment are a 
recurring theme of family life.) We do it in bigger ways when we “use” others, or (in 
Kant’s phrase) fail to treat them as “ends in themselves”. At the limit, we can 
withdraw the interpersonal attitude from others completely, by pretending that they 
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simply aren’t there, as British and Irish settlers did to the aboriginal Australians under 
their notorious legal doctrine of terra nullius (see Gaita 1998). Or we can do it by 
treating them merely as physical objects, as often happens in pornography, violence, 
and murder. Or, lastly, we can do it by declaring them “non-persons”, as the Nazis did 
to the Jews—and as criterialists routinely do to the very old, the very young, and the 
very disabled.  
 
 The personal properties, then, set the content of the ideal of personhood. They 
do not set the boundaries of the class of persons (the PMC, as I’ve also called it). 
What does set the boundaries? That is my question in section 3. My answer will be 
the humanist answer already advertised in section 1: roughly, the boundaries of the 
class of persons are the boundaries of the human species.  
 
 
3. The truth in speciesism 
 
Rubber plants, fridges, sofas, human babies: we come to the last of these four 
sorts of things with a very different attitude from our attitudes to the other three sorts. 
And my point is that we come to them with different attitudes. Our attitudes to them 
are not responses to evidence that we gather after we have “come to them”. The 
moment I meet a rubber plant or a fridge, I am perfectly sure, unless my sanity is in 
question, that it will not attempt to talk to me or tickle me—as, say, a baby might.  
 
What makes me so sure of that? Well, simply the sort of thing a rubber plant 
or a fridge is, and the kinds of behaviour that it is natural to expect from that sort of 
thing. Rubber plants and fridges are not the kind of thing that tries to talk to you or 
tickle you. Babies are. And if you ask “What kind of thing is that?”, the obvious 
answer is: “Young human beings”. If some creature is a human being, it is completely 
natural to expect it to be the kind of thing that might (at least if it’s a family member) 
try to talk to you, or tickle you, or otherwise demonstrate its (budding) mastery of the 
kinds of mental capacity that criterialists take to be criteria. (Talking to someone and 
tickling someone both require interesting interpersonal capabilities. To do either, you 
have to want things to be a certain way for someone else—roughly, you have to want 
to get them to think a thought, or to feel a tickle. These are wants with quite 
sophisticated contents.)  
 
This sort of expectation is based squarely on the nature of the creature in 
question. And that means, on its nature as a member of the human species. Our 
understanding of which creatures are persons, and so may be expected to exhibit the 
personal properties, is not formed on an individual basis but on the basis of 
generalisation from experience of humans in general. I have already mentioned 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “my attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul”; 
on the same page of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein also says that “the 
human body is the best picture of the human soul” (der menschliche Körper ist das 
beste Bild der menschlichen Seele). And perhaps what he means is this: that when we 
see that some creature is a human, just seeing that is enough to license us to adopt the 
interpersonal attitude to that creature.  
 
We know in advance how we can expect any particular rubber plant or fridge 
to behave, because we can draw on a bank of past experience (our own and others’) of 
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rubber plants and fridges. In this sense, the fact that a thing is a rubber plant or a 
fridge sets the scope of our expectations about it. In just the same way, we know what 
kinds of capacities and properties humans in general have. It is that background 
knowledge that we draw on, whenever we apply the interpersonal attitude to any 
individual human being, simply on the basis that it is a human being.  
 
We obviously do the same with other species of animals. When I meet a cat or 
a gerbil, I treat it neither as an inanimate object like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber 
plant, nor as a person. (Not, of course, that I treat all inanimate objects the same, 
either. Sofas, fridges, and rubber plants are very different things, especially rubber 
plants.) You can play games with a gerbil. With a dog or a cat, you can even have a 
cuddle (in the reciprocal sense, I mean).xviii Neither is possible with a fridge. On the 
other hand, you would be wrong to expect a dog to play a good hand of contract 
bridge, or a cat to give you good investment advice, or a gerbil to read your mind, as a 
human being might. What you expect of an individual dog or individual cat will be 
different from what you expect of an individual gerbil, and both will be different from 
your expectations of inanimate objects. In each case, your expectations will be set by 
your background knowledge of the different kinds in question. Where dogs, gerbils, 
cats, and indeed all other kinds of living thing are concerned, this obviously means the 
different species in question. Why should it be otherwise with humans? 
 
These remarks should enable us to see—pace the criterialists—how central it 
is, to our moral responses to the things and creatures around us, to assign them to 
species. It is species-assignments that enable us to answer what you might reasonably 
think is the most basic question of all about any thing that might be in front of us at 
any time: namely, what kind of thing it is. Until we know what species it is, we do not 
know how it may act, or how to treat it: what is good for it, how we might harm or 
hinder it, what counts as health for it, and so on. The nature of the creature determines 
what well-being is for it; and its nature is its species. To put it another way, the best 
way to answer “What is it?”, when this question is asked about any individual animal, 
is to give the name of its species. Or as we might ask moral individualists like 
McMahan: “If species-membership isn’t an intrinsic property, what is?” Singer, 
Rachels, and McMahan never tell us why being human cannot count as any creature’s 
“own particular characteristic”. It can’t be merely because being human is a group 
membership (as McMahan 2005 suggests). For there is nothing to stop a given 
property from being both a “group membership” and an “own particular 
characteristic”; that is how it is with being a vertebrate, for instance. To put it more 
formally, nothing stops a given property from being both a relational property, and 
also an intrinsic property.xix Indeed, if Kripke is right in his well-known thesis of the 
metaphysical necessity of origin, such properties must be very common. 
 
This shows how humanism can be true without falling prey to a charge of 
arbitrary speciesism. To treat any species of creatures as persons is to treat them, not 
as successful passers of some test for the personal qualities, but on the assumption 
that they are individuals of a species the ideal for which is (roughly) the highest 
attainable development of those qualities. In this sense, references to species are an 
ineliminable part of our talk about persons.  
 
In that sense, but not in some others. We are now in a position to respond to 
four familiar objections to “speciesism”. I consider these in section 4. The aim of my 
 13 
response is not of course to defend speciesism, if that is defined as “arbitrary moral 
discrimination on the grounds of species”. But it is to defend humanism, the view that 
not all moral discrimination on the grounds of species is arbitrary. 
 
 
4. Four objections to speciesism  
 
a. All animals are equal. Peter Singer (1993: 57) writes that “No matter what 
the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering of any other being”. Nothing I have said so far commits 
me to rejecting this application of the principle of equality. If I were to accept it, I 
would want to add, first, that plenty of other things besides suffering “count”, and 
secondly, that however alike human and animal pain (the physical sensation) may be, 
human and animal suffering (the state of mind) are mostly quite unlike. A cat can be 
tortured like Gloucester, but it cannot suffer like King Lear.xx And suffering matters 
more than pain. 
 
But perhaps we should reject this application of equality anyway. Right now 
there is (quite likely) monstrous pain, and a fair amount of suffering too, on the plains 
of the Serengeti, where a wounded buffalo is being eaten alive by a pride of lions. 
Singer’s principle of equality requires us to say that our duty to prevent the buffalo’s 
pain and suffering in the teeth of the lions is directly proportional to the amount of 
pain and suffering involved. If any implication of any moral theory is absurd, this one 
is. There just isn’t any duty, not even a prima facie one, for us to act as Zoological 
Pain Police. (Don’t say: “We can’t intervene, because the lions might eat us”. Where 
is your moral courage? And don’t say: “But it causes less pain in nature overall if we 
don’t intervene in nature in this sort of way.” As many writers on the theological 
problem of evil are keen to remind us, most animal suffering is gratuitous. If lions can 
be caught and trained to jump through hoops, perhaps they can be caught and trained 
to kill their prey cleanly before eating it. So is anyone trying to train them? Of course 
they’re not.) The vast majority of the huge amount of animal pain and suffering that 
happens every day is simply none of our business. “It is not an accident or a limitation 
or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a 
condition of our existence and our sanity” (Williams 2006: 147).xxi  
 
So it looks like Singer’s principle that all suffering counts for the same, no 
matter what the species involved, is just false. On the other hand, some weaker 
principle of this general sort seems clearly true: perhaps “Animal suffering is bad for 
the same sort of reasons as human suffering is bad”, or something like that. What also 
seems clearly true is that humans should do what they can not to generate animal 
suffering, and to prevent animals from being needlessly hurt or damaged by humans 
(and sometimes, though less often, by accident or by each other). This is a much 
weaker principle than Singer’s equality-of-suffering principle. But perhaps even this 
is strong enough to generate a good argument for vegetarianism. I suspect it all 
depends what counts as needless hurt or harm. 
 
 Hence “the limit of sentience” is not “the only defensible boundary of 
concern for the interests of others” (Singer 1993: 58). Certainly that limit marks one 
distinction between the ways we should take an interest in the welfare of other 
creatures. For example, hacking a frog to pieces is wrong in a way that hacking an 
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orange to pieces is not, partly because an orange certainly cannot feel pain, and a frog 
pretty definitely can. But only partly. Quite aside from the pain involved, destroying a 
living creature for fun is wrong in a way that destroying a piece of fruit for fun is not. 
(Hacking trees, or anaesthetised frogs, to pieces for fun is usually wrong too.xxii) 
Unless we think that nothing matters except pain and pleasure—and this is not, e.g., 
Singer’s position either (Singer 1993: xi)—there is no reason to think that the 
distinction between sentience and non-sentience is the only fundamental moral 
distinction we can make among beings; nor that it is the most important.  
 
There are some interesting complications about the notion of sentience. If 
“sentience” means simply “capacity to feel (sensational) pain and pleasure”, then 
sentience does not fit the story that I have developed about how the personal 
properties come into being. The capacity to feel pain- and pleasure-sensations is 
certainly one of the capacities that we expect to find in any human person. But it is 
not, unlike rationality or intentionality, a capacity whose presence in any person is 
even partly constituted by others’ idealising assumption, expectation, or hope that it is 
there. Whether or not a being can feel pain does not depend on others’ adopting 
“participant attitudes” or taking the “intentional stance” towards him, in the way that 
(I have argued) his capacities for self-consciousness, rationality, and suffering do. I 
don’t think this shows that sentience is a counter-example to my thesis about how the 
person-constituting properties are developed. Rather, I think it shows that sentience is 
not one of the person-constituting properties. A creature which had the (other) person-
constituting properties, but lacked the capacity for pain- and pleasure-sensations, 
would still undeniably be a person.xxiii A creature which had the capacity for pain and 
pleasure, but lacked the (other) person-constituting properties, surely would not be. 
 
b. Aliens, talking chimps, Locke’s parrot, and a possessed fridge. The position that I 
am defending under the name of humanism says that, normally, to be a person it is 
sufficient to be a human being. Not necessary, because humanism does not imply that 
members of other species could not be drawn into the moral community of human 
persons. On the contrary, I can see at least three distinct ways in which this could 
happen. One is that we could discover a whole species—aliens, or angels, or what 
have you—which is like the human species in that its members are characteristically 
persons (in one sense or another). A second is that a species already known to us 
might, en masse, somehow change so as to become characteristically persons. Or, 
third, some particular individual creature—Locke’s parrot, say (Locke, Essay 2.27), 
or Washoe the chimp (Singer 1993: 111)xxiv, or some group of creatures, like Peter 
Carruthers’ Chimp Class of ’92xxv—might start to count as persons, perhaps e.g. by 
displaying the personal properties, even though this behaviour is otherwise 
completely untypical of the species in question. (Come to that, I suppose a possessed 
fridge might, in principle, start displaying the personal properties.)  
 
In these special cases, we perhaps will have to appeal to something like the 
criterial view of personhood as our decision procedure for the vexed cases. 
Apparently we will have to ask whether this alien species, or this new class of highly-
educated chimps, or this individual chimp, parrot, or spooky fridge, displays 
something like the criterialist’s personal properties, before we can decide whether to 
count these beings as persons.  
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Doesn’t this show that my arguments against criterialism were mistaken? Not 
at all. It does show that something like criterialism may perhaps be our decision 
procedure if and when we encounter a being that we do not already know how to 
classify as a person or not a person by way of its species. (Perhaps; actually I doubt 
even this much is true, but at any rate it is the most that is true.) However, it would be 
utterly misleading to generalise from thought-experiments about these special and rare 
cases—almost all of which, to date, are imaginary—to alleged conclusions about the 
normal cases. (It would be as misleading to do that as it would be generalise the 
justificatory/ rational structure of every belief we have about the external world from 
the justificatory/ rational structure of the external-world beliefs that we might form 
when we are thinking about the classic, and nearly always imaginary, sceptical 
predicaments.) Unfortunately, just this generalisation is a criterialist stock-in-trade. 
The most famous example of it is perhaps Mary Anne Warren’s derivation of the 
personal properties (her list was quoted in section 1) from an imagined meeting with 
aliens. But even if Warren is right that this is the decision procedure that we would 
have to adopt with aliens to settle whether they were persons in some extraordinary 
imaginary scenario, nothing at all follows about our beliefs (either at the decision-
procedure or at the criterion-of-rightness level) about whether any humans are persons 
in a multitude of ordinary real scenarios. For we have met humans before. 
 
But anyway, I suspect Warren’s description is much too black-and-white to 
get anywhere near characterising the decision procedure that would really be involved 
in such a meeting. (This is why I say, above, only that we would probably have to use 
something like the criterialist approach in alien encounters and similar.) For one thing, 
there is not the slightest reason to think that, in such a meeting, yes and no would be 
the only possible answers available to the question “Are these persons?”. Even Star 
Trek yields a rather subtler answer—“It’s life, Jim, but not as we know it”; the world, 
after all, is a complicated place, and it constantly throws us surprises. For another, our 
responses in such situations would be—or should I say will be?—based on all sorts of 
factors and reactions, most of them probably defying explicit articulation; on 
judgements about “forms of life”, in fact. It would not and could not be based on 
some neatly finite check-list of diagnostic properties like Warren’s. Looking beyond 
Star Trek, science fiction is full of wonderfully complex and subtle explorations of 
such encounters. The contrast with the mechanical simplicities of a criterialist list 
such as Warren suggests is instructive—and not entirely to be dismissed as unfair on 
the grounds that Warren is, after all, not writing science fiction. 
 
c. The two-species scenario. A third interesting objection to speciesism is 
offered by Peter Carruthers: 
 
Suppose it had been discovered that human beings in fact consist of two 
distinct species, otherwise hardly distinguishable from one another, the 
members of which cannot inter-breed. In these circumstances it would plainly 
be objectionable for the members of the majority species to attempt to 
withhold moral rights from the members of the minority, on the mere ground 
of difference of species. This, too, would be obvious speciesism. (Carruthers 
1992 Ch 3) 
 
Carruthers, I think, is quite right to claim that it would alter nothing morally 
speaking if we discovered that “the human species” was in fact two different 
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biological species—perhaps homo neanderthalis and homo sapiens—living together 
in a single moral community. (Modulo the point about not interbreeding, some 
anthropologists think that this has actually happened: Trinkaus and Shipman 1993.) 
Pace Carruthers, his argument does not show that that there is no species-
classification that bestows participation in the moral community on its members, and 
so that species-classifications are morally irrelevant. What his argument shows is that 
there may be more than one species-classification (or other kind-classification) that 
bestows participation in the primary moral constituency on its members. That is 
something that we should grant anyway given the possibility of other species whose 
members are characteristically persons; and it is not inconsistent with the claim that 
species-classifications are morally significant.xxvi 
 
d. Species and Darwinism. A fourth objection to my argument is the claim that 
species don’t exist: that as a matter of strict biology, there is no clear differentiation 
between humankind and “other species”, only a differentiation between different parts 
of the same evolutionary family tree. Species therefore are populations, not 
Aristotelian (or Kripkean) natural kinds (Sober 1994). True, but irrelevant to my 
argument, which can work equally well with the population conception of species, or 
indeed with any conception at all that will allow “humanity” to count as the name of a 
kind of some kind. At least for creatures like us, whose temporal experience runs only 
over decades, hardly ever over centuries even, let alone the millions of years that 
speciation takes, it should not be a controversial thought that a population of creatures 
sharing a common genetic heritage, physiology, and ethology can sensibly be treated 
as a unitary grouping, as in fact common sense treats it. And that thought is all I am 
committed to meaning by “species”. 
 
 So it looks like humanism can resist these four objections. And it looks like 
humanism can accept, indeed welcome, the thought that humans are not the only 
persons, the only members of the primary moral constituency—or at least, they might 
easily not be. What about the question on the other side: the question whether all 
human beings are persons? I turn to this question in the next and final section. 
 
 
5. Are all human beings persons?  
 
 Humanism as I have developed it here straightforwardly implies that all 
human beings are persons. Our treatment of any human being should be conditioned 
by the background of expectations, hopes, and aspirations that spell out what we 
know, from experience, humans in general can be. Eudaimonia in its broad outlines is 
the same for all human beings; and requires, as a general rule, that we must give all 
human beings the space to achieve eudaimonia—whether or not they predictably will 
achieve eudaimonia. To deny this space to any individual human being is to exclude 
that individual from the moral community of persons. And that is a serious 
injustice.xxvii 
 
The very young are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they have not yet achieved many key forms of human eudaimonia; the 
mentally handicapped are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they cannot ever achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. As I pointed 
out in section 1, all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever 
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does everything she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are 
just too many things she could do).  In one way or another, all of us are less than fully 
free to pursue happiness; everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, 
or just plain ill, in some respect. That does not make it wrong to treat “normal” 
humans, whatever their age or IQ, with an interpretive charity, and with a kind of pity, 
that sees beyond their limitations, and leaves the door open, in each individual’s case, 
to what any human might become—even if we are well aware that this person here 
has no chance of becoming that.  
 
[T]he kind of care that was needed to make us what we have in fact become, 
independent practical reasoners, had to be, if it was to be effective, 
unconditional care for the human being as such, whatever the outcome. And 
this is the kind of care that we in turn now owe or will owe. Of the brain-
damaged, of those almost incapable of movement, of the autistic, of all such 
we have to say: This could have been us. (MacIntyre 1999: 100) 
 
There is the possibility of deep moral concern for retarded people, in which 
they are seen as having, however incomprehensible we may find it, a human 
fate, as much as anyone else’s…. Someone may be very touched by the 
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being 
touched an imaginative sense of shared humanity. (Diamond 1991: 55) 
 
The terminally ill are not an exception to this rule either, just because they 
cannot any longer achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. Perhaps it is true of 
them that they no longer have—to reuse Marquis’ phrase—“a future like ours”, and so 
will not achieve very much, or any, more eudaimonia before they die. Given that their 
futures have closed in on them in this radical way, you might call it “futile” to go on 
treating them with the full range of interpersonal hopes and expectations that you 
extend to any human, or to go on being as scrupulous about not killing them as you 
would be about anyone else. There again, you might also call it “respectful”; you 
might call it an expression of pity.  
 
To pity someone in the sense I have in mind is to think, as MacIntyre puts it, 
“this could have been us”: this person too is part of human life and shares in human 
ideals, even if the idea of realising them in almost any way is quite hopeless for him/ 
her. Such pity is a key part of our charity towards other people; of what is involved in 
recognising them as people, as fellow human beings.  
 
(It is interestingly not something that follows in any very clear way from an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics where the focus is, eudaimonistically, on maximal forms of 
flourishing—on how much you as a being can develop, not on how many relatively 
undeveloped beings you can extend charity towards. Indeed it is a notorious fact about 
Aristotle that there is something rather ruthlessly bright-eye-and-gleaming-coatxxviii 
about his conception of eudaimonia, and that—not unconnectedly—he seems to have 
had little room in his ethics for the notion of pity.xxix Pity is, however, part of the sorts 
of virtue ethics that we may find in a Christian writer like Simone Weil. And that is 
the sort that I would defend, though I cannot defend it here.)  
 
There are, as many people have emphasised, better and worse ways to die. 
And one of the worse ways to die is to have recognition of your humanity withdrawn 
 18 
from you before it happens. Part of understanding why that is such a bad thing to have 
happen to you must, I think, depend on taking a different view from the criterialist’s 
about the locus of the value of persons. For the criterialist, apparently, the value of 
persons consists in their instantiating the person-constituting properties. Aside from 
such instantiations, persons, at the most basic level, have no value (compare the 
familiar view in bioethics that being alive in itself is neither good nor bad); indeed 
there is a sense in which, aside from such instantiations, there are no persons. What 
such a view of the value of persons obscures from view is the notion of loving an 
individual in itself; it seems to be only the properties of an individual that a consistent 
criterialist can love—and then, only when they are duly manifested. But the idea that 
the object of love is always and necessarily some property-instantiation, common 
though it is, is a dogma. If property-instantiations can be objects of love (we may 
fairly ask), why not things in other metaphysical categories: individual human beings, 
for example?xxx  
 
Alongside this dogma, perhaps there is another, related but slightly different, 
dogma at work in securing the foundations of criterialism. This is the dogma that 
whenever we answer the question “Why is X valuable?” by citing some valuable 
property V that X displays, what we must be really saying is always that it is (this 
instance of) V that is valuable, not X. But this too is a dogma, and unmasking it may 
be another way of setting ourselves free from the lures of criterialism. To cite V in 
explanation of the claim that X is valuable can, so to speak, be understood the other 
way around: you can take it that citing V is displaying a symptom, a reminder, of the 
value of X. When George Orwell, in a famous passage from his essay “A Hanging”, 
describes the growing fingernails and the refusal to walk through a puddle of the man 
who is about to be hanged, I take it that this latter thing is what he is doing.xxxi He is 
not saying that having growing fingernails is a value-giving property. Rather he is 
saying that being human is a value-giving property, the importance of which can be 
brought out for us by all sorts of exercises in the “assembling of reminders”—
including such reminders as the growth of fingernails. 
 
 “But all the same, isn’t there a profound difference between what we hope for 
in general for other people, and what we hope in the particular case of someone who 
is severely mentally handicapped?” There certainly is. There is always a distinction 
between the aspirations for other persons that are grounded in human eudaimonia in 
general, and the aspirations for specific other persons that are grounded in our 
particular knowledge of them as individuals. This distinction is just as applicable to 
the profoundly mentally handicapped as it is to anyone else. And it makes for the 
same commonalities, and the same differences, as with anyone else. If your friend is 
tone-deaf, there is no need to pretend that he will ever be Mozart; but that does not 
make it all right to take home all his CDs. If your friend loses both his legs in a skiing 
accident, you needn’t spend the rest of his life pretending to him that he can still ski; 
but you miss something vital, too, if you bounce into his hospital ward straight after 
his double amputation with the words “So, you won’t be wanting those ski-boots any 
more”. Many of the details of what counts as just and loving treatment of other 
persons are, certainly, set by the particular trajectories of their particular lives. But the 
most basic and elementary requirements of love and justice, is set by reference to the 
aspirations that arise from human eudaimonia in general. And this applies just as 
much to the mentally disabled as to anyone else.  
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In Nick Hornby’s very funny novel about suicidal depression, A Long Way 
Down, Maureen, the mother of a severely mentally disabled child, says this:  
 
This all began years ago, when I decided to decorate his bedroom. He was 
eight, and he still slept in a nursery—clowns on the curtains, bunny rabbits on 
the frieze round the wall, all the things I’d chosen when I was waiting for him 
and I didn’t know what he was. And it was all peeling away… and I hadn’t 
done anything about it because it made me think too much about all the things 
that weren’t happening to him, all the ways he wasn’t growing up. What was I 
going to replace the bunny rabbits with? He was eight, so perhaps trains and 
rocket ships and footballers were the right sort of thing for him—but of 
course, he didn’t know what any of those things were… But there again, he 
didn’t know what the rabbits were either, or the clowns. So what was I 
supposed to do? Everything was pretending, wasn’t it? The only thing I could 
do that wasn’t make-believe was paint the walls white, get a plain pair of 
curtains. That would be a way of [saying] that I knew he was a vegetable, a 
cabbage, and I wasn’t trying to hide it. But then, where does it stop? Does that 
mean you can never buy him a T-shirt with a word on it, or a picture, because 
he’ll never read, and he can’t make sense of pictures? And who knows 
whether he even gets anything out of colours, or patterns? And it goes without 
saying that talking to him is ridiculous, and smiling at him, and kissing him on 
the head. Everything I do is pretending, so why not pretend properly?  
In the end, I went for trains on the curtains, and your man from Star Wars on 
the lampshade. And soon after that, I started buying comics every now and 
then, just to see what a lad of his age might be reading and thinking about. 
And we started watching the Saturday morning television together, so I 
learned a little bit about pop singers he might like… thinking about these 
things helped me to see Matty, in a strange sort of way… I made up a son. 
(Nick Hornby, A Long Way Down, pp.118-9) 
 
Of course there is—as Maureen herself recognises—something delusional, 
and something pathetic, in her treatment of Matty.  For sure, her attitude to him is 
strained and exaggerated. But what we should not lose sight of is that it is a strained 
and exaggerated version of something morally indispensable: the kind of interpretive 
charity, the humanistic understanding and pity, that, I have argued here, we all need 
from everybody else all the time. In the words of an older writer: “Charity bears all 
things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”xxxii  
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Anscombe mistranslates zur Seele as “to a soul”; I have corrected this to “to the soul”. 
ii
 Perhaps we could do ethics entirely or almost entirely without using the word or concept “person”: so 
numerous philosophers have at times suggested, including Jenny Teichman (1996), Bernard Williams 
(2006a), Christopher Coope (2006), and myself (I have at least had this thought; I can’t now remember 
if it has ever seen the light of published day; something close to that thought is certainly at work in 
Chappell 1998, Chapter 4). However, I don’t pursue that idea here. 
iii
 Criterialism, as I call it, is pretty much the same view as what McMahan 2005, following Rachels 
1990, calls “moral individualism”. This is the view (Rachels 1990: 173) that “how an individual may 
be treated is determined, not by considering his group memberships, but by considering his own 
particular characteristics”.  
iv
 Or something very close to criterialism. I need not commit myself yet on whether these authors are 
defending necessary-and-sufficient-conditions versions of a criterial view. 
v
 Something like the criterial view pops up in many other places. For instance, it seems to be behind 
Olson 2007’s suggestion that “person” is a phase sortal: “Being a person may be only a temporary 
property of you, like being a philosopher”.  
vi
 It might be suggested that (some instance of) Criterialism is a bespoke view of personhood, aimed 
only at defining what persons are for some specific purpose. Such a position is perfectly possible, of 
course, but I think it is very clearly not what is at issue in discussions like the four I cite here, all of 
which are aimed at completely general conclusions about “what persons are”: what they are in their 
essence, and for any possible purpose. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.)  
vii
 For more on personhood and language, see Patterson and Gordon 1993.  
viii
 David Hume: “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible 
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist” (Treatise 1.6.3). Derek Parfit: “We could give a complete 
description of reality without claiming that persons exist” (Parfit 1984: 212). The Buddha: “There 
exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements” (quoted in Parfit 1984: 
502).  
ix
 Autism involves very various sorts of emotional dysfunction. It can involve over-emotionality and 
“inappropriate” emotional responses as well as a lack of emotional response. But that just underlines 
the absurdity of using “emotionality” as a necessary condition of personhood. For then autistics who 
are over-emotional will count as persons, autistics who are “cold” and “withdrawn” won’t. 
x
 There is a surprising contrast between some recent philosophers’ willingness to grant moral standing 
to “potential persons” in the sense of metaphysically possible future human beings who admittedly do 
not exist right now, and their reluctance to do so to “potential persons” in the sense of young human 
beings who admittedly do exist right now.   
xi
 “The wrongness of killing us is understood in terms of what killing does to us. Killing us imposes on 
us the misfortune of premature death. That misfortune underlies the wrongness... The misfortune of 
premature death consists in the loss to us of the future goods of consciousness... What makes my future 
valuable to me are those aspects of my future that I will (or would) value when I will (or would) 
experience them... What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us of a future of value. 
Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours.” (Marquis 1997: 
95-96) 
xii
 And it is nearly always the criterion, i.e. some one criterion, that we are talking about. (Warren’s list 
of six criteria is the only exception to this monism that I can think of.) The suspicion that the value of 
persons might be multiform not monistic, that there might be not just one simple and readily-articulable 
reason for valuing persons but all sorts of reasons, some of them far from simple or easy to put into 
words, is not at all a characteristic suspicion for criterialists.  
xiii
 About the argument that I develop from this point on, about “how we treat” people, it is natural to 
ask: are these descriptive or normative claims? The answer to that, as quite often with Wittgensteinians 
like (I suppose) me, is: a bit of both. What is on offer is a phenomenology of (part of) the moral life. 
My claim is that the most basic and fundamental truths about this phenomenology makes certain 
options in thinking about ethics that might seem attractive and viable, such as criterialism, actually 
incoherent, because of its mismatch with what is basic and fundamental. Because of how things are, 
there are some things we shouldn’t think or do: both a normative and a descriptive thesis. 
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Another worry that might occur to some here: am I attacking criterialism because it is a theory of 
personhood? If so, isn’t it hypocritical of me to go on to develop what is really just another theory of 
personhood? The answers are No and No. I’m not attacking criterialism because it’s a theory, but 
because it’s a rotten theory. A good theory (or if you dislike that word, a good philosophical account) 
of personhood will make good sense of our intuitions; this criterialism signally fails to do.  
(My thanks to anonymous referees for pressing these questions.) 
xiv
 The charming comparison is Singer’s: Singer 1993: 89-90. 
xv
 But when exactly? As part of the child’s fourth birthday celebrations? On going to primary school? 
Would a Singerian society have a ritual for an induction into personhood? 
xvi
 At least, the term “objective” is unfortunate if it implies, as I suspect it does in passages like the one 
from Strawson that I cite in the next Note, that there is something non-objective about participant 
reactive attitudes. 
xvii
 “We look with an objective eye on the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic or the tiresome 
behaviour of a very young child, thinking in terms of treatment or training. But we sometimes look 
with something like the same eye on the behaviour of the normal and the mature. We have this resource 
[the objective attitude] and can sometimes use it. Being human we cannot, in the normal case, do this 
for very long, or altogether. But what is above all interesting is the tension there is, in us, between the 
participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is tempted to say: between our humanity and our 
intelligence. But to say this would be to distort both notions.” (Strawson 1962: 66-67, with omissions) 
xviii
 “One speaks and expresses emotions to and not simply at one’s cat. Nonetheless, although we of 
course discipline them, we don’t press claims against or hold our pets accountable in the same way we 
do with one another... Granted, when I look into my cat’s eyes, I can’t get over the feeling that he is 
looking also into mine in some personal way or shake the hope that he is seeing me in some way other 
that ‘the guy who feeds me’. But I find it utterly impossible to sustain the thought that he can 
imaginatively enter into my point of view or acknowledge me as a being with an independent 
perspective.” (Darwall 2006: 43)  
Pets are an interesting case of something like a “pretend” interpersonal relationship, if “pretend” is the 
right thing to call it. We know that, unlike infants, our cats will never become responsive in the way 
that persons do. That doesn’t stop us (or at least the dedicated pet-owners among us) from extending 
something interestingly like the constitutive prolepsis even to cats, hamsters, or stick-insects. Children, 
of course, do something similar with their dolls or other toys—and here “pretend” clearly is the right 
word. For a recent fashion to which similar comments apply see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26FOB-2DLove-t.html . (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for drawing this to my attention.) 
xix
 “Intrinsic” in the sense of “essential”, I mean; not in the sense of “non-relational”, obviously. 
xx
 Gaita 1991: 117: “An animal can suffer, but it cannot curse the day it was born. An animal can be 
afraid, but it cannot be ashamed of its fear and despite itself. An animal can be happy, but it cannot be 
joyous. An animal cannot give of its substance to certain pursuits and be admonished for doing so. One 
could go on almost indefinitely. The problems of life’s meaning cannot arise for an animal. Only a 
being for whom life can be problematic can have a spiritual life, and therefore have a soul.” 
xxi
 For more examples applying this argument see Hills 2010: 235-7. 
xxii
 So I say. In the case of trees, of course, there was at least one stern Victorian moralist who thought 
otherwise, namely W.E.Gladstone, whose hobby was chopping down trees. 
xxiii
 For this speculation deployed for a different purpose, cp. Kahane 2010. 
xxiv
 Cp. Gerald the gorilla in the well-known Not the Nine O’Clock News sketch: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MpbMm0433I 
xxv
 “Suppose that the experiments attempting to teach language to chimpanzees had been successful 
beyond their originators’ wildest dreams. The apes in question gained a complete mastery of English 
within a few years, were able to attend school and later university, and made many close friendships 
with human beings… in these imaginary circumstances it would plainly be absurd to claim that the 
apes lacked moral standing, or had a moral importance that was lower than our own.” (Carruthers 1992, 
Ch.3) 
xxvi
 Carruthers’ own view about animal rights is much closer to speciesism than to animal liberationism. 
He holds that there is an indirect argument, arising from contractualism, for granting all humans and no 
animals moral standing (for a brief exposition see his online paper “The animals issue” at 
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20Issue.pdf). Since I think it is 
obviously true that (non-human) animals do have moral standing in their own right, based roughly on 
the wrongness of causing unnecessary suffering, damage, and destruction, it seems I am closer to 
animal liberationism than Carruthers is. 
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xxvii
 Jeff McMahan (2005: 366) writes that his “moral individualism” gives us reason to deny that it is 
a grave misfortune for a human individual who is disabled to have limited cognitive capacities. After 
all, it is not a misfortune for an individual animal to have capacities of roughly the same level; and 
according to moral individualism, it is only the individual creatures that we should be considering. So 
either both the human and the animal are unfortunate, or neither is.  
This seems a very counter-intuitive consequence of “moral individualism”. Surely it matters how the 
creatures got into their states: at the very least, there must be a difference in fortune between a human 
individual who was born at a low cognitive level, and one who is at that level because of some 
horrendous accident? So far as I can see, McMahan must deny this. For presumably he thinks that my 
past stands to me as a relational characteristic, not an intrinsic one—and the whole point of “moral 
individualism” is that only “intrinsic characteristics” count morally. 
xxviii
 Bernard Williams’ delightfully mordant phrase: Williams 1985: 46. 
xxix
 The best presentation I know of the evidence for Aristotle’s blindness on the subject of pity is in 
Gaita 1991. 
xxx
 For more on this point see Chappell 2003, Grau 2010, Vlastos 1981. 
xxxi
 “It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious 
man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable 
wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was alive just as we 
were alive. All the organs of his body were working—bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself, nails 
growing, tissues forming—all toiling away in solemn foolery. His nails would still be growing when he 
stood on the drop, when he was falling through the air with a tenth of a second to live. His eyes saw the 
yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned—reasoned even 
about puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, hearing, feeling, 
understanding the same world; and in two minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone—one 
mind less, one world less.” (George Orwell, “A Hanging”, Adelphi Magazine August 1931) 
xxxii
 My thanks for their comments and encouragement to a large number of people, including Julia 
Annas, Alex Barber, Chris Belshaw, David Benatar, Peter Cave, Stephen Clark, John Cottingham, 
Christopher Coope, Christopher Grau, John Haldane, Rosalind Hursthouse, Tim Mulgan, David 
Oderberg, Tim O’Hagan, Charles Taliaferro, Chris Tollefsen, and Garrath Williams; an audience in 
Leeds at the Society for Applied Philosophy in 2009; and three anonymous referees for this journal.   
 1 
On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Abstract  
I examine the familiar criterial view of personhood, according to which the possession 
of personal properties such as self-consciousness, emotionality, sentience, and so 
forth is necessary and sufficient for the status of a person. I argue that this view 
confuses criteria for personhood with parts of an ideal of personhood. In normal 
cases, we have already identified a creature as a person before we start looking for it 
to manifest the personal properties, indeed this pre-identification is part of what 
makes it possible for us to see and interpret the creature as a person in the first place. 
And that pre-identification typically runs on biological lines. Except in some 
interesting special or science-fiction cases, some of which I discuss, it is human 
animals that we identify as persons. 
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On the very idea of criteria for personhood 
 
 
Meine Einstellung zu ihm ist eine Einstellung zur Seele. Ich habe nicht die Meinung, 
dass er eine Seele hat.  
My attitude towards him is an attitude towards thei soul. I am not of the opinion that 
he has a soul. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, II, p.152, tr. 
G.E.M.Anscombe) 
 
Love is conditioned by its object, but love also yields its object. (Gaita 1991: 122) 
 
 
1. Persons: humanism, speciesism, criterialism 
 
Any ethical outlook much like ours will take as central some primary moral 
constituency (PMC): some class of creatures who all alike, and all equally, share in 
the highest level of moral rights and privileges. Most philosophical ethicists use 
“person” to mean at least “member of the primary moral constituency” (whatever else 
they may also mean by “person”). In this paper, that is how I shall use the word too.ii  
 
So what makes any creature a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency? One view is what I shall call humanism:  
 
Humanism: Being human is sufficient for membership of the PMC. 
 
Humanism faces two very common objections. The first is that humanism is 
arbitrary discrimination, like racism, sexism, ageism; humanism, in Richard Ryder’s 
famous phrase, is speciesism. The second objection, which is really just the same idea 
taken a little deeper, says that humanism bases its demarcation of persons on a 
biological property which is morally insignificant. Membership of this or that 
species—just like membership of this or that race, gender, or age-group—is, we are 
told, a morally insignificant detail. It is not the kind of thing that we should expect 
any important moral distinction to be based on.  
 
In theory these objections could be put by anyone who rejected humanism. In 
practice they are usually put by proponents of another theory of personhood, which I 
shall call criterialism: 
 
Criterialism: Actual possession of the criterial properties is necessary and 
sufficient for membership of the PMC.iii 
 
 Here are four very well-known enunciations of criterialismiv: 
 
I propose to use “person”, in the sense of a rational and self-conscious being, 
to capture those elements of the popular sense of “human being” that are not 
covered by “member of the species Homo sapiens”. (Singer 1993: 87) 
 
 Persons are beings capable of valuing their own lives. (Harris 1985: 16-17) 
 
 3 
An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of 
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and 
believes that it is itself such an entity. (Tooley 1972: 82) 
 
[The six key markers of personhood are] (1) sentience... (2) emotionality... (3) 
reason... (4) the capacity to communicate... (5) self-awareness... (6) moral 
agency. (Warren 1997: 83-84)v   
 
As here represented, the criterial view is an all-purposevi view about what 
personhood is, and why it matters, which is undeniably simple (as I shall argue, much 
too simple). Despite this simplicity, it is obvious, when criterialism is stated as baldly 
as it is in these four statements, that it has radical implications. Most noticeably, it 
implies a sharp contraction of the circle of intuitive moral concern. If rationality is a 
necessary condition of counting as a person, a member of the primary moral 
constituency, then all children under a certain age will fail to count as persons. (This 
bullet is explicitly bitten by Tristan Engelhardt: “If being a person is to be [sic] a 
responsible agent, a bearer of rights and duties, children are not persons in a strict 
sense” (Engelhardt 1989: 120).) If self-consciousness is a necessary condition, then 
many mentally handicapped humans will fail to count as persons. If the capacity to 
communicate is a necessary condition, then Jean-Dominique Bauby, of The Diving 
Bell and the Butterfly fame, would have failed to count as a person after his 
catastrophic stroke—had he not worked out how to signal with his eyelid.vii (Can 
whether Bauby is still a person after his stroke really depend on contingencies about 
whether he can still communicate?) If persons necessarily have “the concept of a self 
as a continuing subject”, and believe that they are such selves, then David Hume, 
Derek Parfit, and most Buddhists are not persons.viii If you cannot be a person unless 
you are capable of valuing your own life, then you cannot be both a person and a 
committed nihilist about value (i.e. someone who finds himself compelled to believe 
that no such thing as value exists). If persons have to possess “emotionality”, then Mr 
Spock in Star Trek is not a person, and neither, perhaps, are some extreme autistics.ix 
And so on. Criterialists can make personhood sound rather exclusive; it can seem as 
hard to qualify for personhood as it is to make membership of the Country Club. 
 
Of course, these problems are consequences of taking these “markers of 
personhood” as indicators of necessary conditions for personhood. A less extreme 
version of the criterial view might take each of the markers on some list, or some or 
other combination of the markers, as a sufficient condition of personhood: any 
creature that displays just one of these properties, or some large-enough variety of 
them, will count as a person. We might then want to argue about what counts as 
displaying a property, or possessing a capacity. Must I actually evince emotions to 
pass Warren’s emotionality test? How often, and how convincingly? Do I possess the 
capacity to communicate only when I have learned a language? Or just when I have 
learned to sign, or to get others to read my thoughts and feelings? Or do I have the 
capacity to communicate all along, just in virtue of being a member of a species that 
communicates, linguistically and in other ways?  
 
Here we touch on familiar and long-running debates about potentiality versus 
actuality in our assessments of personhood. It is commonplace for criterialists of 
Singer’s sort to point out that potential prime ministers obviously do not have the 
rights of actual prime ministers, so that “potential persons”x, or those with the 
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potential for what Don Marquis famously called “a future like ours”xi , can hardly be 
treated as the same moral category as actual persons, or “us”. It is equally 
commonplace for the opponents of Singer-style criterialism to object that there must 
be something wrong with an emphasis on actual properties that makes it a live 
question whether one is a person while asleep or under general anaesthetic.  
 
Clearly there are problems about at least some of the suggestions listed above 
about what the criteria of personhood might actually be. But not all those suggestions 
are implausible, and it would be easy enough, in principle, to weed out or refine the 
implausible ones. True, it is striking how little criterialists feel they need to do this; in 
practice, criterialists often seem perfectly happy to stick with what, intuitively, seem 
implausibly over-demanding criteria for personhood.  
 
However, the plausibility or otherwise of the various suggested criteria is not 
my main concern here. Obviously enough, other criteria could be devised which did 
not have these consequences. The key difficulties for criterialism that I want to 
emphasise in this paper are three.  
 
The first, which I can state very quickly, is about the argumentative method 
underlying criterialism. To put it at its simplest, it looks as if criterialists typically 
adopt their preferred criterion of moral significance because they think it explains 
moral intuitions which we have anyway. The criterion is adopted, in other words, 
because it doesn’t have counter-intuitive consequences.xii But then, the same criterion 
is deployed, by the very same authors—Peter Singer and John Harris, for example—
precisely to produce counter-intuitive consequences, such as the moral acceptability 
of killing small babies or the mentally disabled. There is, I think, a serious question as 
to what can possibly be going on here. It is not entirely obvious why building a moral 
theory out of one intuition or set of intuitions that we certainly have, and then using 
this theory to attack other intuitions that we also certainly have, is anything more than 
arbitrary selectiveness. Perhaps this is a question that all system-building moral theory 
faces. 
 
 The second difficulty for criterialism, which I shall also mention only very 
briefly, is that criterialism can seem to imply a quite implausible picture of moral 
reasoning. Are we really to suppose that what we do when we come across any being 
we haven’t met before is first see whether it satisfies our criterion for personhood, and 
then, if it does, start treating it as a person? One is reminded of that well-known 
caricature the Cartesian Detective: we start with the hypothesis—the opinion, as 
Wittgenstein says in my epigraph—that the new being is a person, and feel justified in 
acting in line with that hypothesis, just insofar as the behavioural evidence confirms 
it. If criterialism is to be at all plausible, it cannot in this way be a general view about 
our typical real-time interaction with others. Such a picture might apply to some very 
exceptional cases, some of which we will discuss in section 4b. But in general, 
criterialism will have to be a view about the criterion of rightness for taking other 
creatures to be persons, not about our decision procedure for assuming that they are 
persons. For quite obviously, our normal interaction with others typically involves no 
such Cartesian-Detective rigmarole, and it takes a good deal of philosophical 
callousing of the soul not to find something absurd, and morally repugnant too, about 
the idea that it even could. But if in general criterialism only states the criterion of 
rightness, and not our decision procedure, for taking other creatures to be persons, 
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then it still faces a further objection, my third—which it is the main purpose of this 
paper to develop. 
  
This third objection to criterialism, on which I shall spend the rest of this 
paper, is connected to this second point. My claim is that the sort of properties that 
criterialists home in on are not criteria of personhood at all. Rather, they are 
dimensions of interpretation of beings that we already take to be persons.  
 
For my own part, I have always been aware of at least a vague sense of 
discomfort and unease here, the moment we start talking about these (or any other) 
properties as if they were criteria for personhood of the sort the criterialists have in 
mind. There is a hard-to-articulate feeling that, despite the considerable first-blush 
plausibility of criterialism, it leaves out something crucial; a feeling of the kind that is 
naturally expressed in ordinary conversation by a trailing-off “Yes, but…”. I suspect 
that my unease is not unrelated to the unease that Raimond Gaita is bringing out when 
he writes (Gaita 1991: 115) that it is 
 
naïve to think that the kinds of properties which interest philosophers when 
they ask what is a person, and which we often share to some degree with 
higher animals, play the kind of role in our treatment of one another which is 
assumed by those who argue that differences in treatment must be justified by 
relevantly different properties of those kinds. That philosophical perspective 
from which we are encouraged to reassess our sense of how we might 
justifiably treat animals distorts and indeed cheapens our understanding of 
human life. 
 
Gaita 1991 is a marvellous exploration of one philosopher’s attempt to make 
articulate that trailing-off “Yes, but…”. This essay offers another philosopher’s. My 
attempt is not necessarily the same as Gaita’s, but not necessarily in competition with 
it either.  
 
And it is perhaps worth saying before I begin that what I am trying to do here, 
what Gaita was trying to do, is hard: hard to articulate, hard to state clearly, hard to 
see in the round, hard to apply. Again and again criterialism wins out in philosophers’ 
discussions of personhood because, conversely, it is dead easy; it is such a simple and 
straightforward view of personhood. There are plenty of spurious analogies between 
science and ethics around, but at any rate we can trust this one: no more in the case of 
the nature of the person than in the case of particle physics does the fact that a view is 
simple in any way improve its chances of being true.  
 
 
2. The proleptic view of personhood 
 
Contrary to what criterialism seems to suggest, we do not look for sentience or 
rationality or self-awareness in a creature as a test to decide whether or not that 
creature counts as a person. It’s the other way round. Having once decided, on other 
grounds, that a creature is a person, we know that this makes it the kind of creature 
which is likely to display sentience, rationality, self-awareness and the rest of the 
personal properties. Hence we look for displays of these properties from the creature. 
That is to say, we treat it as a person in advance of any such displays.xiii  
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The biggest and clearest example of this is an activity that is absolutely central 
to human life: parenting. Parents are, of course, aware of the differences in rationality, 
linguistic capacity, self-representing ability, and so forth between young human 
beings at various ages and developmental stages. Nonetheless, a parent’s attitude 
towards her child is always, basically, what Wittgenstein famously calls “an attitude 
towards a soul”. She does not do what criterialism (especially if understood in 
decision-procedure terms) might seem to imply she should do: start out by treating her 
child as an inanimate object, like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber-plant, and grudgingly 
consent to adjust her attitude to it, one little step at a time, only as and when it proves 
itself more than inanimate by passing a succession of behavioural tests for at least 
having interests like a snail’s perhaps,xiv and then later on for the interests of some 
more advanced kind of animal such as a puppy, and eventually for full criterialist 
personhood.xv If parents did treat their children in this almost behaviouristic fashion, 
the parents would be callous monsters, and the children would be basket-cases. In a 
world where parents generally accepted this sort of criterial view, and applied it 
directly in their parenting practice, even the best-adjusted of us would be a wolf-child. 
 
Fortunately, however, parents are not criterialists, either in their decision 
procedure or in the criterion of rightness for ascriptions of personhood that they 
actually employ. Rather, a parent treats her child from the very beginning—and from 
before it is literally and actually true—as a creature that can reason, respond, reflect, 
feel, laugh, think about itself as a person, think about others as persons too, and do 
everything else that persons characteristically do. From the beginning her attitudes 
towards the child are not only “objective” (to use Strawson 1962: 67’s slightly 
unfortunate termxvi): they also include what he famously calls “participant reactive 
attitudes”, of just the same sort as she adopts towards anyone else.  
 
Of course, as Strawson impliesxvii, these participant reactive attitudes’ scope 
may be more restricted in the case of a very small baby. The point is that they are 
there; and that like the baby—often indeed in advance of the baby—they grow. As 
Alasdair MacIntyre notes in a recent discussion of the development of practical 
reasoning in the individual person (1999: 90), ethically and psychologically adequate 
parenthood centrally involves “a systematic refusal to treat the child in a way that is 
proportionate to its qualities and aptitudes” (that is, its actual and non-idealised 
qualities and aptitudes, the kind of qualities and aptitudes that interest the criterialist). 
 
The parent who says to her three day old baby, “What do you think? Should 
we give you some more milk now?”, or to her three year old toddler “How kind of 
you to share your toys with your sister when she’s sad!”, is not deluded about a 
neonate’s capacity for interpersonal practical reasoning, or a toddler’s capacity for 
calculatedly empathetic altruism. But she is not making a sentimental joke either. She 
is treating the baby or the toddler proleptically, in the light of the ideal of personhood. 
By years of treating her children as creatures who “have the personal properties”—in 
the sense that interests the criterialist—she makes it true that they are creatures who 
have the personal properties in just that sense.  
 
The child staggers across and plonks a book down on his sibling’s lap; the 
parent’s reaction is “How kind of you to let her share your book!” Is that, in fact, what 
the toddler was doing? The right answer to this question can be: “Yes it is—once the 
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parent has given this reaction.” The parent’s reaction is an interpretation of the child’s 
deed. Before the reaction, perhaps, there was no fact of the matter about what the little 
boy was doing: the child did not know himself what his action was. For all he knew 
about it, his action might as well have been simply a random sequence of bodily 
movements. But now that his mother offers her interpretation, the child, on his 
mother’s authority, learns to see himself a certain way. Because his mother frames his 
act as one with a certain meaning (as the giving of a gift), and because the child sees 
his mother as seeing his act this way, and because his mother sees the child as seeing 
her as seeing his act this way… (Grice 1957), the act comes to have that meaning.  
 
Paul Grice’s famous work on meaning and intention is even more relevant to 
another clear example of this sort of prolepsis, namely language-learning. A baby 
begins by babbling—that is, by producing all the sounds the human mouthparts can 
make. Some of these sounds get a response because they are sounds that occur in the 
parents’ language, while others don’t because they are not. (The inability of many 
English adults to pronounce the Scots ch in loch or the Welsh ll in Llanfair is a learnt 
inability, not mirrored in English babies, who can and do make both sounds until 
conditioned not to by English adults.) The baby “homes in” on the sounds, and then 
on the patterns or combinations of sounds, that get a response. Then it learns to 
correlate particular patterns of sounds with particular contexts by the same homing-in 
process. What the parents say is “She’s learned to say ‘tiger’” (my own first child’s 
first word). What has happened is that the parents, by treating their daughter as if she 
has the word for, and then the concept of, a tiger, have made it true that she has that 
word. (And, a little later perhaps, that concept too; though I am not suggesting that 
any one word or concept can be learned on its own: in Wittgenstein’s familiar image, 
“light dawns gradually over the whole” (On Certainty 141).) 
 
Stephen Darwall too talks of prolepsis when describing a third connected 
process, namely the process whereby we come to be, and to hold others, morally 
responsible (Darwall 2006: 87-88):  
 
There seem to be many cases where we wish to hold others accountable 
though we seem to have very good evidence that they are not free to act on 
moral reasons in the way our practices of holding someone fully responsible 
seem to presuppose… In some instances, for example with children, we seem 
simultaneously to move on two tracks in the process of inducting them into 
full second-person responsibility, sometimes treating them proleptically as 
though they were apt for second-personal address as a way of developing 
moral competence while nonetheless realising… that [at their developmental 
stage] this is an illusion. 
 
Or an illusion, at any rate, if you agree with the criterialist about what it takes 
to be “apt for second-personal address”, and/or about what it takes to “have the 
personal properties”. My point, with which Darwall might or might not agree—I’m 
not sure—is that what it takes does not have to be already-realised and –actualised 
capacities of the sorts that interest criterialists. (The mother who asks her neonate 
child “Shall I give you some milk?” is certainly engaging in second-person address, 
despite the manifold incapacities, perfectly well-known to her, of neonates.)  
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There is at least this much truth in Dennett 1987’s well-known idea of the 
“intentional stance”: persons constitute each other as persons, both as agents and as 
patients, by treating each other as persons, as agents and patients. Something like the 
Davidsonian “principle of charity” (Davidson 1980) is at work in our mutual 
interpretations. By charitably, and proleptically, interpreting the other as a person, I 
make him a person. 
 
The looseness and ambiguity of the term “person” is evident when we say 
things like this. In ordinary language, “person” can certainly, at one end of its 
semantic range, mean something like what Singer and other criterialists want it to 
mean, a “rational and self-conscious being” (or whatever). Yet at the other end of its 
semantic range, the ordinary-language term can also be a synonym for “human 
animal”. It seems to be part of the point of our person-concept to allow those young 
humans who are persons only in the “human animal” sense to enter into a continuum 
of meaning towards the far end of which they can become persons in much stronger 
senses. 
 
Many things in our shared life can be seen in this sort of way as aspirations 
towards an ideal which, like any ideal, is never fully realised. The basic sort of 
idealisation, the sort that grounds attributions of personhood, is not the only sort. We 
ascribe the rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of speech to every human 
being, even though we know that small babies can’t speak and don’t assemble (not 
without help), and that acutely asocial loners may well never (or at least never again) 
actually exercise either right. The behaviour of parents, besides (as described) 
involving the person-constituting prolepsis in a particularly clear form, is also full of 
other similarly-patterned proleptic idealisations that might, on a criterialist’s view, be 
regarded as quite unrealistic. Parents give their children the opportunities to play the 
cello, to learn Spanish, to use their monthly allowances sensibly, to be polite to Great 
Aunt Maud (…), even though the parents may be fully aware that every one of these 
opportunities will in all probability be spurned. In minimally decent jurisdictions the 
treatment even of hardened criminals displays the same pattern of basic openness to 
the convict, however much of an unrealistic idealisation this openness may seem to 
involve: the jurisdiction goes on offering the criminals opportunities to reform, even 
though it is as good as certain that these opportunities will not be taken up. (I think 
that something like this refusal to “close the door” finally and irrevocably on the 
criminal is also, in connection perhaps with some thoughts about the state’s obligation 
to be fundamentally benevolent to the citizens for whose sake alone it after all exists, 
the ground of a good reason to reject capital punishment. But that’s another story.) 
 
In general, the idealisation that accords X the status due to a φer does not have 
to involve any kind of expectation that X will ever actually φ, or even can φ. What it 
does have to involve is the understanding that X is of a kind that characteristically 
includes φers. The human kind includes individuals who characteristically (at the 
right point in the human life-cycle) will freely assemble and speak. That is why it is 
not ridiculous to give the rights to free assembly, speech, and political action, e.g. 
becoming a senator, to any and every human, including asocial misanthropes, those 
(as yet, or as of recently) physically incapable of speech, and those who choose never 
to utter a word. Contrast the equine kind, which does not characteristically include 
any such individuals. That is why it is ridiculous to give these rights (or the status of a 
senator) to any horse.  
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Considered as a kind, children characteristically include individuals who learn 
the cello or Spanish or wise use of money or good manners to venerable relatives 
(well… eventually). That is why the parents who try to teach these lessons to their 
children are not acting absurdly even if they know in advance that this particular 
child is not going to respond—whereas parents who tried to teach these lessons to the 
family goldfish or the rubber plant would be acting absurdly. Similarly, there is 
nothing absurd about offering the old lag a place on the rehabilitation programme, 
even if it seems certain that this old lag will always refuse or abuse the offer: and the 
reason why not has to do with the general fact that some old lags do sometimes 
reform.  
 
A fortiori, there is nothing absurd about giving the rights of free speech, 
assembly, private choice and the rest of it to women, or to other races, or to 
homosexuals or transgender people, or to the disabled, or to gingers, or to the various 
other sorts of historically marginalised groups. People in these categories are not 
another kind, as horses and hamsters are. Their well-being is human well-being, just 
as white male heterosexuals’ is, and just as horses’ and hamsters’ well-being is not. 
That, in a nutshell, is why speciesism is not like racism or sexism. 
 
Clearly, then, this is not just a point about the induction of babies and very 
small children into the social life of humanity at large. All humans, even the healthy 
intelligent mature well-adjusted independent affluent adults that typical criterialism is 
so clearly focused on—the Country Club again—are always only incompletely and 
impurely agents. Incompletely, because we are never all agents can be. However well 
things go, we never do or even can reach the full potential of human well-being, 
which would include a fully worked-out articulation of our own agency, a full 
coordination and marshalling of our own forces and powers for action in the world: 
towards this we are always only, at best, on the way. And impurely, because each of 
us always can be interpreted, by a sufficiently determined sceptic, as not really an 
agent at all, but a victim of the instinctive or other determining external forces that 
constantly threaten anyone’s agency. To extend “an attitude towards a soul” towards 
anyone is always, and not just with children, an idealisation. As Tamar Schapiro notes 
within a Kantian framework (Schapiro 1999: 723): 
 
[T]here is a sense in which no one, regardless of age or maturity, is able to 
achieve autonomy on Kant’s view. This is because the notion of autonomy in 
Kant is an ideal concept which outstrips all possible realisations in experience. 
Strictly speaking, every instance of human willing is necessarily an imperfect 
realisation of transcendental freedom, and every virtuous character necessarily 
falls short of perfect virtue. And yet the applicability of the moral law depends 
on our mapping these ideal concepts onto ourselves and one another for the 
purposes of guiding action. So we are to regard the social world as a 
community of autonomous agents despite the fact that perfect realisations of 
autonomy are nowhere to be found. 
 
The criterialists are right to insist that properties like self-awareness, emotionality, 
rationality, and so forth are crucial parts of our concept of a person. It does not follow 
that these properties can be used as the criterialists want to use them: as tests for 
personhood. Even at the cool-hour level of the criterion of rightness—never mind the 
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real-time level of deliberative procedure—to treat someone as a person is not to put a 
tick in the box by her name, to show that she has passed some inspection or met some 
standard, of rationality or self-awareness or emotionality or whatever. Indeed, it 
seems no less arbitrary discrimination to say “Sorry, you’re not rational or self-aware 
or linguistically capable or emotionally responsive enough to count as a person” than 
to say “Sorry, you’re not white enough to count as a person”. Behavioural properties 
like rationality, self-awareness, emotionality are not tests for, but parts of the ideal of, 
personhood. To treat someone as a person is to engage with him as the kind of 
creature to which that ideal applies. So to treat him is not, at the deepest level, a 
response to his behaviour at all, but to his nature. To see some creature as a person is 
to take an attitude to that creature which, before any behavioural evidence comes in, is 
already different from our attitudes to creatures that (we think) aren’t persons. This is 
the second-person standpoint (to use the title of Darwall’s outstanding book): the 
attitude we take to persons, and do not take to sofas, fridges, or rubber plants.  
 
The fact that it takes charity, in more than one sense, to constitute persons 
imposes on persons a crucial sort of vulnerability and dependence: “The personal 
reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, and demand for, the 
manifestation of a certain degree of good will or regard on the part of other human 
beings towards ourselves” (Strawson 1962: 70). All human persons are, in Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s splendidly apt phrase, “dependent rational animals”, as MacIntyre 
himself emphasises (MacIntyre 1999: 81-85): 
 
In most moral philosophy the starting point is one that already presupposes the 
existence of mature independent practical reasoners whose social relationships 
are the relationships of the adult world. Childhood, if noticed at all, is a topic 
that receives only brief and incidental attention… To become an effective 
independent practical reasoner is an achievement, but it is always one to which 
others have made an essential contribution. The earliest of these relate directly 
to our animal existence, to what we share in our development with members of 
other intelligent species… [But what] we [also] need from others, if we are not 
only to exercise our initial animal capacities, but also to develop the capacities 
of independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary for 
fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own practical 
judgements… Acknowledgement of dependence is the key to independence.  
 
We are vulnerable to each other, and dependent on each other, because it is 
remarkably easy to attack persons by withdrawing the second-personal attitude from 
them. Part of the reason why it is so easy to stop seeing others as persons is, as I said 
before, because the interpersonal attitude always involves a degree of idealisation. 
There is always some truth in sceptical or cynical views that reject that idealisation. 
(For example, the human person is a physical object—even if it is not “merely” a 
physical object.) 
 
We fail to see others as persons in a small way when we explain away what 
others do, or refuse to listen to them or to take their wishes and ambitions seriously. 
(Parents are never perfect in charity; children’s protests against such treatment are a 
recurring theme of family life.) We do it in bigger ways when we “use” others, or (in 
Kant’s phrase) fail to treat them as “ends in themselves”. At the limit, we can 
withdraw the interpersonal attitude from others completely, by pretending that they 
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simply aren’t there, as British and Irish settlers did to the aboriginal Australians under 
their notorious legal doctrine of terra nullius (see Gaita 1998). Or we can do it by 
treating them merely as physical objects, as often happens in pornography, violence, 
and murder. Or, lastly, we can do it by declaring them “non-persons”, as the Nazis did 
to the Jews—and as criterialists routinely do to the very old, the very young, and the 
very disabled.  
 
 The personal properties, then, set the content of the ideal of personhood. They 
do not set the boundaries of the class of persons (the PMC, as I’ve also called it). 
What does set the boundaries? That is my question in section 3. My answer will be 
the humanist answer already advertised in section 1: roughly, the boundaries of the 
class of persons are the boundaries of the human species.  
 
 
3. The truth in speciesism 
 
Rubber plants, fridges, sofas, human babies: we come to the last of these four 
sorts of things with a very different attitude from our attitudes to the other three sorts. 
And my point is that we come to them with different attitudes. Our attitudes to them 
are not responses to evidence that we gather after we have “come to them”. The 
moment I meet a rubber plant or a fridge, I am perfectly sure, unless my sanity is in 
question, that it will not attempt to talk to me or tickle me—as, say, a baby might.  
 
What makes me so sure of that? Well, simply the sort of thing a rubber plant 
or a fridge is, and the kinds of behaviour that it is natural to expect from that sort of 
thing. Rubber plants and fridges are not the kind of thing that tries to talk to you or 
tickle you. Babies are. And if you ask “What kind of thing is that?”, the obvious 
answer is: “Young human beings”. If some creature is a human being, it is completely 
natural to expect it to be the kind of thing that might (at least if it’s a family member) 
try to talk to you, or tickle you, or otherwise demonstrate its (budding) mastery of the 
kinds of mental capacity that criterialists take to be criteria. (Talking to someone and 
tickling someone both require interesting interpersonal capabilities. To do either, you 
have to want things to be a certain way for someone else—roughly, you have to want 
to get them to think a thought, or to feel a tickle. These are wants with quite 
sophisticated contents.)  
 
This sort of expectation is based squarely on the nature of the creature in 
question. And that means, on its nature as a member of the human species. Our 
understanding of which creatures are persons, and so may be expected to exhibit the 
personal properties, is not formed on an individual basis but on the basis of 
generalisation from experience of humans in general. I have already mentioned 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “my attitude towards him is an attitude towards the soul”; 
on the same page of Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein also says that “the 
human body is the best picture of the human soul” (der menschliche Körper ist das 
beste Bild der menschlichen Seele). And perhaps what he means is this: that when we 
see that some creature is a human, just seeing that is enough to license us to adopt the 
interpersonal attitude to that creature.  
 
We know in advance how we can expect any particular rubber plant or fridge 
to behave, because we can draw on a bank of past experience (our own and others’) of 
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rubber plants and fridges. In this sense, the fact that a thing is a rubber plant or a 
fridge sets the scope of our expectations about it. In just the same way, we know what 
kinds of capacities and properties humans in general have. It is that background 
knowledge that we draw on, whenever we apply the interpersonal attitude to any 
individual human being, simply on the basis that it is a human being.  
 
We obviously do the same with other species of animals. When I meet a cat or 
a gerbil, I treat it neither as an inanimate object like a sofa or a fridge or a rubber 
plant, nor as a person. (Not, of course, that I treat all inanimate objects the same, 
either. Sofas, fridges, and rubber plants are very different things, especially rubber 
plants.) You can play games with a gerbil. With a dog or a cat, you can even have a 
cuddle (in the reciprocal sense, I mean).xviii Neither is possible with a fridge. On the 
other hand, you would be wrong to expect a dog to play a good hand of contract 
bridge, or a cat to give you good investment advice, or a gerbil to read your mind, as a 
human being might. What you expect of an individual dog or individual cat will be 
different from what you expect of an individual gerbil, and both will be different from 
your expectations of inanimate objects. In each case, your expectations will be set by 
your background knowledge of the different kinds in question. Where dogs, gerbils, 
cats, and indeed all other kinds of living thing are concerned, this obviously means the 
different species in question. Why should it be otherwise with humans? 
 
These remarks should enable us to see—pace the criterialists—how central it 
is, to our moral responses to the things and creatures around us, to assign them to 
species. It is species-assignments that enable us to answer what you might reasonably 
think is the most basic question of all about any thing that might be in front of us at 
any time: namely, what kind of thing it is. Until we know what species it is, we do not 
know how it may act, or how to treat it: what is good for it, how we might harm or 
hinder it, what counts as health for it, and so on. The nature of the creature determines 
what well-being is for it; and its nature is its species. To put it another way, the best 
way to answer “What is it?”, when this question is asked about any individual animal, 
is to give the name of its species. Or as we might ask moral individualists like 
McMahan: “If species-membership isn’t an intrinsic property, what is?” Singer, 
Rachels, and McMahan never tell us why being human cannot count as any creature’s 
“own particular characteristic”. It can’t be merely because being human is a group 
membership (as McMahan 2005 suggests). For there is nothing to stop a given 
property from being both a “group membership” and an “own particular 
characteristic”; that is how it is with being a vertebrate, for instance. To put it more 
formally, nothing stops a given property from being both a relational property, and 
also an intrinsic property.xix Indeed, if Kripke is right in his well-known thesis of the 
metaphysical necessity of origin, such properties must be very common. 
 
This shows how humanism can be true without falling prey to a charge of 
arbitrary speciesism. To treat any species of creatures as persons is to treat them, not 
as successful passers of some test for the personal qualities, but on the assumption 
that they are individuals of a species the ideal for which is (roughly) the highest 
attainable development of those qualities. In this sense, references to species are an 
ineliminable part of our talk about persons.  
 
In that sense, but not in some others. We are now in a position to respond to 
four familiar objections to “speciesism”. I consider these in section 4. The aim of my 
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response is not of course to defend speciesism, if that is defined as “arbitrary moral 
discrimination on the grounds of species”. But it is to defend humanism, the view that 
not all moral discrimination on the grounds of species is arbitrary. 
 
 
4. Four objections to speciesism  
 
a. All animals are equal. Peter Singer (1993: 57) writes that “No matter what 
the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering of any other being”. Nothing I have said so far commits 
me to rejecting this application of the principle of equality. If I were to accept it, I 
would want to add, first, that plenty of other things besides suffering “count”, and 
secondly, that however alike human and animal pain (the physical sensation) may be, 
human and animal suffering (the state of mind) are mostly quite unlike. A cat can be 
tortured like Gloucester, but it cannot suffer like King Lear.xx And suffering matters 
more than pain. 
 
But perhaps we should reject this application of equality anyway. Right now 
there is (quite likely) monstrous pain, and a fair amount of suffering too, on the plains 
of the Serengeti, where a wounded buffalo is being eaten alive by a pride of lions. 
Singer’s principle of equality requires us to say that our duty to prevent the buffalo’s 
pain and suffering in the teeth of the lions is directly proportional to the amount of 
pain and suffering involved. If any implication of any moral theory is absurd, this one 
is. There just isn’t any duty, not even a prima facie one, for us to act as Zoological 
Pain Police. (Don’t say: “We can’t intervene, because the lions might eat us”. Where 
is your moral courage? And don’t say: “But it causes less pain in nature overall if we 
don’t intervene in nature in this sort of way.” As many writers on the theological 
problem of evil are keen to remind us, most animal suffering is gratuitous. If lions can 
be caught and trained to jump through hoops, perhaps they can be caught and trained 
to kill their prey cleanly before eating it. So is anyone trying to train them? Of course 
they’re not.) The vast majority of the huge amount of animal pain and suffering that 
happens every day is simply none of our business. “It is not an accident or a limitation 
or a prejudice that we cannot care equally about all the suffering in the world: it is a 
condition of our existence and our sanity” (Williams 2006: 147).xxi  
 
So it looks like Singer’s principle that all suffering counts for the same, no 
matter what the species involved, is just false. On the other hand, some weaker 
principle of this general sort seems clearly true: perhaps “Animal suffering is bad for 
the same sort of reasons as human suffering is bad”, or something like that. What also 
seems clearly true is that humans should do what they can not to generate animal 
suffering, and to prevent animals from being needlessly hurt or damaged by humans 
(and sometimes, though less often, by accident or by each other). This is a much 
weaker principle than Singer’s equality-of-suffering principle. But perhaps even this 
is strong enough to generate a good argument for vegetarianism. I suspect it all 
depends what counts as needless hurt or harm. 
 
 Hence “the limit of sentience” is not “the only defensible boundary of 
concern for the interests of others” (Singer 1993: 58). Certainly that limit marks one 
distinction between the ways we should take an interest in the welfare of other 
creatures. For example, hacking a frog to pieces is wrong in a way that hacking an 
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orange to pieces is not, partly because an orange certainly cannot feel pain, and a frog 
pretty definitely can. But only partly. Quite aside from the pain involved, destroying a 
living creature for fun is wrong in a way that destroying a piece of fruit for fun is not. 
(Hacking trees, or anaesthetised frogs, to pieces for fun is usually wrong too.xxii) 
Unless we think that nothing matters except pain and pleasure—and this is not, e.g., 
Singer’s position either (Singer 1993: xi)—there is no reason to think that the 
distinction between sentience and non-sentience is the only fundamental moral 
distinction we can make among beings; nor that it is the most important.  
 
There are some interesting complications about the notion of sentience. If 
“sentience” means simply “capacity to feel (sensational) pain and pleasure”, then 
sentience does not fit the story that I have developed about how the personal 
properties come into being. The capacity to feel pain- and pleasure-sensations is 
certainly one of the capacities that we expect to find in any human person. But it is 
not, unlike rationality or intentionality, a capacity whose presence in any person is 
even partly constituted by others’ idealising assumption, expectation, or hope that it is 
there. Whether or not a being can feel pain does not depend on others’ adopting 
“participant attitudes” or taking the “intentional stance” towards him, in the way that 
(I have argued) his capacities for self-consciousness, rationality, and suffering do. I 
don’t think this shows that sentience is a counter-example to my thesis about how the 
person-constituting properties are developed. Rather, I think it shows that sentience is 
not one of the person-constituting properties. A creature which had the (other) person-
constituting properties, but lacked the capacity for pain- and pleasure-sensations, 
would still undeniably be a person.xxiii A creature which had the capacity for pain and 
pleasure, but lacked the (other) person-constituting properties, surely would not be. 
 
b. Aliens, talking chimps, Locke’s parrot, and a possessed fridge. The position that I 
am defending under the name of humanism says that, normally, to be a person it is 
sufficient to be a human being. Not necessary, because humanism does not imply that 
members of other species could not be drawn into the moral community of human 
persons. On the contrary, I can see at least three distinct ways in which this could 
happen. One is that we could discover a whole species—aliens, or angels, or what 
have you—which is like the human species in that its members are characteristically 
persons (in one sense or another). A second is that a species already known to us 
might, en masse, somehow change so as to become characteristically persons. Or, 
third, some particular individual creature—Locke’s parrot, say (Locke, Essay 2.27), 
or Washoe the chimp (Singer 1993: 111)xxiv, or some group of creatures, like Peter 
Carruthers’ Chimp Class of ’92xxv—might start to count as persons, perhaps e.g. by 
displaying the personal properties, even though this behaviour is otherwise 
completely untypical of the species in question. (Come to that, I suppose a possessed 
fridge might, in principle, start displaying the personal properties.)  
 
In these special cases, we perhaps will have to appeal to something like the 
criterial view of personhood as our decision procedure for the vexed cases. 
Apparently we will have to ask whether this alien species, or this new class of highly-
educated chimps, or this individual chimp, parrot, or spooky fridge, displays 
something like the criterialist’s personal properties, before we can decide whether to 
count these beings as persons.  
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Doesn’t this show that my arguments against criterialism were mistaken? Not 
at all. It does show that something like criterialism may perhaps be our decision 
procedure if and when we encounter a being that we do not already know how to 
classify as a person or not a person by way of its species. (Perhaps; actually I doubt 
even this much is true, but at any rate it is the most that is true.) However, it would be 
utterly misleading to generalise from thought-experiments about these special and rare 
cases—almost all of which, to date, are imaginary—to alleged conclusions about the 
normal cases. (It would be as misleading to do that as it would be generalise the 
justificatory/ rational structure of every belief we have about the external world from 
the justificatory/ rational structure of the external-world beliefs that we might form 
when we are thinking about the classic, and nearly always imaginary, sceptical 
predicaments.) Unfortunately, just this generalisation is a criterialist stock-in-trade. 
The most famous example of it is perhaps Mary Anne Warren’s derivation of the 
personal properties (her list was quoted in section 1) from an imagined meeting with 
aliens. But even if Warren is right that this is the decision procedure that we would 
have to adopt with aliens to settle whether they were persons in some extraordinary 
imaginary scenario, nothing at all follows about our beliefs (either at the decision-
procedure or at the criterion-of-rightness level) about whether any humans are persons 
in a multitude of ordinary real scenarios. For we have met humans before. 
 
But anyway, I suspect Warren’s description is much too black-and-white to 
get anywhere near characterising the decision procedure that would really be involved 
in such a meeting. (This is why I say, above, only that we would probably have to use 
something like the criterialist approach in alien encounters and similar.) For one thing, 
there is not the slightest reason to think that, in such a meeting, yes and no would be 
the only possible answers available to the question “Are these persons?”. Even Star 
Trek yields a rather subtler answer—“It’s life, Jim, but not as we know it”; the world, 
after all, is a complicated place, and it constantly throws us surprises. For another, our 
responses in such situations would be—or should I say will be?—based on all sorts of 
factors and reactions, most of them probably defying explicit articulation; on 
judgements about “forms of life”, in fact. It would not and could not be based on 
some neatly finite check-list of diagnostic properties like Warren’s. Looking beyond 
Star Trek, science fiction is full of wonderfully complex and subtle explorations of 
such encounters. The contrast with the mechanical simplicities of a criterialist list 
such as Warren suggests is instructive—and not entirely to be dismissed as unfair on 
the grounds that Warren is, after all, not writing science fiction. 
 
c. The two-species scenario. A third interesting objection to speciesism is 
offered by Peter Carruthers: 
 
Suppose it had been discovered that human beings in fact consist of two 
distinct species, otherwise hardly distinguishable from one another, the 
members of which cannot inter-breed. In these circumstances it would plainly 
be objectionable for the members of the majority species to attempt to 
withhold moral rights from the members of the minority, on the mere ground 
of difference of species. This, too, would be obvious speciesism. (Carruthers 
1992 Ch 3) 
 
Carruthers, I think, is quite right to claim that it would alter nothing morally 
speaking if we discovered that “the human species” was in fact two different 
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biological species—perhaps homo neanderthalis and homo sapiens—living together 
in a single moral community. (Modulo the point about not interbreeding, some 
anthropologists think that this has actually happened: Trinkaus and Shipman 1993.) 
Pace Carruthers, his argument does not show that that there is no species-
classification that bestows participation in the moral community on its members, and 
so that species-classifications are morally irrelevant. What his argument shows is that 
there may be more than one species-classification (or other kind-classification) that 
bestows participation in the primary moral constituency on its members. That is 
something that we should grant anyway given the possibility of other species whose 
members are characteristically persons; and it is not inconsistent with the claim that 
species-classifications are morally significant.xxvi 
 
d. Species and Darwinism. A fourth objection to my argument is the claim that 
species don’t exist: that as a matter of strict biology, there is no clear differentiation 
between humankind and “other species”, only a differentiation between different parts 
of the same evolutionary family tree. Species therefore are populations, not 
Aristotelian (or Kripkean) natural kinds (Sober 1994). True, but irrelevant to my 
argument, which can work equally well with the population conception of species, or 
indeed with any conception at all that will allow “humanity” to count as the name of a 
kind of some kind. At least for creatures like us, whose temporal experience runs only 
over decades, hardly ever over centuries even, let alone the millions of years that 
speciation takes, it should not be a controversial thought that a population of creatures 
sharing a common genetic heritage, physiology, and ethology can sensibly be treated 
as a unitary grouping, as in fact common sense treats it. And that thought is all I am 
committed to meaning by “species”. 
 
 So it looks like humanism can resist these four objections. And it looks like 
humanism can accept, indeed welcome, the thought that humans are not the only 
persons, the only members of the primary moral constituency—or at least, they might 
easily not be. What about the question on the other side: the question whether all 
human beings are persons? I turn to this question in the next and final section. 
 
 
5. Are all human beings persons?  
 
 Humanism as I have developed it here straightforwardly implies that all 
human beings are persons. Our treatment of any human being should be conditioned 
by the background of expectations, hopes, and aspirations that spell out what we 
know, from experience, humans in general can be. Eudaimonia in its broad outlines is 
the same for all human beings; and requires, as a general rule, that we must give all 
human beings the space to achieve eudaimonia—whether or not they predictably will 
achieve eudaimonia. To deny this space to any individual human being is to exclude 
that individual from the moral community of persons. And that is a serious 
injustice.xxvii 
 
The very young are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they have not yet achieved many key forms of human eudaimonia; the 
mentally handicapped are not excluded from the moral community of persons, just 
because they cannot ever achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. As I pointed 
out in section 1, all persons are incomplete and impure in their agency. No one ever 
 17 
does everything she could with her own nature (partly, of course, because there are 
just too many things she could do).  In one way or another, all of us are less than fully 
free to pursue happiness; everyone is wounded or damaged or limited or compulsive, 
or just plain ill, in some respect. That does not make it wrong to treat “normal” 
humans, whatever their age or IQ, with an interpretive charity, and with a kind of pity, 
that sees beyond their limitations, and leaves the door open, in each individual’s case, 
to what any human might become—even if we are well aware that this person here 
has no chance of becoming that.  
 
[T]he kind of care that was needed to make us what we have in fact become, 
independent practical reasoners, had to be, if it was to be effective, 
unconditional care for the human being as such, whatever the outcome. And 
this is the kind of care that we in turn now owe or will owe. Of the brain-
damaged, of those almost incapable of movement, of the autistic, of all such 
we have to say: This could have been us. (MacIntyre 1999: 100) 
 
There is the possibility of deep moral concern for retarded people, in which 
they are seen as having, however incomprehensible we may find it, a human 
fate, as much as anyone else’s…. Someone may be very touched by the 
response of a severely retarded person to music; and there may be in that being 
touched an imaginative sense of shared humanity. (Diamond 1991: 55) 
 
The terminally ill are not an exception to this rule either, just because they 
cannot any longer achieve many key forms of human eudaimonia. Perhaps it is true of 
them that they no longer have—to reuse Marquis’ phrase—“a future like ours”, and so 
will not achieve very much, or any, more eudaimonia before they die. Given that their 
futures have closed in on them in this radical way, you might call it “futile” to go on 
treating them with the full range of interpersonal hopes and expectations that you 
extend to any human, or to go on being as scrupulous about not killing them as you 
would be about anyone else. There again, you might also call it “respectful”; you 
might call it an expression of pity.  
 
To pity someone in the sense I have in mind is to think, as MacIntyre puts it, 
“this could have been us”: this person too is part of human life and shares in human 
ideals, even if the idea of realising them in almost any way is quite hopeless for him/ 
her. Such pity is a key part of our charity towards other people; of what is involved in 
recognising them as people, as fellow human beings.  
 
(It is interestingly not something that follows in any very clear way from an 
Aristotelian virtue ethics where the focus is, eudaimonistically, on maximal forms of 
flourishing—on how much you as a being can develop, not on how many relatively 
undeveloped beings you can extend charity towards. Indeed it is a notorious fact about 
Aristotle that there is something rather ruthlessly bright-eye-and-gleaming-coatxxviii 
about his conception of eudaimonia, and that—not unconnectedly—he seems to have 
had little room in his ethics for the notion of pity.xxix Pity is, however, part of the sorts 
of virtue ethics that we may find in a Christian writer like Simone Weil. And that is 
the sort that I would defend, though I cannot defend it here.)  
 
There are, as many people have emphasised, better and worse ways to die. 
And one of the worse ways to die is to have recognition of your humanity withdrawn 
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from you before it happens. Part of understanding why that is such a bad thing to have 
happen to you must, I think, depend on taking a different view from the criterialist’s 
about the locus of the value of persons. For the criterialist, apparently, the value of 
persons consists in their instantiating the person-constituting properties. Aside from 
such instantiations, persons, at the most basic level, have no value (compare the 
familiar view in bioethics that being alive in itself is neither good nor bad); indeed 
there is a sense in which, aside from such instantiations, there are no persons. What 
such a view of the value of persons obscures from view is the notion of loving an 
individual in itself; it seems to be only the properties of an individual that a consistent 
criterialist can love—and then, only when they are duly manifested. But the idea that 
the object of love is always and necessarily some property-instantiation, common 
though it is, is a dogma. If property-instantiations can be objects of love (we may 
fairly ask), why not things in other metaphysical categories: individual human beings, 
for example?xxx  
 
Alongside this dogma, perhaps there is another, related but slightly different, 
dogma at work in securing the foundations of criterialism. This is the dogma that 
whenever we answer the question “Why is X valuable?” by citing some valuable 
property V that X displays, what we must be really saying is always that it is (this 
instance of) V that is valuable, not X. But this too is a dogma, and unmasking it may 
be another way of setting ourselves free from the lures of criterialism. To cite V in 
explanation of the claim that X is valuable can, so to speak, be understood the other 
way around: you can take it that citing V is displaying a symptom, a reminder, of the 
value of X. When George Orwell, in a famous passage from his essay “A Hanging”, 
describes the growing fingernails and the refusal to walk through a puddle of the man 
who is about to be hanged, I take it that this latter thing is what he is doing.xxxi He is 
not saying that having growing fingernails is a value-giving property. Rather he is 
saying that being human is a value-giving property, the importance of which can be 
brought out for us by all sorts of exercises in the “assembling of reminders”—
including such reminders as the growth of fingernails. 
 
 “But all the same, isn’t there a profound difference between what we hope for 
in general for other people, and what we hope in the particular case of someone who 
is severely mentally handicapped?” There certainly is. There is always a distinction 
between the aspirations for other persons that are grounded in human eudaimonia in 
general, and the aspirations for specific other persons that are grounded in our 
particular knowledge of them as individuals. This distinction is just as applicable to 
the profoundly mentally handicapped as it is to anyone else. And it makes for the 
same commonalities, and the same differences, as with anyone else. If your friend is 
tone-deaf, there is no need to pretend that he will ever be Mozart; but that does not 
make it all right to take home all his CDs. If your friend loses both his legs in a skiing 
accident, you needn’t spend the rest of his life pretending to him that he can still ski; 
but you miss something vital, too, if you bounce into his hospital ward straight after 
his double amputation with the words “So, you won’t be wanting those ski-boots any 
more”. Many of the details of what counts as just and loving treatment of other 
persons are, certainly, set by the particular trajectories of their particular lives. But the 
most basic and elementary requirements of love and justice, is set by reference to the 
aspirations that arise from human eudaimonia in general. And this applies just as 
much to the mentally disabled as to anyone else.  
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In Nick Hornby’s very funny novel about suicidal depression, A Long Way 
Down, Maureen, the mother of a severely mentally disabled child, says this:  
 
This all began years ago, when I decided to decorate his bedroom. He was 
eight, and he still slept in a nursery—clowns on the curtains, bunny rabbits on 
the frieze round the wall, all the things I’d chosen when I was waiting for him 
and I didn’t know what he was. And it was all peeling away… and I hadn’t 
done anything about it because it made me think too much about all the things 
that weren’t happening to him, all the ways he wasn’t growing up. What was I 
going to replace the bunny rabbits with? He was eight, so perhaps trains and 
rocket ships and footballers were the right sort of thing for him—but of 
course, he didn’t know what any of those things were… But there again, he 
didn’t know what the rabbits were either, or the clowns. So what was I 
supposed to do? Everything was pretending, wasn’t it? The only thing I could 
do that wasn’t make-believe was paint the walls white, get a plain pair of 
curtains. That would be a way of [saying] that I knew he was a vegetable, a 
cabbage, and I wasn’t trying to hide it. But then, where does it stop? Does that 
mean you can never buy him a T-shirt with a word on it, or a picture, because 
he’ll never read, and he can’t make sense of pictures? And who knows 
whether he even gets anything out of colours, or patterns? And it goes without 
saying that talking to him is ridiculous, and smiling at him, and kissing him on 
the head. Everything I do is pretending, so why not pretend properly?  
In the end, I went for trains on the curtains, and your man from Star Wars on 
the lampshade. And soon after that, I started buying comics every now and 
then, just to see what a lad of his age might be reading and thinking about. 
And we started watching the Saturday morning television together, so I 
learned a little bit about pop singers he might like… thinking about these 
things helped me to see Matty, in a strange sort of way… I made up a son. 
(Nick Hornby, A Long Way Down, pp.118-9) 
 
Of course there is—as Maureen herself recognises—something delusional, 
and something pathetic, in her treatment of Matty.  For sure, her attitude to him is 
strained and exaggerated. But what we should not lose sight of is that it is a strained 
and exaggerated version of something morally indispensable: the kind of interpretive 
charity, the humanistic understanding and pity, that, I have argued here, we all need 
from everybody else all the time. In the words of an older writer: “Charity bears all 
things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.”xxxii  
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Notes 
                                                 
i
 Anscombe mistranslates zur Seele as “to a soul”; I have corrected this to “to the soul”. 
ii
 Perhaps we could do ethics entirely or almost entirely without using the word or concept “person”: so 
numerous philosophers have at times suggested, including Jenny Teichman (1996), Bernard Williams 
(2006a), Christopher Coope (2006), and myself (I have at least had this thought; I can’t now remember 
if it has ever seen the light of published day; something close to that thought is certainly at work in 
Chappell 1998, Chapter 4). However, I don’t pursue that idea here. 
iii
 Criterialism, as I call it, is pretty much the same view as what McMahan 2005, following Rachels 
1990, calls “moral individualism”. This is the view (Rachels 1990: 173) that “how an individual may 
be treated is determined, not by considering his group memberships, but by considering his own 
particular characteristics”.  
iv
 Or something very close to criterialism. I need not commit myself yet on whether these authors are 
defending necessary-and-sufficient-conditions versions of a criterial view. 
v
 Something like the criterial view pops up in many other places. For instance, it seems to be behind 
Olson 2007’s suggestion that “person” is a phase sortal: “Being a person may be only a temporary 
property of you, like being a philosopher”.  
vi
 It might be suggested that (some instance of) Criterialism is a bespoke view of personhood, aimed 
only at defining what persons are for some specific purpose. Such a position is perfectly possible, of 
course, but I think it is very clearly not what is at issue in discussions like the four I cite here, all of 
which are aimed at completely general conclusions about “what persons are”: what they are in their 
essence, and for any possible purpose. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for discussion of this point.)  
vii
 For more on personhood and language, see Patterson and Gordon 1993.  
viii
 David Hume: “For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble 
on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the 
perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible 
of myself, and may truly be said not to exist” (Treatise 1.6.3). Derek Parfit: “We could give a complete 
description of reality without claiming that persons exist” (Parfit 1984: 212). The Buddha: “There 
exists no individual, it is only a conventional name given to a set of elements” (quoted in Parfit 1984: 
502).  
ix
 Autism involves very various sorts of emotional dysfunction. It can involve over-emotionality and 
“inappropriate” emotional responses as well as a lack of emotional response. But that just underlines 
the absurdity of using “emotionality” as a necessary condition of personhood. For then autistics who 
are over-emotional will count as persons, autistics who are “cold” and “withdrawn” won’t. 
x
 There is a surprising contrast between some recent philosophers’ willingness to grant moral standing 
to “potential persons” in the sense of metaphysically possible future human beings who admittedly do 
not exist right now, and their reluctance to do so to “potential persons” in the sense of young human 
beings who admittedly do exist right now.   
xi
 “The wrongness of killing us is understood in terms of what killing does to us. Killing us imposes on 
us the misfortune of premature death. That misfortune underlies the wrongness... The misfortune of 
premature death consists in the loss to us of the future goods of consciousness... What makes my future 
valuable to me are those aspects of my future that I will (or would) value when I will (or would) 
experience them... What makes killing us wrong, in general, is that it deprives us of a future of value. 
Thus, killing someone is wrong, in general, when it deprives her of a future like ours.” (Marquis 1997: 
95-96) 
xii
 And it is nearly always the criterion, i.e. some one criterion, that we are talking about. (Warren’s list 
of six criteria is the only exception to this monism that I can think of.) The suspicion that the value of 
persons might be multiform not monistic, that there might be not just one simple and readily-articulable 
reason for valuing persons but all sorts of reasons, some of them far from simple or easy to put into 
words, is not at all a characteristic suspicion for criterialists.  
xiii
 About the argument that I develop from this point on, about “how we treat” people, it is natural to 
ask: are these descriptive or normative claims? The answer to that, as quite often with Wittgensteinians 
like (I suppose) me, is: a bit of both. What is on offer is a phenomenology of (part of) the moral life. 
My claim is that the most basic and fundamental truths about this phenomenology makes certain 
options in thinking about ethics that might seem attractive and viable, such as criterialism, actually 
incoherent, because of its mismatch with what is basic and fundamental. Because of how things are, 
there are some things we shouldn’t think or do: both a normative and a descriptive thesis. 
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Another worry that might occur to some here: am I attacking criterialism because it is a theory of 
personhood? If so, isn’t it hypocritical of me to go on to develop what is really just another theory of 
personhood? The answers are No and No. I’m not attacking criterialism because it’s a theory, but 
because it’s a rotten theory. A good theory (or if you dislike that word, a good philosophical account) 
of personhood will make good sense of our intuitions; this criterialism signally fails to do.  
(My thanks to anonymous referees for pressing these questions.) 
xiv
 The charming comparison is Singer’s: Singer 1993: 89-90. 
xv
 But when exactly? As part of the child’s fourth birthday celebrations? On going to primary school? 
Would a Singerian society have a ritual for an induction into personhood? 
xvi
 At least, the term “objective” is unfortunate if it implies, as I suspect it does in passages like the one 
from Strawson that I cite in the next Note, that there is something non-objective about participant 
reactive attitudes. 
xvii
 “We look with an objective eye on the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic or the tiresome 
behaviour of a very young child, thinking in terms of treatment or training. But we sometimes look 
with something like the same eye on the behaviour of the normal and the mature. We have this resource 
[the objective attitude] and can sometimes use it. Being human we cannot, in the normal case, do this 
for very long, or altogether. But what is above all interesting is the tension there is, in us, between the 
participant attitude and the objective attitude. One is tempted to say: between our humanity and our 
intelligence. But to say this would be to distort both notions.” (Strawson 1962: 66-67, with omissions) 
xviii
 “One speaks and expresses emotions to and not simply at one’s cat. Nonetheless, although we of 
course discipline them, we don’t press claims against or hold our pets accountable in the same way we 
do with one another... Granted, when I look into my cat’s eyes, I can’t get over the feeling that he is 
looking also into mine in some personal way or shake the hope that he is seeing me in some way other 
that ‘the guy who feeds me’. But I find it utterly impossible to sustain the thought that he can 
imaginatively enter into my point of view or acknowledge me as a being with an independent 
perspective.” (Darwall 2006: 43)  
Pets are an interesting case of something like a “pretend” interpersonal relationship, if “pretend” is the 
right thing to call it. We know that, unlike infants, our cats will never become responsive in the way 
that persons do. That doesn’t stop us (or at least the dedicated pet-owners among us) from extending 
something interestingly like the constitutive prolepsis even to cats, hamsters, or stick-insects. Children, 
of course, do something similar with their dolls or other toys—and here “pretend” clearly is the right 
word. For a recent fashion to which similar comments apply see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/magazine/26FOB-2DLove-t.html . (Thanks to an anonymous 
referee for drawing this to my attention.) 
xix
 “Intrinsic” in the sense of “essential”, I mean; not in the sense of “non-relational”, obviously. 
xx
 Gaita 1991: 117: “An animal can suffer, but it cannot curse the day it was born. An animal can be 
afraid, but it cannot be ashamed of its fear and despite itself. An animal can be happy, but it cannot be 
joyous. An animal cannot give of its substance to certain pursuits and be admonished for doing so. One 
could go on almost indefinitely. The problems of life’s meaning cannot arise for an animal. Only a 
being for whom life can be problematic can have a spiritual life, and therefore have a soul.” 
xxi
 For more examples applying this argument see Hills 2010: 235-7. 
xxii
 So I say. In the case of trees, of course, there was at least one stern Victorian moralist who thought 
otherwise, namely W.E.Gladstone, whose hobby was chopping down trees. 
xxiii
 For this speculation deployed for a different purpose, cp. Kahane 2010. 
xxiv
 Cp. Gerald the gorilla in the well-known Not the Nine O’Clock News sketch: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_MpbMm0433I 
xxv
 “Suppose that the experiments attempting to teach language to chimpanzees had been successful 
beyond their originators’ wildest dreams. The apes in question gained a complete mastery of English 
within a few years, were able to attend school and later university, and made many close friendships 
with human beings… in these imaginary circumstances it would plainly be absurd to claim that the 
apes lacked moral standing, or had a moral importance that was lower than our own.” (Carruthers 1992, 
Ch.3) 
xxvi
 Carruthers’ own view about animal rights is much closer to speciesism than to animal liberationism. 
He holds that there is an indirect argument, arising from contractualism, for granting all humans and no 
animals moral standing (for a brief exposition see his online paper “The animals issue” at 
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/The%20Animals%20Issue.pdf). Since I think it is 
obviously true that (non-human) animals do have moral standing in their own right, based roughly on 
the wrongness of causing unnecessary suffering, damage, and destruction, it seems I am closer to 
animal liberationism than Carruthers is. 
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xxvii
 Jeff McMahan (2005: 366) writes that his “moral individualism” gives us reason to deny that it is 
a grave misfortune for a human individual who is disabled to have limited cognitive capacities. After 
all, it is not a misfortune for an individual animal to have capacities of roughly the same level; and 
according to moral individualism, it is only the individual creatures that we should be considering. So 
either both the human and the animal are unfortunate, or neither is.  
This seems a very counter-intuitive consequence of “moral individualism”. Surely it matters how the 
creatures got into their states: at the very least, there must be a difference in fortune between a human 
individual who was born at a low cognitive level, and one who is at that level because of some 
horrendous accident? So far as I can see, McMahan must deny this. For presumably he thinks that my 
past stands to me as a relational characteristic, not an intrinsic one—and the whole point of “moral 
individualism” is that only “intrinsic characteristics” count morally. 
xxviii
 Bernard Williams’ delightfully mordant phrase: Williams 1985: 46. 
xxix
 The best presentation I know of the evidence for Aristotle’s blindness on the subject of pity is in 
Gaita 1991. 
xxx
 For more on this point see Chappell 2003, Grau 2010, Vlastos 1981. 
xxxi
 “It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to destroy a healthy, conscious 
man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable 
wrongness, of cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was alive just as we 
were alive. All the organs of his body were working—bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself, nails 
growing, tissues forming—all toiling away in solemn foolery. His nails would still be growing when he 
stood on the drop, when he was falling through the air with a tenth of a second to live. His eyes saw the 
yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned—reasoned even 
about puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together, seeing, hearing, feeling, 
understanding the same world; and in two minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone—one 
mind less, one world less.” (George Orwell, “A Hanging”, Adelphi Magazine August 1931) 
xxxii
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